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Preface 
The End Conscription Campaign (ECC) was a unique part of the anti-apartheid movement. 
Emerging from within the politically dominant white group itself, the ECC mounted opposition 
which threatened the apartheid state in an increasingly vulnerable area. 
While there is existing literature on the ECC, much of it emerged in the 1980s and had a highly 
proselytising tone, reflecting on the negative impact of militarisation on white society, and 
attempting to drum up support for the ECC. Other studies considered the ECC in the broad 
context of conscientious objection, or the anti-apartheid struggle, offering little insight into the 
peculiar challenges facing the organisation, or the particular opposition threat it posed. 
This study offers a contribution to understanding of the ECC by exploring new sources. Military 
commentators insisted that military manpower was not an issue during the 1980s. However, the 
Defence Force records currently open for research suggest that manpower was an issue of 
significant concern, particularly during the township uprisings of 1985 and 1986. 
Secondly, analysis of popular magazines demonstrates that escapism was an integral part of 
white culture in this period. This has significant implications for the ECC. Rather than countering a 
culture of militarism, much of its work lay in encouraging whites to acknowledge and articulate the 
pain and frustrations caused by conscription, which in turn encouraged calls for change. 
Thirdly, investigation of newspaper articles indicates the difficulty of anti-conscription opposition. 
White security fears remained a potent force, limiting the ability of the ECC to penetrate white 
society as a whole. The press offers a unique indication of where the ECC was successful in 
winning white support. 
Lastly, the ECC's use of popular culture was a highly significant aspect of its work. While much of 
the performance work is not part of the permanent historical record, the graphic legacy of the 
ECC has been preserved but has been analysed only partially to date. 
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Summary 
The apartheid state was vulnerable to the opposition of the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) on 
two fronts. From 1967 universal white male conscription was introduced, and progressively 
increased until 1984. This indicated the growing threat to the apartheid state from regional 
decolonisation which offered bases for the armed liberation movement. From 1977 a policy of 
"reformed apartheid" attempted to contain internal black opposition through socio-economic 
upliftment, but the failure of this containment intensified the need for military coercion. Minority 
conscription created an ongoing manpower challenge, which the ECC exacerbated by making the 
costs of conscription explicit, thus encouraging non-compliance and emigration. 
Secondly, the National Party used a security discourse to promote unity among whites, offsetting 
both its conscription demands and its decreased capacity to win white political support through 
socio-economic patronage. After the formation of the Conservative Party in 1982, the state faced 
conflicting demands for stability from the right, and for reform from the left. The ECC's opposition 
intensified these political differences, and challenged conscription on moral grounds, particularly 
the internal deployment of the SADF after 1984. 
Through its single-issue focus the ECC was able to sidestep divisions which plagued existing 
anti-apartheid opposition, uniting a variety of groups in national campaigns between 1984 and 
1988. Since it could not afford to accommodate the ECC's demands, and in view of growing white 
acceptance of aspects of the ECC's opposition, the state repressed the ECC to limit its public 
impact. 
By 1988 - in a climate of growing white discontent around the material and personal costs of 
conscription, economic decline, political instability and conscript deaths in Angola - the ECC's 
call for alternatives to military conscription encouraged a broader range of anti-conscription 
sentiment, prompting the state to ban it. 
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Chapter One 
The role of the South African 
Defence Force in perpetuating 
the apartheid state. 
2 
It is the overall contention of this thesis that the End Conscription Campaign {ECC) posed a unique oppositional 
challenge to the apartheid state between 1983 and 1988. This chapter will examine how the apartheid state became 
increasingly dependent on the South African Defence Force, which, in tum, relied heavily on conscripted white 
manpower, making the state vulnerable to a call to end conscription from within the white community. 
Initially there was little white opposition to conscription. The use of military power had been an integral part of the 
colonisation process in southern Africa, so that whites had a long history of advancing their values and interests by 
force. By the time South Africa was constituted in 1910, not only did whites uncritically assume their political right to 
rule the territory, they also regarded the protection of their own interests against competing claims from other groups 
within South Africa as part of the function of the defence apparatus of the state. 1 The Union Defence Force, created in 
1912, therefore limited the registration of soldiers, and hence the right to bear arms, to whites.2 However, because 
white numbers were low as a proportion of the total population, and because whites contributed significantly to the 
country's relatively small tax base, conscription was the only means to supply sufficient numbers of soldiers in times of 
crisis, while keeping the economy functioning. 
At a time when European countries were increasingly differentiating between the minimum force expected of police 
within the country and the maximum force deployed by the army against external enemies, in South Africa the white 
community thus classed all threats to its privilege as the legitimate targets of the state's security apparatus. 3 
Underlying whites' common demand for racially based privilege and security, however, were divisions along class, 
political, cultural, language and geographic lines, which the demands of conscription had the potential to exacerbate. 
Consequently, South African men participated on a voluntary basis in both World Wars, as the governments of the day 
chose not to confront the divisive potential of conscription for external wars.4 
When whites' exclusive political and preferential economic access to power was formalised in apartheid legislation 
after 1948, the need to protect white privilege by force intensified. Political exclusion and socio-economic restrictions 
helped focus black opposition in mass protests like the 1952 Defiance Campaign and built bridges between the 
African and Indian Congress movements. The apartheid state therefore reconstiMed the defence force to serve its 
1 In many ways the apartheid state merely foonalised existing segregation and racially based exclusion from economic and political power. As 
Beinart comments, current events were "situated in context of long-established historical patterns of violence·. W. Beinart, "Political and collective 
violence", Journal of Southern African studies. vol.18, no.3, 1992, p.456. 
2 This was despite the qualified franchise in the Cape and the request of coloureds to serve. S.B. Spies & B.J. liebenberg, South Africa in the 
twentieth century (Pretoria, J.L van Schait. 1993) p.57. 
3 Magistrates frequently received "reports of agitation and subversive activities" where white fears of black uprisings led whites to demand a greater 
supply of arms or the protection of the Union Defence Force. A. Seegers, The mijitarv in the making of South Africa (London, Taurus, 1996) pp.23, 
~&48. 
4 Spies & liebenberg, South Africa in the twentieth century. p.285. 
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growing containment needs. The Defence Act (Act 44 of 1957) established a South African Defence Force (SADF) 
comprising permanent force (PF), citizen force (CF) and commando components, as well as an officer, permanent 
force, citizen force and national reserve. 
Initial defence demands were light as the National Party (NP) built its power base. In 1957, for example, when the NP 
had less than 60 per cent of the vote, it relied primarily on the South African Police (SAP}, with the SADF only mandated 
to call-up 7 000 men and to train each intake over a three-month period, despite the provision of the Defence Act that all 
white males between the ages of 17 and 55 were liable for training and service. Similar1y, commando units were set up 
for short notice service, but until 1967 commando service was voluntary.5 Nevertheless, conscription was the point at 
which whites "paid" for the privileges of apartheid, setting up a critical contradiction within the apartheid state. On the 
one hand the NP was increasingly successful politically through its servicing of white needs, but on the other hand white 
privilege could only be maintained by the state making the unique demand on its white constituency that it contain the 
disgruntlement of the excluded majority by shouldering the primary defence burden. 
Conscription thus set up a cost:benefit ratio with political risks for the NP. The first major increase in conscripted 
manpower occurred in response to black protests following the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960, when the SADF 
intake was raised from 7 000 to 20 000 and the training period increased from three to nine months.6 Although white 
South Africa was badly frightened by Sharpeville, the state was able to regain control through a combination of force 
and repressive legislation, which progressively outlawed black opposition. After the banning of the African National 
Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC) in 1960, both movements calculated that they would have to 
counter the violence of the state with armed resistance, but here, too, the state was able to raise significantly the costs 
of opposition through legislation which made sabotage a capital offence.7 Increasingly punitive legislation and an 
expansion of the powers of the police meant that by 1964 the leadership of both the major opposition movements, the 
ANC and the PAC, was either imprisoned or in exile.8 The state's use of force in the early 1960s thus proved a highly 
successful containment strategy against internal opposition, while the state's heavy reliance on the SAP meant that 
the burden on the white electorate was not too heavy. An economic boom further allowed the state to absorb white 
5 Section 67 d the Defence Act alk1Ned the Minister d Defence to make up by ballot the difference between the men required and those who 
volunteered for service. Statutes of lhe Union cl South Afiica (Parow, Cape Tunes Ud, 1957) part 1, no.1-44, pp.528-556 & 586. 
6 Out of step: war resistance in South Africa (London, CllR, 1989) p.55. The Truth and Reconcifiation Commission of South Africa Report (IRC) 
~Cape Town, TRC, 1998) vol.4, p.246. 
Spies & liebenberg, South Africa in the twentieth century, pp.405-407. 
8 G. Cawthra, Brutal force: the apartheid war machine (London, COSAWR, 1986) p.16. 
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discontent through patronage, so that despite increased conscription demands the NP's parliamentary majority grew 
between 1961and1966.9 
However, from the mid 1960s South Africa faced new threats from a changing regional context as black self-
government began to replace colonial rule. Neighbouring Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland became independent, 
and wars of liberation broke out, beginning with Angola in 1961, follovved by Mozambique in 1964, and Zimbabwe and 
Namibia in 1966. Decolonisation increased the significance of the apartheid state's military capability because it ended 
the protective cordon sanitaire of white-ruled states which had limited the reach of the exiled ANC and PAC within 
South Africa. The 1975 independence of Angola and Mozambique, in particular, increased the likelihood of liberation 
movements setting up bases in these countries to mount "armed propaganda" operations into Namibia and South 
Africa. 
As black states achieved greater political and diplomatic influence they campaigned against apartheid. In 1963 the 
Organisation of African Unity was formed and by 1969 had developed the Lusaka Accord which committed 13 states 
in the region to support the international campaign to isolate South Africa, and called for support for regional armed 
struggles. As newly independent African states began to take their places in the United Nations (UN), they also 
encouraged South Africa's traditional western allies to oppose apartheid more actively, and South Africa found itself 
increasingly isolated internationally. By 1963 the UN imposed a non-mandatory arms embargo, following its 1962 call 
for economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, while the continued South African administration of 
Namibia also drew concerted international disapproval .10 
This combination of growing international isolation, decreasing diplomatic leverage, and the increased regional threat 
posed by decolonisation encouraged the apartheid state to strengthen its capacity for forceful containment. Defence 
expenditure rose from R44 million to R210 million between 1960 and 1964. By 1968 Armscor had been established to 
produce or procure the SADF's military requirements and within ten years the South African military machine had 
become one of the "most modem and effective" in sub-Saharan Africa.11 South Africa also began to seek alternative 
sources of essential resources like oil, and to stockpile against the possibility of further sanctions. 
9 The NP won 65 per cent c:J the seats in the 1961 election and 76 per cent in the 1966 election. T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: a modem history 
{4" ed.} (London, Macmilan, 1991) pp.564-565. 
0 The UN General Assembly declared South Africa's continued presence in Namibia illegal in 1966, and the International Court of Justice made an 
official ruling to this effect in 1971. Cawthra, Brutal force: the apartheid war machine. pp.13 & 19. 
11~p.16. 
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As South Africa was increasingly unable to influence the course of regional decolonisation through diplomatic 
channels, so it became more committed to military intervention, particularty to contain the opposition of the Namibian 
liberation group, the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), and to mould the course of Namibian 
independence to create a friendly buffer state. Similarly, its lack of diplomatic or economic leverage in Angola 
encouraged South Africa to use the SADF in 197 4 to attempt to manipulate the independence power struggle in 
Angola by backing the guerrilla group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola {UNITA). The failure 
of this initiative to install UNITA as a "friendly" black government merely increased the state's perception of the 
importance of a strong military capability, particularty in the context of the withdrawal of western powers from the 
region, growing international pressure for a settlement in Namibia, and the arrival of Cuban troops in Angola. 12 
However, the increased regional threat meant the apartheid state could no longer rely primarily on the SAP for 
security. By 1967 the apartheid state was forced to put into effect the provision of the 1957 Defence Act for universal 
white male conscription. In 1972 the SADF increased conscript training from nine to 12 months with a subsequent CF 
obligation of 19 days per year for five years in order to have sufficient manpower to contain the growing dissatisfaction 
in Namibia. In 1971, for example, 20 000 people went on strike and SWAPO attempted to make political capital out of 
this discontent by intensifying its attacks. By 1973 the SADF had replaced the SAP as occupying force in northern 
Namibia, and by 1975 it had taken overall responsibility for the counter-insurgency war, and conscripts now faced a 
three-month operational camp in Namibia as part of their national service. 13 
By the 1970s the apartheid state also saw a resurgence of internal black protest, fuelled by a new generation of 
leadership, the empowering ideas of Black Consciousness, and the anger generated by the oppression of apartheid 
policies. Beginning with the Durban strikes of 197211973, protest culminated in the Soweto riots of June 1976. While 
the security forces regained control, the import-dependent South African economy was hurt by capital flight and the 
threat of further sanctions implicit in the successful passage of a mandatory UN arms embargo in 1977. Future 
economic growth demanded a greater pool of consumers and skilled workers than current apartheid policies could 
provide, as well as conflict-resolution mechanisms. The riots also significantly strengthened South African liberation 
movements operating outside South Africa. The ANC, in particular, was boosted by growing international recognition 
and aid, as well as exiles seeking military training. 
12 By 1975 Britain and France unHaterally dissolved long-standing defence agreements with South Africa. Even the United States of America, which 
had initially supported attempts to avert a Marxist government in Angola, withdrew from the region by the end of 1975 and the senate passed the 
Clark Amendment, ending military assistance to groups like UNITA. R. Dreyer, Namibia and Southern Africa: regional dynamics of decolonisation 
1945-1990 (London. Kegan Paul, 1993) pp.78-79, 109. 
'
3 Out of steo, p.55. TRC. vol.3, p. 17. 
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This convergence of internal and external opposition to apartheid intensified the apartheid state's reliance on military 
solutions, leading to a further extension of conscription. In 1977 national service was effectively doubled, with the 
initial service period increased from one to two years, and the CF camp commitment increased from 19 days annually 
served over five years, to 30 days served over eight years. The SADF expected that a longer initial training period 
would triple the usefulness of units, cut down on transport costs and the operational dislocation which resulted from 
frequent changes of manpower, and thus decrease the burden on the economically active sector: the CF and the 
commandos.14 
Despite the extension of service, manpower remained a problem for the army. Effective numbers were back under the 
1976 figures by 1979,15 but operational commitments continued to increase with continuous occupation in Namibia,16 
induding 14 military bases along the Angolan border and the extension of de facto martial law as far south as 
Windhoek, as well as a situation of "escalating/de-escalating conflict intensity",17 which required flexible manpower 
resources to mount both counter-insurgency and conventional operations. The 1978 passage of UN resolution 435 
further increased the pressure for Namibian independence. In turn, this encouraged the apartheid state to put 
renewed emphasis on the military containment of SWAPO's liberation struggle in order to install a government friendly 
to South Africa, which could then be expected to block ANC incursions into South Africa. 
As the apartheid state was increasingly forced to rely on military containment, so this changed the conscription 
cost:benefit equation among the white electorate. CF commitments in particular meant economic and social disruption 
for whites. While the 1957 Defence Act prohibited employers from penalising employees facing national service, this 
was difficult to prove, and white unions began to complain that some potential employers were prejudiced against 
white candidates because of the disruption of their military commitments. Even when employers kept jobs open, they 
were not obliged to make up the difference in pay. In a period with rising inflation and a slowing economy, this could 
mean financial hardship for conscripts. Graduates serving their two years often found that while their professional 
14 Documentary Service Directorate of the South African National Defence Force (DSD) Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/1211, vol.4, box 45, report 
on the extension of the national service system 1977. 
15 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/1211, vol.5, box 46, memorandum on manpower 8 March 1979. Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6, 
101/5/1/B, box 394, statistics of those called up 14 August 1979. The navy and air force received four times as many applications as they could 
use but the armv continued to struaolewith mant><11•er orovision. 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
army 33000 37000 45280 51 010 41378 39604 
airforce - 316 1 521 2393 690 2569 
navy 701 986 1 014 1 217 1 247 2155 
medical 510 340 680 540 520 850 
total 34 211 38642 48495 55160 43 835 45178 
16 J. Barber & J. Barratt, South Africa's foreign policy: tile search for status and securitv 1945-1988 (Johannesburg, Southern Book Publishers, 
1990) p.313. 
17 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/1211, vot4, box 45, memorandum on manpower 8 March 1979. 
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organisations were prepared to recognise appropriate service, the SADF preferred to use them as military leaders 
than to utilise their professional skills. Business, too, complained about the impact of camps, while women's groups 
began to express concern at the impact of extended periods of military service on family life.18 
Elements within the white community began to demonstrate their dissatisfaction at the state's conscription demands 
by withholding their labour. Some responded by avoidance. Non-registration and non-reporting accounted for some 
3 904 and 4 622 men respectively in the 1980 intakes. Perhaps the most common form of resistance was not notifying 
the SADF of changes of address. Since the onus was on the SADF to prove a conscript had received his call-up 
before he could be prosecuted for not serving, this carried very little risk. There was also an increase of around 8 000 
exemption applications between 1974 and 1978, leading to a SADF directive that the Exemption Board tighten its 
conditions. School leavers applying for passports had to seek the authority of the SADF, those renouncing South 
African citizenship now had to provide documentary proof they were leaving, and the SADF uncovered a bribery scam 
designed to avoid service. Rising white emigration figures were further evidence of resistance to conscription. 19 
Heavier conscription demands also undermined the morale of those who continued to serve. Among serving men the 
SADF noted an increase in "welfare" cases, which included social, economic and psychological problems exhibited by 
troops. The nature of the conflict meant that counterinsurgency units in particular were continually in demand for 
camps, leading to complaints of unequal service. Moreover, manpower needs sometimes meant that units served 
three-month camps instead of the prescribed 30 days, but were still only credited with 30 days,20 as Defence Minister 
General Magnus Malan claimed that if full credit was given the effective troop strength would decrease so rapidly the 
SADF would be unable to undertake defence tasks.21 Numerous letters to the SADF identifying particular individuals 
or groups as avoiding service were thus not just evidence of personal vindictiveness and xenophobia, but also of a 
growing sense that national service was a burden, and anger when this was perceived to be unfairty shared.22 
18 DSD Ministly of Defence, group 4, 61/12/1, vol.5, box 46, Federation of Women's Institutes resolution 25 November 1977. Vol.6, box 46, 
memorandum for submission to Assacom Defence Liason Committee 18 May 1978, letter from General Magnus Malan to the South African 
Association of Municipal Workers 29 February 1980. Ministry of Defence, group 5, MV/V/61/1212, vol.45, box 215, numerous letters from various 
conscripts to the Minister of Defence requesting area-bound status for professional reasons, 3October1984, 2 November 1984. Vol.55, box 233 & 
vol.60, letters from conscripts, spouses and parents to the Minister of Defence complaining about the economic hardships caused by national 
service, 26 May 1983, 24 January 1984. J. Hanlon, Beggar vour neiahbours {London, CllR, 1986) p.54. 
19 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/12/1, vol.4, box 45, memorandum from the Minister of Defence on the tightening of conditions for 
exemption 29September1979. Vol.5, box 46, note regarding bribery charges 12 January 1979. Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/12/4, vol.31, box 
86, memorandum from the Exemption Board 4 March 1980. 
20 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/1211, vol.8, box 47, letter to Minister of Defence 3 March 1982. The author of this and other letters written W members of the public will not be named in this study as they were not writing to a public forum. 
2 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 6111211, vol.8, box 47, letterfrom the Minister of Defence to a member of the public who had complained about 
the burden m conscription 3 March 1982. 
22 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/1211, vol.4, box 45, letters exposed neighbours, family members, immigrants and various ethnic groups as 
failing to serve, see for example under 16 December 1976 and 3 August 1977. Ministry of Defence, group 5, MV/V/61/1214, vol.60, box 234, 
numerous letters to the Minister of Defence, often giving identity numbers or addresses, 13 February 1984, 18 April 1984. Vol.65, box 236, letter to 
Minister of Defence 10 March 1985. 
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Critics argued that the SADF should augment the PF. By 1980 the PF stood at 7.5 per cent of the total SADF, but 
despite attempts to increase it, numbers continued to decline through the 1980s. Similarly, the attempt to draw white 
women into non-combatant posts did not attract the required numbers.23 Manpower projections in 1980 thus indicated 
that further increases in white conscription would be necessary.24 The SADF explored the option of conscripting other 
race groups. The tricameral parliament, established in 1983, gave a segregated vote to coloureds and Indians, and at 
first the SADF hoped to use this to justify extending conscription to these groups too, potentially more than doubling 
the numbers available.25 However, the large-scale rejection of "reformed" apartheid by these communities,26 together 
with the costs of setting up additional training facilities, and long-standing white fears about arming blacks, made the 
extension of conscription beyond the white community impractical and politically risky. While a poor economic climate 
led some blacks, coloureds and Indians voluntarily to seek employment with the SADF, and blacks were absorbed into 
non-combatant roles in the Supporting Service Corps, these numbers also were not substantial enough to decrease 
the SADF's dependence on white conscription.27 Thus while a white critic suggested to the SADF that a "system 
offering wider involvement to the population as a whole seems to be more appropriate for a country whose very 
survival is threatened",28 only whites were benefiting sufficiently to be willing to defend the status quo. Most blacks 
continued to view the apartheid system, rather than the liberation movements, as the enemy.29 
The state's continued reliance on white conscription thus posed a threefold problem. It forced the state to make 
continuous manpower demands on the most educated and highly skilled group to the detriment of the economy. The 
limited size of the conscripted group was increasingly disproportionate to the growing threat it was expected to 
contain. The white group only made up 16.7 per cent30 of the total population of South Africa, and its numbers were 
23 P. Johnson & D. Martin, Destructive engagement (Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986) pp.177-8. DSD Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6 
102/12/B, vol.2, box 519, toewysing van NDPs 23 November 1982, despite a recruitment campaign intended to attract some 150 applicants, only 50 
women applied in 1983, and of these only 33 were suitable. 
24 DSO Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/12/2, vol. 7, box 47, SAOF projection of manpower needs October 1980. 
25 The 1981 attempt to reclassify Chinese as whites was a further attempt to expand the sman white group of conscripts. DSD Ministry of Defence, 
woup 4, 61/12/1, vol.8, box 47, secret memorandum "Plans for the preparation of the pubfic for changes in the law• 12 November 1982. 
Only 30.9 per cent of coloureds and 20.2 per cent of Indians supported the tricameral system in 1983. Spies & Liebenberg, South Africa in the 
twentieth century, p.479. 
27 White Paper on defence and armament supply (Cape Town, Government printer, 1977) pp.18 & 30. By 1977 only 1 185 of some 12 392 troops at 
South West Africa Command were black. DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/12/2, vol.8, box 47, memorandum regarding the accommodation of 
coloureds and Indians 31May1982. 
28 DSO Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/12/1, vol.4, box 45, letter to the Minister of Defence 28 September 1977. 
29 While the SADF liked to boast it had many more non-white applicants than it could accommodate, this was more a reflection on the 
accommodation than the numbers. In 1982, for example, 1 500 Indians and coloureds were being trained, while between 2 000 and 3 000 were 
applying. Commentatas also noted that black enlistment for the SAOF reflected a worsening economy rather than support for SAOF policies. DSD 
Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6, 102112/B, vol.2, box 519, vool1igling aan Minister 5November1982. 
30 Some official statistics put whites at some 19 per cent of the population, but the artificial exclusion of the "independent" horn elands skewed these 
statistics. W.F. Gutteridge (ed), South Africa from aoartheid to national unity, 1981-1994 (Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing, 1995) p.170. Davenport, 
South Africa: a modem history, p.370. 
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further undermined by emigration and a low white birth rate.31 Lastly, conscription demands created dissatisfaction 
among whites,32 threatening the white political cohesion which kept the NP in power. 
By 1977 it was clear to military manpower planners that the limits of white conscription had to be addressed. The 
apartheid state thus introduced a policy of "reformed" apartheid, designed to co-opt blacks through socio-economic 
upliftment, while containing white dissatisfaction through a threat-based analysis of the conflict, intended to build white 
cohesion by focusing white attention on the protection of a common self-interest. This strategy clearly indicated how 
the civilian state~s growing reliance on military coercion had led to the incorporation of the military into policy making. 
"Reformed" apartheid largely reflected the ideas of military counter-insurgency strategist Andre Beaufre who argued 
that in order to defeat a guerrilla movement the state must correctly identify the sources of discontent and undermine 
them with convincing reforms. He claimed that a formula which was 80 per cent political and 20 per cent military would 
shrink the popular support base of the guerrillas. The state thus had to mobilise all aspects of the power structure to 
win the hearts and minds of the population.33 
In presenting the 1977 Defence White Paper to parliament the Minister of Defence linked the idea that the SADF was 
"one of the most important guarantees for the security of all population groups in our country" to the necessity for "full 
and worthy opportunities" for all population groups, in the context of continued white "self-determination", which most 
whites understood as the perpetuation of white political domination. 34 The NP was also attempting to move beyond its 
predominantly Afrikaner support base by emphasising that "free enterprise and economic growth, not Afrikanerdom 
and racial hegemony, were at the core of the system to be defended" .35 Military power thus remained critical for 
influencing the regional balance of power and containing the ANC's ability to mount guerrilla attacks. However, 
through socio-economic reform the state hoped to co-opt blacks short of political accommodation and facilitate the 
growth of a stable black middle class, sharing the state's determination to fend off Marxism. "Reformed" apartheid thus 
recognised both the state's reiiance on the SADF and the limitations of the SADPs capability due to its largely 
conscripted white manpower base, and aimed to contain the contradiction of conscription by co-opting the black 
majority, thus in the long term lessening the state's reliance on the military, and hence its demands on white 
conscripts. 
31 The number who emigrated to avoid mifitary service is impossible to ascertain because young men without asset bases were not required to have 
an emigration allowance and consequently could leave without becoming official statistics. A. Greenblo, "Self-defence', F·inance Week, vol.32, 
no.9, 5 March 1987, p.434. 
32 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/12/1, vol.4, box 45, letter from Minister of Defence to Head of the Army 16 September 1977. 
33 S. Davis, Aoartheid's rebels (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987) p.159. 
34 White Paper on defence and armament supply 1977 p.3. 
35 L. Price, A documentation of the experiences of mifltary conscripts in the South African Defence Force (Durban, University of Natal, 1989) p.46. 
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Instead, the failure of co-option led to increased levels of protest in the black townships in the mid 1980s. Although 
the state attempted socio-economic upliftment, it did not have the resources to deflect growing levels of black 
discontent. Rather, economic factors "played a decisive role in fuelling discontent and its translation into organised 
resistance•.36 Reform also created new opportunities for the expression of black protest, through the establishment of 
trades union for instance. The state's problems were further exacerbated by the ANC's reactivation of its guerrilla 
campaign after 1979. As black protest increasingly focused on political exclusion, the apartheid state had no answer 
but to contain the growing protest militarily, and in September 1984 the SADF was deployed in black townships, in 
addition to its external containment role. 
The SADF's manpower difficulties were exacerbated by this dual deployment, while the burden on white conscripts 
intensified, increasing white political dissatisfaction. The state's attempted co-option of blacks had lessened its 
patronage among the white community. Race bars were lifted in the work place, for example. A conservative white 
breakaway resulted, formalised in the emergence of the Conservative Party (CP) in 1982. The state was thus caught 
between the demands of the international community, the parliamentary left and white business in South Africa that 
reform should be faster and more far-reaching, and those of the CP, which focused and encouraged the claims of the 
white right that the NP had lost control, and could no longer be relied upon to protect white interests. Not only was 
containment increasingly necessary in the face of failed co-option, it was also critical in order to limit the political threat 
from the white right. However, containment necessitated further extensions to conscription in 1982, 1983 and 1984, 
despite the risk of intensifying white dissatisfaction. The inherent contradiction of conscription was becoming 
increasingly clear. 
By 1984 state policy suggested that security concerns were taking precedence over diplomatic, political and economic 
gains, both reflecting the influence of the military, and indicating the apartheid state's decreasing options. From 1978 
the military had moved steadily from the position of policy advisors to becoming an integral part of the executive 
structures of ex-Defence Minister P.W.Botha's government. Executive authority was strengthened at the expense of 
traditional party instruments, while the State Security Council (SSC) emerged as the most important cabinet 
committee, co-ordinating the total strategic planning and policy-making of the state, which was then disseminated to 
regional and local levels of government through a system of Joint and Sub-Joint Management Centres (JMCs).37 The 
SSC was not accountable to the cabinet as other cabinet committees were. Its decisions were neither circulated nor 
36 K. Naidoo in S. Johnson (ed.), South Africa: no tumjoo back (London, MacmiDan, 1988) p.178. 
37 R. Griffiths, "The South African militaiy: the dilemmas of expanded influence in decision-making", Journal of Asian and African Studies, va.26, 
no.1-2, 1991, p.82. 
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subject to confirmation by the full cabinet.38 The state's heightened threat perception meant that the military were 
well represented in the SSC, while the definition of •strategic affairs" was significantly broadened, allowing the military 
to influence a wide range of domestic, regional and international issues, giving substance to analyst Kenneth Grundy's 
assertion in 1986 that the SADF ·is no longer simply an instrument for policy implementation. It is an active participant 
in policymaking".39 
It is not surprising, then, that military force became the primary strategy in regional relations. Significantly, five of the 
15 JMCs set up to facilitate implementation of SSC policies were aimed outside South Africa, to give force to the 1977 
amendment of the Defence Act which allowed for the deployment of troops outside South Africa's borders.40 While 
South Africa also used economic leverage to influence neighbours' policies, exploiting historical dependencies and its 
own strong infrastructure, communications network and energy production,41 the impact of this was heightened by 
military destabilisation which targeted Mozambican and Angolan ports and the Benguela railway, enforcing South 
Africa's dominance with regard to the region's exports and imports.42 
A military subtext also underlay the foreign policy initiatives of the early 1980s. While the official foreign policy line still 
addressed regional co-operation, the military established a "cordon of instability'',43 undermining the political and 
economic structures of the region. Overt raids in Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana, and the SADF's use of the 
surrogate force Renamo in Mozambique were further designed to intimidate these countries into refusing the ANC aid 
or access.44 
The 1984 Nkomati accord with Mozambique briefly regained some international diplomatic recognition for South 
Africa. Yet, when this was sabotaged by the open contempt of General P. van der Westhuizen, who encouraged 
continued military action in Mozambique, the apartheid state did not reprimand him, and later promoted him to 
Secretary of the SSC.45 Likewise, the capture of an SADF commando unit on a sabotage mission inside Angola after 
the 1984 Lusaka Agreement, which promised a South African withdrawal, was further evidence that the apartheid 
state valued security over diplomatic advantage. Until the mid 1980s international repercussions over these actions 
38 H. Giliomee, ·rhe mUitarisation of government policy in South Africa", Indicator, vol.1, no.2, 1983, pp.16-17. 
39 K. Grundy, Themilitarisatioo of South African DOlitics (London, Taurus, 1986) pp.1, 4, 5, 11. 
40 R. Davies & D. O'Meara, "Total strategy in Southern Africa", Journal of Southern African Studies, vol.11, no.2, 1985, p.194. Barber & Barratt, 
South Africa's foreign oo!icy. p.212. 
41 Hanlon, Beooar your neiahbours, p. 79. 
42 l.S.R. Msabaha & T.M. Shaw, Confrontation and liberation in Southern Africa: regional corrections after the Nkomati Accord (Boulder, Westview 
Press, 1987) p.182. 
43 Hanlon, Beggar your neighbours, p.32. 
44 The SADF anned and trained Renamo in Mozambique from 1980. S. Metz. "The Mozambique Natiooal Resistance and South African foreign 
policy", African Affairs. vol.85, no.341, 1986, p.494. G. Cawthra (ed.), War and resistance (London, Macmman, 1994) p.89. Msabaha & Shaw, 
Confrontation and liberation in Southern Africa, p. 76. 
45 Johnson & Martin, Destructive engaaem ent, p.39. 
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were limited because of the Cold War concerns of conservative governments in Britain and particular1y the United 
States of America (USA), which made them willing to accept that apartheid could be reformed.46 
This growing power and influence of the military came at a cost, however. Military containment in the regional context 
was manpower intensive, demanding a large-scale and long-term deployment of troops. In Angola UNITA required 
ongoing training and logistical support to face Cuban and Soviet-armed and trained Angolan government troops, while 
its political ambitions militated against a quick, devastating victory.47 Attempts to create political alternatives to 
SWAPO in Namibia failed in 1983 and again in 1988, so the SADF remained committed as an army of occupation 
there too. Attempts to conscript Namibians were largely thwarted by the low population, resistance, and a lack of 
instructors. Although the SADF used indigenous units in the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) and 
Angolan deserters in special units like Koevoet and 32 Battalion, the extent of its manpower requirements meant the 
SADF continued to rely heavily on its white conscripted forces for the bulk of its manpower provision. 
While the SADF described the development of a trained, efficient CF as the primary long-term goal of national service, 
providing the "backbone of the SADF., the deployment of this group created perhaps the greatest white 
dissatisfaction.48 Although the conscription load was supposed to be carried by the three separate sections, where 
insufficient national servicemen arrived for the initial intake, a double burden was placed on the economically active 
CF, and, to a lesser degree, the commandos. Although paper strength for a complete deployment in 1981 was 
168 000, rising to a projected 225 000 by 1990, the SADF still faced a relatively constant actual availability of 
some 27 000 national servicemen per year, after an exemption rate of between 30 and 45 per cent, while it faced low 
reporting figures of 50 per cent in the CF and 36 per cent in the commandos.49 Moreover, a complete deployment was 
a doomsday scenario, as it would devastate the economy.50 
46 The USA refused to actively condemn South African actions in Angola, like Operation Protea in 1981, because of the continued Soviet and Cuban 
g-esence. Barber & Barratt, South Africa's foreign policy, p.277. 
7 Metz, "The Mozambique National Resistance and South African foreign policy·, p.507. 
48 DSD Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6, 101/511, box 394, memorandum on manpower 6 November 1986, memorandum from the Minister of 
Defence regarding manpower 26 November 1986.10211218, box 519, a secret memorandum about troop strength from 17September1986 showed 
the national service component at 48 000, the conventionally trained citizen force at 70 000, the citizen force units trained in counter-insurgency 
at 41 000, and the commandos at 73 000 men. These statistics show the extent to which the SADF relied on ongoing service from men who had 
already completed their initial training. Ministry of Defence, group 5, MV/61/1211, vol.9, box 42, secret memorandum regarding manpower and 
complaints (undated). Letter of complaint from a businessman to the SADF 10 December 1982. MVN/61/1211, vol.11, box 209, report from milll:ary 
secretary Colonel Opperman 18 April 1984. 
49 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/1211, vol.5, box 46, memorandum on troop strength in the Orange Free State 8 March 1979. 61/1212, vol.7, 
box 47, letter from the Minister of Defence to the Secretary of the SSC October 1980, projection of manpower needs October 1980; vol.8, box 47, 
secret memorandum on troop strength (undated). 
50 W. Steenkamp, "The South African Defence Force·. Leadership, vol.2, no.4, pp.53-55, 60. DSO Chief of the SAOF, group 2, 101/7/1, box 1A, 
memorandum regarding problems in the commandos 20 June 1984. 
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Thus while the SADF's allocation of manpower resources, as a proportion of the total white population, rose from 
3.1 per cent in 1970 to 8.6 per cent by 1982, increased demands on the SADF, together with limited actual availability, 
necessitated further extensions of conscription.51 Given the political dangers of increasing the burden on the white 
community, this indicated both the intensity of the threat perceived by the apartheid state and its limited options for 
dealing with it. Defence Amendment Act 103 of 1982 nearly trebled camp commitments, from 240 days over eight 
years, to 720 days over 12 years, with further obligations in the commandos till age 55, and in the national reserve 
until age 65. The SADF took pains to prepare the ground for this new legislation, undertaking surveys of conscript 
opinions, and carefully designing propaganda to accompany the announcement of the changes, suggesting that the 
apartheid state was well aware of the potential political costs of these further demands on the small pool of white 
conscripts. SADF communications personnel were told to emphasise the intention of the new legislation to spread the 
burden more equitably, with credit for service now on a day-for-day basis and three-month camps being limited to 
alternate years.52 At the same time, the state stressed the threat to the white community, and the need to counter this 
militarily, encouraging continued white conscription compliance by emphasising the common white self-interest it was 
defending. 
As the apartheid state faced the growing political dangers and practical limitations of white conscription, so it became 
increasingly unwilling to tolerate the more public white opposition to conscription which developed after 1978. 
Although conscientious objector (CO) numbers were very small, CO generated considerable national and international 
publicity.53 Moreover, by January 1983, despite the SADF daiming to have cut its requirements "to the bonen, 
only 13 053 of the required 17 037 national servicemen (excluding graduates) arrived, suggesting that there were 
many who expressed their resistance through passive non-compliance, and could be further encouraged by a growing 
and vocal resistance movement. 54 
Defence Amendment Act 34 of 1983 was therefore intended to nip the developing objector movement in the bud, 
providing for CO on strictly religious grounds, while extending the period of such alternative service to an effective six 
51 DSD Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6, 101/511, box 394, the Minister of Defence was concerned about the impact on white public opinion, 
overseas investment and the South African economy of deploying reserves and even citizen force troops beyond their fourth cycle of 30 then 90 
day camps. In the fifth cycle the unit commander needed the authority of the Minister of Defence or Chief of the SADF to call up troops, while in the 
sixth cycle troops could only be called up on the direct orders of the Minister of Defence. Moreover, the period for which these troops could be used 
was limited, there were exemptions, a number were not G1K1 fit for active service, a number did not report, and so the paper strength was whittled 
down. Ministry of Defence. group 5, MVN/61/12/1, vol.12, box 210, confidential report "Voordrag aan die Minister op 5 Mei oor 
t>egrolingsdebatraangeleenthede". 
52 DSD Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6, 102112/B, vol.4, box 519, voorligting aan Minister 5 November 1982. 
53 CO as an ideological challenge to the state will be examined in detail in the next chapter. 
54 DSD Chief cl Staff Personnel, group 6, 102/12/B, vol.5, box 520, toekenning van Januarie 1983 NOP inname 2 February 1983. Ministry of 
Defence, .group 5, MV/61/12/1, vol.9, box 42, a secret memorandum on manpower parity (undated, but referring to a recent poll of immigrant 
leaders, so presumably before the 1984 amendment) noted that the growing incidence of draft dodging meant that approximately 12 000 citizen 
force members were having to be caHed up annually to fill the manpower gap. This suggests a much more extensive problem that the SADF ever 
publicly admitted. 
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years. Objection on any other grounds was punishable by six years in jail. By significantly increasing the costs of 
non-compliance, the state hoped to re-assert control over conscripts. In addition, the Non-Effective Unit was created 
to find defaulters and those who had slipped through administrative gaps, and members of the national reserve were 
required to take part in a nationwide registration of their current details.55 Once again, however, while greater 
administrative efficiency produced a registration of some 6 256 new members in commandos, and the future allocation 
of 11 654, paper strength did not correspond with reporting figures, which remained low.56 This suggested that 
conscription increasingly interfered with career and family commitments to the point that whites withheld service. 
By 1984 the state was forced to harness its last untapped source of white manpower.57 The South African Citizenship 
Amendment Act (Act 43 of 1984) gave automatic citizenship to white immigrants, making those under the age of 25 
liable for military service. Previously this group had not been conscripted as the state had feared losing skilled 
immigrants, but by 1984 manpower needs were more pressing. Although the SADF quoted its poll of immigrant 
leaders to demonstrate positive support for this measure, the fact that only 3.19 per cent of immigrants had voluntarily 
registered for national service indicated that there was not widespread support among the conscripted generation. 58 
Rather, the state had to resort to the threat of withdrawing permanent residence status to force compliance after 
1984.59 After exemptions, only between 3000 and 4000 immigrant servicemen were expected to report in 1985, but 
the SADF was hopeful that the immigrants could be utilised as a "bonus·, rather than a stopgap. In addition to easing 
manpower requirements, the drafting of immigrants was also intended to stop the continuous stream of discontent 
directed at the SADF as South African whites felt they were carrying an "unfair" burclen.60 
While the liberal newspaper the Star questioned this continuous expansion of the SADF, suggesting that drastic new 
immigrant measures were not justified in a country "not in a state of war",61 the ongoing allocation of resources to the 
SADF was symptomatic of the level of threat perceived by the apartheid state, and its reliance on a military 
containment of that threat. While its allocation of material resources is difficult to calculate, since SADF expenditure 
was hidden in the votes of other departments or in the Secret Services Account, which was not open for scrutiny, UN 
55 The state was also able to use its influence in major semi-state organisations like lscor, to ensure that this took place. Government Gazette, 
no.1182, 3June1983, p.14. 
56 In some areas this was running at between 35 and 60 percent. OSO Chief of the SAOF, group 2, 101/7/1, box 1A, memorandum about problems 
in the commandos 20 June 1984. Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6, 101/5/1/B, box 395, letter to the Minister of Defence from a national serviceman 
5 January 1982, the conscript complained to the minister that many of his peers were emigrating as they felt they would never be finished with their 
military commitments. 
57 By conscripting white women the state would have doubled its labour force, but the cost of duplicating facilities, as well as considerable 
resistance within the general white population, seem to have limited this avenue. 
58 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/1211, vol.5, box 46, memorandum from the Minister of Defence on the need for parity 6 January 1978. 
59 Grundy, The militarisation of South African politics, p.23. 
60 Once again firms preferred those without military commitments. DSO Chief of the SADF, group 2, 101/5/1/1, vol.1, box 1A, memorandum about 
the amendment to the Defence Act 14 September 1984. 
"' The Star 3 September 1982. 
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analysts estimated that real spending on security could be as much as 35 per cent of the total budget,62 while other 
analysts argued that defence expenditure had risen from one-fifth to one-quarter of state spending between 1980 and 
1986.63 Despite the enonnous allocation of resources to the SADF and the continuous extension of conscription 
demands, however, by the mid 1980s the convergence of internal and external opposition to apartheid rule exposed 
the limits of minority rule by force, while the ever-increasing conscription demands on whites exacerbated the potential 
for disaffection within the white community. 
Moreover, containment was no longer as successful as before. The creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 
1983 led to a wide affiliation of groupings helping to build and focus the growing opposition in the townships, while its 
grassroots organising structure lessened the impact of the arrest and detention of top leadership.64 Its community 
base enabled it to spread rapidly and mobilise widely, and required vast resources to quell. As the Deputy 
Commissioner in the Police Counter Insurgency Unit complained, "rural areas and small towns ... began to experience 
extensive political unrest, in some cases for the first time ever".65 Black anger further limited the state's co-option 
schemes by making collaboration a deadly choice, as township councillors became the targets of township violence. 
SADF coercion did not quell this anger; rather the SADF itself became a focus of discontent. The use of the SADF as 
a strikebreaking force, for example, encouraged further "unresf as organised labour linked security concerns to its 
demands, like the well-supported two-day general strike in 1984, calling for an end to the police and anny presence in 
the townships.66 As greater levels of force were needed to suppress protest, containment itself became a source of 
renewed resistance, providing black martyrs and "funerals-as-resistance".67 
Growing grassroots opposition in the townships further encouraged greater access and sanctuary for ANC cadres and 
provided more recruits to train. Although state propaganda insisted unrest was fermented by outside agitators, in fact 
the ANC was increasingly welcomed and incorporated into the black community. As the ANC was able to re-establish 
a presence within South Africa, it reinforced its status in the townships by linking guerrilla activities to popular 
grievances.68 While the Nkomati Accord cut guerrilla activity from 56 attacks in 1983 to 44 in 1984, attacks increased 
to 136 in 1985 and 168 in 1986. In 1987 the Minister of Law and Order refused to disclose statistics, but information 
gathered from press reports suggested they could have been as high as 566, indicating that the ANC was finding new 
62 Grundy, The militarisation of South African politics, pp.20-22. 
63 Davis, Apartheid's rebels, p.180. 
64 Barber & Barratt, South Africa's foreian policy, p.304. 
65 R.L Jackson (ed), Security: a national strategy (Johannesburg, Lex Patria, 1987) p.83. 
66 J. Cock, "A high price for freedom", Work in Progress, no.53, April-May 1988, p.20. 
67 Davis, Apartheid's rebels, p.90. 
68 J..biQ., p.155. W.James, The state of apartheid (Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987) pp.53 & 65-66. S.A. Barometer, vol.2, no.9, May 20 
1988, p.137. 
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points of refuge and support within South Africa itself.69 SADF containment thus became increasingly difficult. 
Township residents started erecting alternative structures, with street committees and people's courts replacing 
apartheid rule.7° Civic self-defence units resisted the incursions of the security forces, while rent, schools and 
consumer boycotts demonstrated the power of resistance. The ANC's call to make the country ungovernable seemed 
to have taken hold. 
Increased black resistance meant the apartheid state had little option but to continue to pump resources into regaining 
control militarily, but this ongoing dual deployment of the SADF stretched its manpower capacity to the limit. From 
1984 SADF records show a continuous refusal of requests for transfers and deferments due to manpower shortages 
across the board, a situation which continued into 1985 and 1986. While regional commands in the popular urban 
centres were overstaffed, fighting units were under-strength.71 
The necessity of deploying some 35 000 troops in over 97 townships required a significant reliance on the citizen 
force, so that by 1985 the state was forced to make a further conscription demand: that the length of township camps 
be doubled from 30 to 60 days.72 By August 1986 78 of the available 272 companies, including 13 national service 
companies, were still being deployed inside South Africa, while in September the SADF estimated its requirements at 
420 companies per year, nearly 50 per cent more than was available. It estimated that its citizen force and commando 
units were already maximally deployed and by June it had already deployed the January 1986 intake of national 
69 $.A.Barometer, vol.1, no.7, June 51987, p.101. Davis, Apartheid's rebels, pp.120-125, 145-146. 
70 nm .. p.oo. 
71 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/61/12/1, vol.11, box 209, whHe the Exemption Board was instructed on 30 October 1984 to be as 
accommodating as possible "in the current economic cUmate", by mid 1984 the SADF was refusing transfers on the grounds that units were 
shortstaffed in tenns of active troops. As the situation worsened with the continued deployment of troops in the townships so the Exemption Board 
was told to tighten its policy and a wide range of army divisions continued to refuse transfers. Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/61/12/2, vol.37, 
box 213, refusal by 2 SA Infantry Battalion (Walvisbaai) 30 March 1984. Vol.39, box 214, refusal by 4 SA Infantry Battalion 19 June 1984, 
Personnel Services Corps 15 June 1984. Vol 40, box 214, refusal by Western Province Command 2 July 1984. Vol.41, box 214, refusal by 
Southern Transvaal region 1 August 1984. Vol.42, box 215, refusal by 6 SA Infantry Battalion 6 September 1984. Vol.45, box 216, refusal by 
Regiment Bloemspruit 19 September 1984. Vol.45, box 216, refusal because of a shortage of tank personnel 29 November 1984, refusal by 10 
ArtiDery Brigade 29 November 1984. Vdi.47, box 216, refusal by 7 Divisie Mobilisasie Eenheid 13 February 1985. Vol.49, box 217, refusal by 
Northern SWA Command 11 April 1985. Vol.50, box 217, refusal by 3 SA Infantry Battalion 24 January 1985, notification of Komops personnel 
shortage. Vol.51, box 218, refusal by 5 SA Infantry Battalion 21 May 1985. Vol.52, box 218, refusal by Pantzerkorps 24 May 1985, 1 
Valskermbrigade 16 July 1985. Vol.52, box 218, notification of a critical shortage of artillery men 24 June 1985. Vol.55, box 219, refusal by 8 SA 
Infantry Battalion 4 September 1985. Vol.58, box 220, refusal of transfer because of the shortage of medical orderlies 17 January 1986, refusal by 
Armoured Division 6 December 1985. Vol.64, box 222, notification of a critical shortage of infantry personnel at Eastern Transvaal Command 26 
June 1986 and in the Eastern Cape 8July1986. Vol.65, box 222, even the navy, which was inundated with requests for transfers, was 30 per cent 
short of personnel by August 1986, and estimated that 17.3 per cent of its intake was "untraceable overseas• 20 August 1986. These shortages 
were not widely pubficised. Rather, from September 1984 refusals were couched in tenns of the costs of training the conscript. 
Chief of the SADF, grouo 2, 101/5/1/1, box 1A, oersonnel allocation 21 July 1983 
aHocated oriaina/IY reauested 
armv 25832 25272 
airforce 2400 3042 
navv 940 1100 
medical 1 550 1829 
snecial services - 579 
72 Out of step, p.55. DSD Chief of the SADF, group 2, 107/7/5, box 34C, letter from the Minister of Defence to the Chief of the SADF 13 May 1985. 
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servicemen.73 Leadership was also significantly understaffed.74 The SADF warned that this situation was not 
sustainable from an "operational, morale [or] economic viewpoint». At the same time SADF records pointed to 80 633 
non-effective members. Manpower planners argued that many of these were only absent on paper, and that of 
the 25 000 it had found, only 10 000 still had service owing. However, further calls from within the SADF for future 
extensions of national service to enable the SADF to meet the requirements of "present or future projected manpower 
needs" suggested a problem beyond administrative inefficiency. 75 
The state ultimately regained control by a two-fold strategy. Firstly, from July 1985 a series of states of emergency 
gave the security forces wide-ranging powers and indemnity, while allowing the state to arrest and detain its 
opponents indefinitely.76 Secondly, the state began to foster civil war between the UDF and conservative black 
elements77 such as lnkatha, the Zulu cultural organisation which was beginning to be mobilised more directly in 
political conflict. It also began to train homeland armies from 1986,78 and deployed some 16 000 "kitskonstables• and 
municipal policemen as a first line of defence in the townships and rural areas,79 as well as training 14 black 
companies with four coloured companies already serving in Namibia by 1986, and using blacks in a full-time capacity 
in commandos for border control.80 However, this strategy, too, had limits. While a 1980 SADF memorandum noted 
that 20 per cent of troops in the operational area were "non-white" and this was expected to increase with time, by 
1988 General Malan was forced to admit in parliament that no black volunteers had signed up in 1987.81 
Moreover, demand for rapid and far-reaching change had reached such a pitch in the outside wor1d that sympathetic 
conservative leaders in Britain and the USA were no longer able to block significant financial and economic 
sanctions,82 deepening South Africa's economic decline and the spiral of white discontent and black 
73 DSD Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6, 102112/B, box 519, secret memorandum about troop strength 17 September 1986. 101/5/1, box 394, 
memorandum on manpower 6 November 1986, memorandum from the Minister of Defence regarding manpower 26 November 1986. 
74 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/61/1211, vol.11, box 210, memorandum on the use of graduate national servicemen 14 June 1984. 
letter from the Minister of Defence to the Minister of Justice 19 September 1985. In September 1985 the Minister of Justice's request for law 
graduates to be seconded to his department was refused by General Matan on the grounds that the SADF faced a critical shortage of leadership so 
that graduates not used in their professional capacity were needed in other leadership positions. Chief of the SADF, group 2, 101/5/1/1, vol.1 box 
1A, request from Prison Service for national servicemen 16 May 1983, a similar request from the Prison Service was also turned down on the 
grounds that secondeering was a "sensitive issue' and the SADF needed graduates for leadership as the growing number of conscripts chosing to 
study first was depleting the leadership pool. 
75 DSD Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6, 102112/B, box 519, secret memorandum about troop strength 17 September 1986. 101/5/1, box 394, 
memorandum on manpower 6 November 1986, memorandum from the Minister of Defence regarding manpower 26 November 1986. 
76 Cawthra, War and resistance, p.10. 
77 Black police were trained in anti-terrorist techniques by the SAP and deployed in Namibia. TRC, vol 3, pp.17 & 22. 
78 Gutteridge, South Africa from aoartheid to national unity. p.216. 
79 J. lonsdale, South Africa in auestion (London, Heineman, 1988) p.69. J. Cock, Colonels and cadres (Cape Town, OUP, 1991) p.9. 
80 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/61/12/1, vol.12, box 210, manpower report 5 May 1986. Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6, 102112/B, box 
519, secret memorandum about troop strength 17 September 1986. 101/5/1, box 394, memorandum on manpower 6 November 1986, 
memorandum from the Minister of Defence regarding manpower 26 November 1986. Chief of Staff Personnel, group 6, 101/511/B, box 394, secret 
memorandum to bring the Minister of Defence up to date on the manpower position 17 September 1986. 
81 Week!v Mail 4 March 1988. DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/12/4, vol.31, box 86, ministerial enquiry regarding national service 4 March 
1980. 
82 Barber & Barratt, South Africa's foreign policy, p.323. 
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frustration.83 At the same time that the NP faced intensifying international pressure for reform, it lost eight seats in 
the 1987 election. As the CP took over as the official opposition the pressure from conservatives within the country 
increased.84 
Conscription exacerbated these growing white political divisions. Businesses continued to complain about the 
withdrawal of personnel, particularly when they felt these men had not been deployed on vital matters. Repeated 
heartfelt pleas came from parents and spouses for exemptions and transfers, suggesting that conscription was playing 
havoc with family life, studies and careers. \Mlile SADF personnel officers privately made unsympathetic 
recommendations that mothers "learn to live with it», and sarcastic comments about the number of mothers who 
developed nervous complaints during their sons' national service, the disruption of national service began to be 
evident in symptoms like a rising conscript suicide rate, and welfare requests from previously G1 K1 (fighting fit) 
troops, induding officers.85 
Internal SADF assessments attempted to personalise the problem, blaming particular soldiers for ·anti-social" 
tendencies, or asserting that problems arose from other "deviant• behaviours like drug usage or homosexuality. 86 
However, the continual disruption of national service, the brutalisation of army training and active duty, and alternating 
3 SA. - vol.1, no.15 Seotember 251987 o.234, 
liauidations insolvencies 
1983 2275 1 201 
1984 2675 1637 
1985 3 061 3 221 
1986 2741 4 248 
University of the Witwatersrand H1stoncal Papers, ECC collect1on, AG 1977, folder A 11.3. 1, the finaooal Journal, Econometri~ reported that in the 7 
~ears between 1981 and 1988 the tax burden on individuals, which particularly affected whites, had doubled. 
4 The CP now had 22 seats, while the PFP lost seven seats and the NP lost eight. Davenport, South Africa· a modern history, p.564. 
85 DSD Ministry of Defence group 4, 61/12/1, vol.4, box 45, manpower memorandum 31 January 1977. Ministry of Defence, group 5, MV/V/61/1212, 
vol.49, box 217, a 4 April 1985 memorandum from 2 SA Infantry Training Unit noted sourly that each of the five officers deployed there had 
developed welfare problems, which none of them had had before their December 1984 departure to the operational area. Ministry of Defence, 
group 5, MV 61/1212, vol.31, box 43, oorplasing en toewysing 12 January 1983 -15 March 1983, although only covering a three month period, this 
folder bulges with heartfelt pleas for husbands and sons to be closer to home for a variety of reasons. Ministry of Defence, group 5, MV/V/61/12/2, 
vol.37, box 213, report on transfers 30 March 1984. Vol.41, box 214, letter from conscript to the SADF 2July1984, this young man pleaded to be 
classified as area bound to prevent him losing his job. He asked plaintively if it was a good idea to "destroy a man's spirit for the future?' Vol.49, box 
217, report of increased welfare cases 4 April 1985. Vol.62, box 221, letter from a mother to the Minister of Defence 21 April 1986, like many others 
this mother assured the Minister that despite the request that he exempt her son, her family were loyal citizens with no conscientious objection to 
conscription. Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/61112/3, vol.81, box 224, SADF internal response to a mother's request for her son to be 
transferred closer to home 21 January 1984. Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/61/1212, vol.41, box 214, in a revealing series of correspondence, 
the mother of a conscript who had taken an overdose claimed in a letter to the SADF (14 May 1984) that the ·sadistic brutality of some of the 
corporals• and conscripts' powerlessness to bring this matter to the attention of anyone in command "completely destroys all motivation in decent 
young men·. The SAOF concept answer of 12 July 1984 attacked the conscript. "Your son, who is a self-confessed dagga-smoker ... • WhHe this 
concept answer was discarded, fears that the mother would go to the press led to the suggestion that it would be simpler to transfer the conscript to 
another unit, memorandum 23 June 1984. Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/61/1214, vol.64, box 236, letter to the SADF 22 January 1985, 
similarly, when a serviceman returning from the border warned the SADF that "More of our own troops are killed on the border by negligence and 
alcohol-related incidents than the enemy', the SADF response was to attack his integrity and to warn him not to •spread stories·. Group 5, 
MVN/61/12/2, vol.44, box 215, reports from Eastern Province and Natal Command respectively refusing further welfare cases as they were already 
overstaffed, 4 tember 1984, 30 October 1984. .A. r, vol.2, no.15, 12 Au ust 1988, suicide rate among servicemen: 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
suicides 11 25 37 24 24 
attem s 260 362 352 
In the general population the suicide rate was 1:10 000 but 6:10 000 among servicemen. 
86 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/12/4, vol.34, box 87, report of psychiatric examination of conscript 27 June 1980. Vol.36, box 88, letter from 
SADF regarding discharge of conscript 2 December 1980. Group 4, 61/12/4, vol.50, box 95, report of psychiatric examination of conscript 27 
October 1982. Vol.55, box 233, psychiatric evaluation of a conscript (undated). 
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periods of danger and boredom led to demoralisation among serving soldiers, and destructive behaviour including 
substance abuse, vehide and ammunition accidents, and suicide. Theft and sabotage increased as conscripts sought 
an outlet for their frustration and anger. Returning conscripts began to exhibit symptoms of stress too, such as 
alienation, the inability to readjust to civilian life, depression and difficulties in forming relationships. The divorce rate 
climbed, and the phenomenon of family murders emerged, which psychologists explained as resulting from despair or 
a sense of loss of control over events or the future.87 
As political and economic progress failed to materialise, growing numbers of young whites began to express their 
dissatisfaction by emigration. From 1987 the press began to document a growing "brain drain" as increasing numbers, 
of skilled graduates in particular, left the country. Some were politically motivated; more probably felt the personal and 
professional costs of remaining were too high. Thus while conscription emphasised the duty of the individual to serve 
the good of the group, for many whites the group benefits of continued white rule were being undermined by the 
personal costs. As a father wrote to the Minister of Defence as early as 1983, explaining his decision to send his son 
abroad, "I do not agree with the politicians playing political games, whilst my only son could be killed. u88 
Racially based conscription was thus ultimately a self-limiting strategy, creating continuous manpower problems as 
well as fracturing white political consensus by the extent and nature of SADF deployment. If whites were deployed in 
high-risk positions which justified their call-up, there was the political risk of conscript casualties. If the state tried to fill 
its front lines with blacks89 and used whites in support positions, it was accused of compromising white interests 
without a visible justification. In the long run, the very success of regaining control by force thus pointed to the demise 
of the apartheid power structure. The NP's inability to co-opt the black majority weakened it politically by forcing its 
continued, and even increased, reliance on the SADF. As the burden of conscription grew it was increasingly difficult 
for the NP to demonstrate sufficient benefits to offset the costs of its conscription demands on whites, which in tum 
limited the effectiveness of SADF deployments. 
87 DSD Reports, K 97/3, box 373, "Refusing apartheid conscription by a war resister", Sechaba, December 1985, pp.18-25. Price, A documentation 
of the exoeriences of military conscripts in the South African Defence Force, pp.9, 184, 185, 192, 194, 208, 212, 248, 295, 312, 388, 389, a 
conscript explained that one way of opposing the authoritarian SADF was to· 'jippo' at every point. It was almost something that was revered. It 
was part of our ethic. One of the ways of getting through the army was that you really took pride in your jippo-moves, how good they were, how 
well-planned they were and ho.v successful they were•. SA. Barometer, vol.1, no.10, July 17 1987, vol.2, no.12, 31 July 88, p.145. 
88 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/61/12/4, vol.57, box 234, letter to the Minister of Defence 1 December 1983. S.A. Barometer, vol.2, no.3, 
26 February 1988, pp.41-42, vol.2, no.18, September 23 1988. 
c· migration statistics 
October November December 
1987 617 566 689 
April May June 
1988 724 839 606 
89 G. Arnold, "Africa is arming itself: South Africa beware", New African, no.250, July 1988, p.37, black troops were used in more dangerous 
situations because white deaths were reluctantly reported. 
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By late 198711988 when the NP feared that a combination of circumstances - including a warming in the Cold War 
and a change of US president - would further decrease sympathy for its regional ambitions,90 its ability to influence 
regional settlements through decisive military action in Angola was limited by a broad negative reaction in the white 
community to the conscript losses this entailed. limited air cover and dissatisfaction in the ethnic battalions meant 
white soldiers were more exposed than before.91 Consequently, SADF commanders felt that a decisive infantry push 
might succeed in taking the strategic town of Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola, but were constrained by concerns 
that the casualties which might result, estimated as high as 300, were more than the white South African public would 
tolerate.92 As early as 1983/1984 the state had faced the first critical reaction from the white public and mainstream 
press when 20 conscripts died during Operation Askari.93 The 28 deaths reported in the last three months of 1987 and 
a dozen more by April 1988 provoked a new range of white criticism - including traditional supporters of the 
government, like the Nederlandse Gereformeerde Kerl< (NGK) - to the extent that military specialist H.R.Heitman 
suggested that the political cost of gambling with conscript lives limited South Africa's use of the SADF.94 Thus while 
the NP continued to jockey for position, alternating negotiations and renewed attacks, after a further 11 men were 
killed in June 1988, a settlement was finally reached on 22 August 1988 with South Africa agreeing to withdraw from 
Namibia before having reached a firm agreement on the removal of ANC guerrillas. 95 
An examination of the apartheid state after 1957 thus shows an ever-increasing reliance on the SADF to contain 
opposition, which, in tum, set up a critical contradiction within the heart of apartheid's power base. Firstly, the minority 
basis of conscription and the growing threat led to ever increasing demands for white military manpower. Some 
commentators have suggested the SADF was limited by equipment shortages and obsolescence rather than its 
reliance on minority conscription, 96 but SAOF records open for research thus far suggest that at the very least a 
perception of shortages influenced the continuous extension of the state's conscription demands between 1957 and 
1984. Secondly, increased conscription demands fostered white discontent and political fragmentation. As whites felt 
the costs of conscription more, their demands for political and economic stability intensified, but growing political 
division within the white community made it impossible for the state to reconcile the conflicting demands. Conscription 
was thus both an essential part of the apartheid state's ability to perpetuate itself, and a unique opposition opportunity. 
00 Dreyer, Namibia and Southern Africa, p.170. Cawthra, War and resistance, p.70. Barber & Barratt, South Africa's foreign oolicy, p.343. 
91 A. Seegers, 'War in southern Africa", Africa, vol.62, no.2, 1992, p.278. H. Campbell, "The military defeat of the South Africans in Angola•, Monthly 
~eview, vol.40, no.11, April 1989, p.12. 
Dreyer, Namibia and Southern Africa, p.172. Cawthra, War and resistance, p.69. 
93 Ibid., p.8. Johnson & Martin, Destructive engagement, pp.99 & 102. 
94 Cock, "A high price for freedom", p.21. A. Grundlingh, ·oorlog en onrus: vertolkings van resente Suid-Afrikaanse militere geskiedenis", South 
African Historical Journal, vol.23, 1990, p.159. 
95 Dreyer, Namibia and Southern Africa, pp.177-179, this was finalised in January 1989. 
96 J. Cilliers and M. Reichardt, About tum (Halfway House, Institute for Defence Poficy, 1995) p.127. 
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While the previous chapter detailed how the apartheid state increasingly relied on the SADF to contain the 
discontent of the black majority, and was thus vulnerable to the call to end consaiption, it is significant that the ECG 
was banned on 22 August 1988, the day on which South Africa signed a ceasefire with Angola, thus cutting its 
manpower requirements. This suggests that perhaps the greatest opposition threat of the ECG was to the apartheid 
state's ideological hegemony, undermining and contradicting the threat-based ideology with which the NP attempted 
to maintain white unity. This chapter will eJCamine the state's security discourse and how the remaining legal avenues 
for extra-partiamentary white opposition - the churches, universities, and human rights organisations - challenged this 
by taking up the issue of CO in the 1970s and early 1980s. This period was significant because it was the state's 
attempt to contain this early ideological opposition which led to the formation of the ECG, while the vocabulary, issues, 
and alliances of the earty CO debates continued to influence the structure and campaigns of the ECG. 
Initially, the state successfully controlled the security discourse. From colonial times the economic and political 
ambitions of settlers had been entangled in ideologies which justified their military conquests. Although South Africa 
increasingly found itself at odds with the rest of the world during the 1960s and 1970s, threats like regional 
decolonisation and reminders of the potential strength of the black majority in protests like Sharpeville and Soweto 
encouraged white political cohesion on security issues.97 While white liberal parliamentary opposition criticised 
apartheid policies in this period, white security fears remained a potent unifying tool for the state. 
From 1977 "total onslaught" and "total strategy" became the new watchwords of apartheid ideology. Precisely because 
the state's demand for greater co-operation from the white group was tied to •reformed" apartheid, which meant less 
socio-economic patronage for whites, survival became a critical element in state discourse as a means of maintaining 
white political loyalty. The sacrifice of some white privileges and renewed conscription demands were therefore 
presented as necessary in an epic battle between starkly contrasted choices, either "Christianity" or "atheism", 
•democracy" or 8totalitarianism", "order" or "chaos". 
Significantly, it was the 1977 Defence White Paper which initially presented the analysis of a number of domestic and 
foreign problems in terms of a "total onslaught" which located the threat outside the country, ascribing all internal 
opposition to "agitators", supposedly agents of a broader east-west ideological struggle.98 Black protest and the ANG 
and PAC's armed struggle were thus decontextualised and explained as the work of agents or stooges of 
97 White fears were exacerbated by well-reported stories of racially motivated atrocities in former colonies. P. Hugo (eel), South African perspectives !fape Town, Die Suid-Afrikaan. 1989) p.240. 
While Paoer on defence and armament supplv, p.3. The 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, for example, was the beginning of legislation 
which turned ideological opposition into a criminal offence. 
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communism, particular1y Soviet expansionism seeking to incorporate South Africa's strategic position and mineral 
wealth. In such a scenario the role of the SADF was presented as defensive, seeking to stop an unscrupulous enemy, 
in tum manipulated by an even more devious superpower.99 
"Total onslaught" propaganda played an important role in redirected attention from political to military solutions, while 
"total strategy" reminded whites that the NP was their protective, pre-emptive bulwark against the security fears 
articulated by "total onslaughe. The discourse of "national security" was therefore a critical rallying call to encourage 
the white population to remain politically loyal to the NP as protector against black majority rule, while accepting 
limited reform as a safeguard against the spread of Marxism, with the subtext that the NP would continue to protect 
white interests in return for continued political loyalty and conscription service.100 
Again, in preparing to market its increased 1982 conscription demands, the SADF briefed its public relations team to 
stay away from political questions and to emphasise that the demands of security, as well as continued white 
prosperity, peace and happiness necessitated greater manpower demands and sacrifice. The proximity of the 
Russian/Marxist threat to South Africa was to be emphasised, together with the theme that peace required new 
initiatives and plans.101 In 1985, too, as South Africa faced growing internal unrest, SADF communications strategy 
emphasised that destabilisation was coming from Russia, through stooges like the ANC, while the SADF was the 
protector of all groups in South Africa.102 
Nevertheless, the security discourse held political risks. Demands justified primarily in terms of the negative effects of 
non-compliance led to increased emigration as some whites found the costs too high and chose to leave. Growing 
black militancy and grassroots organisation, combined with ongoing guerrilla attacks, also helped foster a 
conservative white backlash based on the perception that rising costs were producing little result. The white left and 
humanitarian and church groups condemned the spiral of violence to which the state seemed to have no answer but 
more violence. 
Conscription thus remained a potential political wedge among whites, although the NP's ability to set the dominant 
discourse among whites meant that objection to conscription was slow to develop. Established in 1963, the 
99 M. Hough & M. Van der Merwe (eds), Selected official South African perceptions 1976-1987: Institute for Strateaic Studies ad hoc publications 
no.25 (Pretoria, University of Pretoria. 1988} p.35. 
Ttlf\iVhite Paper on defence and armament supo!y, pp.4-10. 
'°' OSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61112/1, vol.8, box 47, secret memorandum regarding planning for the preparation of the public for changes in 
the law 12November1982. 
'
02 OSD Chief of the SAOF, group 2, 102114, temas in Suid-Afiikaanse leer komopsstrategie 1984/1985 28 June 1985. 
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Publications Control Board was mandated to prohibit material "prejudicial to state security", and the growing power 
of the state encouraged self-censorship in the press, while the state controlled public broadcasting.103 By the 1970s 
the geographic and social separation of apartheid had created a generation of whites who had little contact with blacks 
except as subordinates, while Christian National Education in state schools encouraged authoritarianism and an 
uncritical acceptance of the doctrines of apartheid. The growing power of the apartheid state further enabled it to limit 
white opposition. The multiracial liberal Party, for example, was legislated out of existence in 1968, while more 
outspoken and radical white critics of apartheid like Braam Rsher and Helen Joseph were silenced by prison or 
banning. 
Initially, white security concerns, the relatively low burden of conscription and the mainstream gender expectations of 
both English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites encouraged a broad white acceptance that military service was a useful 
disciplinary and maturational process, making "men" of boys.104 CO was limited to the doctrinal objections of the 
"peace" churches, which espoused universal pacifism, and the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose religious beliefs forbade 
them to participate in the affairs of the secular state. Both these groups were numerically small and did not attempt to 
politicise their objection .105 
In 1974 the South African Council of Churches (SACC) released the Hammanskraal Declaration, often seen as the 
first salvo of the anti-conscription movement. The Declaration reflected growing international protest against apartheid 
and the increased influence of blacks in the multiracial mainline churches. The SACC's parent body, the World 
Council of Churches (WCC), had committed itself to a "Programme to Combat Racism" by 1970, which explored and 
attempted to address socio-economic and political structural oppression. The WCC also pledged to provide financial 
assistance to "anti-racist liberation movements fighting in southern Africa against white minority governments", 106 
insisting that social justice was a Christian responsibility. 
The Hammanskraal Declaration, however, was a modest document. It made no prescriptions, as the SACC had little 
authority over its member churches, 1°7 and some black theologians dismissed its call as mere "situational 
103 Davenport, South Africa: a modem history, p.365. 
104 Interestingly, in both the case of the ~mobiisalion of whites around what was perceived as a lhreat to lheir survival and the organisation of 
opposition forces around the cause of national liberation" conservative views on gender prevailed. E. Unterhalter in Unsettling settler societies: 
P.':!!aOOns of gender. race. ethnicity and class (London, Sage, 1995) p.234. 
AlHwugh Jehovah's Witnesses formed the majority of objectors at any given time, they will not be discussed in this study, as their objection had 
no political base. While Jehovah's Witnesses remained a nuisance to the state, because many refused to be processed through the new channels 
created for reigious objection in 1983, insisting on being charged in a civH court before carrying out alternative service, they were generaffy 
perceived as narrowly sectarian and alien, eliciting little sympathy or understanding among the broad white group. CllR, War and conscience in 
South Africa (London, Pax Christi, 1982) p.27. 
""' J. De Gruchy, The chuR:h sbuggle in Sooth Africa (2"' ed.) (Michigan, W.B. Eerdmans, 1986) pp.116-117 & 129. 
'°' W.S. Vaster, Views on violence (Pretoria, UNISA, 1985) p.44. 
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passivism".108 Nevertheless, the Declaration did represent a new ideological challenge to the state's justification of 
conscription by suggesting that individual Christians should not "engage in violence and war, or. .. prepare to engage 
in violence and war, whenever the state demands it", but rather consider "whether Christ's call to take up the cross 
and follow Him in identifying with the oppressed does not, in our situation, involve becoming conscientious 
objectors· .109 
The competing authority of church and state has been in contention since the church's inception. As theologians 
struggled to determine how Christians should respond to the demands of the state for military manpower, the "just 
war" doctrine gradually emerged. In essence it stated that war should be contracted as the "last resort", for "legitimate 
causes·, by "legally constituted authorities·, be conducted "justly" and only if there were a reasonable chance of 
success. The mainstream Christian denominations which endorsed the just war doctrine thus theoretically claimed the 
right both to judge the actions of the secular state and to engage in civil disobedience.110 
In the South African context this was significant because many whites still regarded themselves, at least nominally, as 
"Christian",111 but state ideology had gained moral power by steadily usurping the authority of the church, encouraging 
a spiritualisation of religion which limited the implication of religious belief to the individual sphere, while arguing that 
the social, economic and political implications of Christianity could be entrusted to the "Christian" state. Moreover, the 
apartheid state used the Pauline doctrine that states exist because they have been established by God in order to 
justify the demand for obedience from conscripts.112 Since the state claimed to be resisting the "ungodly advance of 
the Marxists", ergo the defence of the status quo was a Christian duty, as the opponents of the "Christian" state must, 
by extension, be the enemies of all Christians. Duty to the state was therefore to be given precedence over individual 
conscience, as indicated by Defence Minister P.W.Botha's 1970 statement that the duty to defend one's country 
"should not be made subservient to one's religious convictions".113 
In stark contrast, the Hammanskraal Declaration offered an alternative interpretation of the conflict in South Africa, 
suggesting that Christians were personally accountable for their actions and must therefore scrutinise the purposes 
'
08 This tension continued into the 1980s. The Church of Province for example, was criticised by black priests as equivocating when it decided to 
support spiritually those on both sides of the border. Yet within white churches many whites felt the church leadership was moving too fast and too 
radically. De Gruchy, The church struaole in South Africa, p.144. C. Vina-Vicencio (ed.), Theoloay and violence: the South African debate 
(Michigan, W.B. Eerdmans. 1988) pp.77-78 & 91. CUR, War and conscience in Sooth Africa pp.7-9. B. Tlhagale & I. Mosala (eds}, Hammering 
swords into ploughshares (Johannesburg, Sk<iaville Publishers, 1986) p.243. 
'"" J.W. Hofmeyr, J.A. Millard & C.J.J. Froneman (eds), History of the Church in South Africa: a document and source book (Pretoria, UNISA, 1991) 
p.264. DeGruchy, The church struggle in South Africa pp.140-141. 
11
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and actions of their society, and had the right, even the duty, to disobey the state if it acted unjustly. This thinking 
was informed by the growth of liberation theology in response to decolonisation struggles wor1dwide, which justified 
rebellion against the "structural violence" of existing authorities. The Declaration thus contrasted the violence of 
"terrorists or freedom fighters'', condemned by many white South Africans, with the state's institutionalised violence, 
often unquestioningly accepted by whites. By suggesting there were Christians on both sides of the border it 
undermined the state's characterisation of the enemy as godless communists. In questioning the provision of army 
chaplains it refuted the church's perceived blessing of the existing conflict. 114 The overall ideological challenge of the 
Declaration was therefore to contextualise the just war argument, and to question the justification of SADF 
deployments as defensive. This challenged the state's claims of a just cause, and hence the justice of its conscription 
demands, and so legitimised Christian C0.115 
However, in tracing the history of CO, C.C. Moskos and J.W. Chalmers suggested that this kind of particularisation of 
the just war debate has never been tolerated by a secular state because of its direct political challenge to the state's 
moral and physical right to rule. 116 The rapid, punitive nature of the apartheid state's response to the Declaration 
suggested it fuffy recognised the potential of this challenge, despite the fact that existing CO was extremely limited 
and non-proselytising. Section 121(C) of the Defence Further Amendment Bill (1974) criminalised not only CO, but 
even discussion of the issues. Encouraging anyone to avoid military service was now punishable by a hefty fine of 
R6 000, six years in jail, or both. In addition to criminalising discussion of CO, the state also attacked the integrity of 
those who had opened the debate, attempting to portray CO as the province of "cowards and ratters", while reiterating 
its doctrine of the separation of religious beliefs and civic responsibilities.117 A favourite argument against Christian 
anti-apartheid activists was therefore that their protest was essentially a "cloak of religion to disguise subversive 
activities", and the state claimed that bodies like the wee, and outspoken individuals like Anglican bishop Desmond 
Tutu, had missed their Christian calling by meddling in politics.118 
The responses of the broader white community to the Hamanskraal Declaration indicated that security concerns were 
still a powerful uniting factor among whites at this point. Not only were there "strong cultural-political traditions 
emphasising service to the state" and a culture of authoritarianism in opposition to the individual exercise of 
114 De Gruchy, The church struggle in South Africa p.141. 
115 K Nurnberger, J. Tooke & W. Oomeris (eds), Conflict and the guest for justice (Pietermaritzburg, Encounter Publications, 1989) p.120. Villa-
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116 Moskos and Chalmers, The new conscienfious nhjeclioo pp.14-16. 
117 Comment by Deputy Defence Minister J. Coeilsee in 1979. CllR. War and conscience in South Africa pp.54 & 59. 
"
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conscience, 119 but regional decolonisation also encouraged whites to see a direct connection between their safety 
as a minority and a viable defence force. Predictably, the state-controlled media projected CO as a menace to the 
country's security, but within the white commercial press there was also little sympathy for CO. The liberal press was 
sharply critical of the SACC resolution for encouraging "unlawful" actions, 120 while the pro-government press 
emphasised the Biblical injunction of obedience to authorities and made emotional judgements on those it labelled 
"disloyal" for daring to oppose the state. Parliamentary opposition also ranged itself finnly behind the government in 
condemning the Hammanskraal Declaration, underscoring both the convergence of white opinion, and the political 
riskiness of security issues. Sir de Villiers Graaf, leader of the official opposition, the United Party, opposed the SACC 
motion on the basis that it was the duty of every South African to assist in the defence of the country against 
aggression, including terrorism. The small liberal opposition party, the Progressive Party, argued that opposition to 
conscription was counter-productive because it "spreads a defeatist spirit towards peaceful change and ... draws 
attention away from crucial political issues that are negotiable in our society". Whether motivated by "volk en nasie" -
style patriotism, nervousness over the regional situation, or the possibility of refonning apartheid, the need for "law 
and order",121 and hence viable security forces, was clearly a point of convergence for white interests in 1974. 
Nevertheless, the Hammanskraal Declaration was an important stepping-stone for the later emergence of the ECC. In 
addition to a theological justification of CO, it used a political vocabulary to which those outside the church could 
relate. Moreover, the size, nature and authority of the church meant the state could not use its normal repressive 
mechanisms against it, 122 but was obliged to engage with at least some aspects of the debate. The CO movement 
also benefited from access to church resources and contacts, for example, alerting worldwide agencies like Amnesty 
International about CO prisoners to increase pressure on the apartheid state.123 As individual COs later stood up to 
the state the SACC provided financial backing and produced a Counsellor's Resource Manual in 1983, aimed at 
empowering COs. 
Although by 1975 CO issues were parcelled out to various interested divisions of the SACC, becoming less prominent 
as they were taken out of the plenary, CO did become part of the work of the Justice and Reconciliation Departments 
m Moskos and Chalmers, The new conscientious objection, p.127. 
120 CllR, War and conscience in South Africa, pp.29-30. 
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123 Historical Papers, Robertson collection, A 2558, folder 11, legal assistance for CO: a memaandum on the Defence Amendment Act no.34 of 
1983 October 1983. DSD Chief of the SADF, group 2, 10717/5, box 498, Directaate of Publications appeal regarding Counsellor's Resource 
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in the SACC and South African Catholic Bishops' Conference {SACBC),124 so that a group of Christian activists was 
informed about and experienced in conscription opposition by the time the ECC was established. 
For a number of reasons, however, the church's ability to propel the CO movement was limited. Conscription was just 
one of the problems generated by the monolith of apartheid and the church's multiple foci diffused its ability to take up 
conscription effectively. Moreover, within both the SACC and SACBC there was outright resistance to the church's 
involvement in opposition issues as white congregations tended to be much more conservative than the more 
progressive leadership.125 White member churches limited the impact of such SACC resolutions at congregational 
level, if not refusing outright to endorse them.126 
Indeed, the mainline churches suffered a significant loss of membership as white congregants sought less "politicar 
churches in the 1980s. H. Jurgens Hendrikse has documented a denominational shift among whites, particularly after 
1980, towards community-based Pentecostal and independent churches, and suggested that the numerical growth of 
these churches at the expense of mainline denominations was at least partly due to their focus on individual salvation, 
which, at a time of intense political and economic upheaval, whites found more comfortable than the social justice 
thrust of the mainline churches. These new churches tended to take a fundamentalist line on obedience to the state, 
with little sympathy for C0.127 
Support for CO was thus largely limited to the traditional English-speaking churches. Afrikaans churches turned 
increasingly inward as their continued support for apartheid alienated them from their reformed counterparts 
worldwide and from the ecumenical movement within South Africa. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Afrikaans 
124 De Gruchy, The church struagle in South Africa, pp.98-99. CllR, War and conscience in South Africa p.54. 
125 Particularly after Vatican II, the SACBC took a clear and often bold stand on conscription issues, similar to that of the SACC. In 1972 the Catholic 
Church published a "Call to conscience" which denounced the injustices of South Africa and committed itself to the anti-apartheid struggle. In 1974 
Roman Cathoric Archbishop Denis Hur1ey anticipated the SACC Declaration, arguing that to defend white South African society by force of arms 
was to defend apartheid, and that to defend apartheid was to defend an unjust cause. He emphasised that Christians must not fight an unjust war, 
but needed to "recognise the right of liberation movements to react to the situation in this country". CUR, War and conscience in South Africa pp.13-
14. Moskos and Chalmers, The new conscientious obiection, p.127. 
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capacity within the SADF. However, an individual Congregational Church was so incensed by this that its leadership wrote to the Minister of 
Defence explaining that their church did not agree with the ruling. DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MV/61/12/1, vol.51-54, box 49, letter to 
Minister of Defence from the East Claremont Congregational Church (undated}. CllR, War and conscience in South Africa pp.31-32. De Gruchy, 
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Between 1980 and 1991 while Pentecostal membership increased by 16 per cent and independent churches by 111 per cent, the Anglican 
Church lost 36 per cent of its membership, the Catholic Church 20 per cent, the Methodist Church 19 per cent, the Congregational Church 24 per 
cent, the Presbyterian Church 30 per cent. and the Lutheran Chun:h 28 per cent. H. Jwgens Hendlikse. "South African dencminational growth and 
decline 1911-1991·. Journal d Theology in South Amca vol.91, June 1995, pp.38-43. De Gruchy, ·Christians in cooflict; p.19. In 1985 the Weeklv 
Mail suggested that the enthusiasm of the Pentecostal churches to sign up as military chaplains, together with their unquestioning attitude to 
secular affairs were no doubt a welcome change for the authorities, and noted that whie numbers were still small, they were growing, at a time 
when both the English and Afrikaans churches reported declining numbers. Weekly Mai 16 August 1985. DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, 
MV61/12/2, vol.30, box 43, letter from Ray MacCauley to the SADF 14 December 1982, MacCauley, pastor of the 3 000 member Pentecostal 
Rhema Church in Johannesburg, requested that he be allowed to spend his 12 days of commando duty as an evangelist among the troops. 
29 
churches continued to endorse the NP's line of separate spheres for church and state, and to support 
conscription.128 
While the religious aspect of CO was important because it was from this angle that the state tried to contain the 
conscription debate in 1983, CO opposition grew because of its increasingly multifaceted appeal. Yet as other 
opposition sectors took up the issue of CO, they faced similar constraints to those of the churches. After 1974 English-
speaking campuses began to consider the political and ethical implications of conscription, but the National Union of 
South African Students {NUSAS) also faced a diffusion of energy because of the scale of apartheid issues, internal 
divisions along liberal-radical lines, and a white constituency which still saw its interests best served by the status quo. 
The Progressive Federal Party (PFP), which became the official parliamentary opposition in 1977, and its youth wing, 
PFP Youth, endorsed the possibility of reforming apartheid from within the parliamentary system, while radical 
students maintained contact with the ANC, and saw little chance of creating a democratic system without a complete 
restructuring. Thus, while universities were important centres for conscientising whites, offering some free-flow of 
information, interracial contact and protection for dissident ideas, there were considerable ideological differences 
between the radical left, the Christian left and the parliamentary-affiliated liberals on campuses. 
Moreover, universities were gateways to privileged professions and many whites were unwilling to risk future rewards 
by engaging in student politics. Apartheid apportioned opportunities and privilege on a racial basis which deadened 
empathy for other groups through the enforcement of geographic and social distance, while hardening pre-existing 
racial and class prejudices. Language, dass and cultural differences, exacerbated by negative sanctions against 
contact, resulted in South Africa's youth growing up in segregated worlds. Much of white popular culture was based on 
American or British models in terms of dress, music, literature and films, and many white students passed through 
universities with their stereotypes and cultural expectations relatively unchanged. Even for those whose consciences 
were stirred, active opposition was often seen as too costly in a society in which the economy sanctioned apartheid, 
the state sector actively promoted it, and opposition was not only discouraged but also criminalised. 129 
Thus while NUSAS endorsed the Hammanskraal Declaration, it was divided as to how to address conscription. The 
early 1970s had been a difficult period. The 1973 Schlebusch Commission declared NUSAS an affected organisation, 
128 De Gruchy, The church struagle in South Africa pp.90-91. 
129 Nurses and teachers in state hospitals and schools, for instance, were forced to join segregated unions. State employees were not allowed to 
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because they were COs. 
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limiting its finances and banning and detaining leaders. At the same time, the Black Consciousness movement 
appeared to repudiate any role for white activism, and non-racial movements only began to develop after the Soweto 
riots in 1976. Commentator Julie Frederikse suggested that the line "the most I can do is be the least obstruction", 
from a 1976 play "The Fantastical History of a Useless Man", encapsulated the lack of positive direction of white 
student activism in this period.130 
After the Soweto Riots the small white activist community was also hindered by increased white emigration. Some 
continued to raise the issue of militarisation abroad. The Committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR), 
based in London and Amsterdam, was established in 1978 to "mobilise support for conscientious objectors in South 
Africa and to highlight the repressive role of the military". It also published Resister to give information and analysis on 
South African militarisation.131 Yet, while the state kept records on the most vocal of these emigrants and how they 
were received by host countries, 132 many of those who left chose to make new lives for themselves, and due to family 
ties, or the nature of their qualifications, were quietly absorbed overseas. By the late 1970s a section of NUSAS 
leadership actively discouraged CO through a policy of •strategic participation", which urged students to grit their teeth 
and do their national service unobtrusively in order to be able to stay and contribute to building opposition within the 
country. The externally based ANC was also divided on the conscription issue at this point, and called on whites to 
find ways to "resist apartheid war", without prescribing a particular course of action.133 
From 1979 the stands of individual objectors demonstrated the political and public potential of objection while 
encouraging a new convergence of interest and a cross-pollination between the Christian and secular left on 
campuses. In 1978 Militarisation Committees (Milcoms) were envisaged, initially at the University of Cape Town (UCT) 
then spreading to other NUSAS campuses, to explore alternatives to military service and to investigate its effect on 
conscripts. By 1979 this had grown into focus weeks on war resistance, public debates involving church leaders, the 
distribution of publications and pamphlets, and a petition calling on the government to introduce a non-military form of 
national service for COs.134 From 1982 NUSAS began to produce a number of booklets intended to educate students 
about the link between growing militarisation and apartheid, while well-attended mass meetings suggested that a 
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significant proportion of the student body was concerned about conscription.135 The 1982 UCT campaign around 
militarisation and conscription led to the formation of a Conscription Action Group (CAG) and other NUSAS campuses 
followed suit. A broader campaign developed as students in CAG linked up with church groups, Conscientious 
Objector Support Groups {COSG) and progressive organisations like the women's group Black Sash. The level of 
interest and participation was such that by the end of the year the state felt obliged to intervene, sending military 
leaders to speak on campus to emphasise the "snares of conscientious objection", while NUSAS' anti-militarisation 
material was the subject of year1y reports and analysis in the SSC.136 
By the early 1980s the ANC, too, decided military issues could be an effective opposition tool to raise questions within 
the white community. In 1983 the ANC youth publication Forward was calling for whites to "totally defy the draft", to 
"link the draft resistance struggle to all other struggles", and to develop multi-level strategies that would involve as 
broad a spectrum of whites as possible. Student leaders in contact with the ANC therefore began to push for active 
opposition to conscription, rather than "strategic participation· .137 
However, as NUSAS gradually committed itself to war resistance it encountered limitations similar to those faced by 
the churches. CO was just one of its concerns, and there was a wide divide between the commitment of leadership 
and that of the student body. Moreover, NUSAS directives only affected English campuses. Afrikaans universities 
were more intellectually conservative and authoritarian. While NUSAS-affiliated universities were setting up Milcoms, 
Afrikaans universities were allowing SADF commando units to be established on campus to facilitate camps without 
interrupting students' studies.138 Yet even on English-speaking campuses, which did not allow commando units, white 
self-interest, encouraged by the state's security discourse, was a powerful conservative force.139 NUSAS therefore 
contributed valuable analyses of apartheid and militarisation, as well as creative, experienced, articulate and energetic 
activists, but remained a contributor to, rather than the driving force behind, CO. 
A third strand of white opposition was the numerous regional and national extra-par1iamentary human rights 
groupings. These groups addressed the issue of conscription within their own contexts and attempted to bring the 
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weight of their particular membership to bear on the state.140 The Cape Town-based Civil Rights League, for 
instance, organised a conference on objection and the plight of Jehovah's Witnesses as early as 1970/1971.141 Like 
the churches and NUSAS, however, conscription was just one of the foci of these groups. Moreover, they did not 
represent a broad white movement for democracy, but rather numerous special interests, perpetuating the same kind 
of liberal/radical divisions faced by NUSAS. Membership was also limited, as the majority of whites still clearly 
equated the protection of their interests with NP rule, and even the more liberal who supported "reformed» apartheid 
often relied on the NP to ensure a pace and degree of reform which would not compromise white interests. This was 
dearly indicated by the 1983 referendum on the tricameral parliament. Although the PFP opposed the proposed 
constitutional changes on the grounds that they did not address black political grievances, the state's promise of 
"reformed" apartheid swayed a considerable number of PFP supporters to vote against the official party line, 
suggesting that much of the PFP's membership wanted to encourage the NP towards controlled reform, without 
committing themselves on the more dangerous question of black demands for full political inclusion.142 
Given the limitations of the church, academic and human rights sectors of the growing objector movement, it is 
unsurprising that the greatest anti-conscription impetus between 1979 and 1983 came from the stands of individual 
objectors. They gave a human face to theological and ideological debate, conscientised their peers, and created 
considerable publicity for CO issues through the human interest inherent in their stance as Davids against the Goliath 
of the powerful apartheid state. The refusal of the apartheid state to acknowledge CO led to further publicity as 
objectors faced imprisonment. Their willingness to accept the consequences of their civil disobedience, together with 
public outrage at the harshness of their sentencing and treatment, gave them a kind of martyr status. This helped to 
keep conscription a live issue in white public discourse, particularly in the English community, significant elements of 
which related to issues raised by CO, such as freedom of conscience, freedom of choice and individual accountability. 
The objectors thus built on and expanded the preceding conscription debates. In 1979 Peter Moll's refusal to serve a 
three-month camp was based on a "just war" position, which was well publicised in the press and within the church. 
He received over 550 letters of support, both local and from England and the USA.143 In 1980 Richard Steele 
objected on the basis of universal Christian pacifism, and was also sent to detention barracks. Moll and Steele 
received further publicity as the SADF had no mechanisms for dealing with CO within its ranks either, and there was 
140 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 4, 6111211, vol.6, box 46, letter to the Minister of Defence from Women for Peaceful Change Now 25 February 
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ongoing conflict over the SADF's insistence that they wear SADF overalls. When objector Charles Yeats refused a 
SADF overall in 1981, he was left in his underwear in winter and sentenced to a further year, prompting an 
intervention by Amnesty International. Within South Africa COSG branches emerged in various regions, dedicated 
both to publicise the stands of objectors and to sustain them through their incarceration.144 
From 1981 the state began to give objectors dishonourable discharges and then send them to civilian prisons in an 
attempt to defuse public interest in CO. While a 1972 Defence Act amendment had provided for a once-only detention 
barracks sentence, this was limited to adherents of the "peace· churches. The SADF did begin to accommodate non-
combatants informally at unit level,145 but concern about growing numbers of COs in the context of the state's 
increasing reliance on the SADF limited the extent to which it could attempt to defuse CO in this way. 
A terse letter from General Magnus Malan to the Minister of Justice demanding that Yeats should receive no reduction 
in sentence146 indicated that the opposition potential of CO was a matter of concern, but also epitomised the apartheid 
state's preference for confrontation and shows of force to dominate opposition it could not afford to accommodate. 
Malan wanted to make an example of Yeats to deter further CO, but it was precisely this intransigence which 
sustained and stimulated the CO movement, encouraging the ANC and NUSAS to see objection as an effective 
opposition tool. Human rights groups and churches focused on the lack of alternatives faced by objectors, and the 
churches continued to defend CO as a legitimate Christian response and to debate the justice of the conflict. In the 
light of objectors' expressed willingness to serve in alternative structures, for instance, General Secretary of the 
Presbyterian Church LC.Atkin told General Malan in 1982 that "the issue before the church is whether it can defend 
the military option if others are not open".147 
While CO was initially on Christian grounds, it soon developed into political and ideological opposition too. Objection 
grew from one case per year in 1979, 1980 and 1981, to three by 1982, and six by 1983. By 1983 Paul Dobson 
became the first serving soldier to object,148 and student leader Brett Myrdal began to travel between campuses, 
publicising his forthcoming CO trial. In the context of intakes of some 27 000 this was a miniscule challenge. However, 
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despite a steady increase in conscription demands on whites, the SADF still found itself facing an escalating threat 
with a constant manpower pool, in part because conscripts demonstrated passive resistance through "no shows" and 
emigration. As the CO movement grew, so organisations like COSAWR made it their business to disseminate 
information about how to seek asylum overseas. Moreover, CO raised moral and spiritual questions about 
conscription which challenged "total onslaught" propaganda, stimulating white discontent, overseas criticism and 
encouraging further emigration by demonstrating the costs of resistance. 149 
The growing publicity associated with CO was thus a considerable problem for the state. In 1980 the SADF suggested 
the whole objector movement should be regarded as part of the "total onslaught", since it aroused the interest of a 
media prepared to carry such "subversion", 150 and elicited a degree of public sympathy, particularly as it was non-
violent and COs accepted the consequences of their actions. 151 CO debate also fuelled divisions within the white 
community. By 198211983 the state feared a spread of conscription objection into Afrikaans circles. To the left, the son 
of Dawid Bosch, University of South Africa's (UNISA) Dean of Theology, was thinking about objecting, while to the 
right, two extremists were refusing to do camps, demanding that the state first implement extreme anti-black and ultra 
right-wing policies.152 Thus on the one hand liberal newspapers ran agitated letters from readers condemning the 
treatment of COs, while on the other, the SADF received irate letters from the Afrikaner right asking why those who 
refused to carry weapons were being accommodated in a time of "national crisis" .153 With the creation of the UDF in 
August 1983 conscription further focused opposition, as the UDF set up a committee to examine how to oppose the 
extension of conscription to coloureds and Indians. 
As early as 1975 the SADF had recommended alternative service for COs in order to keep their profile low.154 The 
state had also attempted to discourage CO through measures as diverse as propagating the view that university 
studies were more successful after national service in order to keep conscripts out of the clutches of "dissidents", to 
articles on how CO was a Russian plot and descriptions of the difficult conditions draft dodgers would face 
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overseas. 
155 Military analysts also collected church resolutions in an attempt to develop a strategy to appease the 
churches while defusing the political potential of just war objection.156 The growing public profile of CO gave added 
urgency to containing the political impact of the issue. 
In 1980 the state set up the Naude Committee to investigate and make recommendations about CO, in consultation 
with the churches. The state retained tight control of this process, staffing the committee with three SADF chaplains, 
all from the NGK which was unsympathetic to CO, and limiting the parameters of its investigation. Its complete 
acceptance of the premises of "total onslaught" made it unsurprising that the Naude Committee Report of 1982 
validated the state's conscription demands, concluding that "without the military to protect the system it would collapse 
ovemight". 157 The state used the committee's recommendations and its limited consultation with the churches to try 
both to recapture the moral high ground and to contain CO by accommodating very limited CO on religious grounds, 
while criminalising all other objection, with the intention of dividing the CO movement.158 
Defence Amendment Act 34 of 1983 provided for a Board for Religious Objection, mandated to allow religious 
objection on universal pacifist grounds only. Although nominally autonomous under the auspices of the Department of 
Manpower, its composition demonstrated the state's determination to control CO. Two of the board's members had to 
be from the SADF, one a chaplain, with a quorum consisting of the chairman and three members, including the 
chaplain, ensuring the board would favour the state's interpretation of legitimate CO. 
In this way the state hoped to avoid further conflict with the churches, while protecting its own interests by only 
accommodating "the small number of genuine religious objectors who actually operate beyond the threat contexr .159 
Even the public potential of religious objection was limited, as religious objectors were not permitted to disseminate 
their ideas or speak publicly about CO once they had been classified. The punitive demand that applicants 
demonstrate the sincerity of their convictions by serving one and a half times as long as soldiers meant that objectors 
would be safely tucked away in government offices for a long time. More importantly, the Act gave the state license to 
155 Paratus January 1980, p.47, April 1982, pp.34-35. 
156 DSD Ministry of Defence, Chief of the SADF, group 2, 107/7/5, box 498, confidential report: briefing regarding proposed legislation regarding 
religious objectors (undated). 
157 DSO Ministry of Defence, group 5, MV/6111211, vol.9, box 42, secret memorandum on the need for manpower parity (undated). 
156 OSD Ministiy of Defence, group 4, 61/1211, vol.5, box 46, "Weerstand teen !fiensplig en ondermying van die SAW" collated by members of the 
information community 25June1979. Vol.6, box46, confidential report on CO 7 March 1980. This desire to split the objector movement can also be 
seen in a confidential report on a soldier who justified "terrorist" activity in Namibia in the October 1979 issue of South African Outlook, but still 
served in the SADF and rejected selective CO. The state carefully collected such evidence of differences in emphasis within the broad objector 
¥J;OUP and hoped to utitise them to create division. 
59 DSD Chief of the SADF, group 2, 107/7/5, box 498, briefing regarding proposed legislation regarding religious objectors, confidential report 
(undated). 
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"unmask radical elements hiding behind conscience and apply real sanctions to them". 160 CO on just war, political, 
ethical, or moral grounds was now punishable by a six-year jail term, as the NP loftily declared that the physical safety 
and military defensibility of the state could not be compromised by subjective ideological views about the injustice of 
its internal policies.161 
In order to regain control of the security discourse the apartheid state thus claimed that religious belief differed from 
other ideological positions. Whereas it had previously repudiated individual CO positions, allowing only CO which was 
based on the testable evidence of the faith tradition or artides of faith of the "peace" churches, the apartheid state now 
reversed itself and claimed that while other kinds of belief were not a valid basis for CO since they were "subjective", 
universal religious pacifism was testable.162 Yet the criteria for the Board for Religious Objection to identify a "genuine" 
candidate rested solely on its accepting the sincerity of his personal beliefs, with no frame of reference to anything 
outside of his subjectively held views. This manipulation of language and logic was a clear indication that the whole 
system was designed to limit the political threat of CO by invalidating selective opposition, which contextualised 
conscription and therefore raised questions about the apartheid state's legitimacy and its deployment of the SADF. 
With unconscious irony the state defended these narrow conditions on the basis that uncontrolled CO would allow the 
"domination of the majority by the minority" .163 
Initially, the SADF seemed to have regained control of the CO issue. The cost:benefit ratio of a personal CO stand 
was no longer tenable, as demonstrated by Brett Myrdal's choice of exile, rather than continuing his trial and facing a 
potential six years in jail .164 All the objectors of the January 1984 intake agreed to apply for some category before the 
Board for Religious Objection. As a small number of objectors gradually refused to appear before the Board, the 
SADF initially opted to avoid the high profile of previous CO trials by deferring or dropping these call-ups.165 
160 OSO Ministry of Defence, group 4, 61/1212, vol.7, box 47, report on CO 4 February 1980. Group 5, MV/V/6111214, vol.51-54, box 49, opleiding: 
~ewetensbesware 9 February 1982. 
61 Out of step. pp.69-71, non-combatant service in the SADF was served for the same period as military service, non-combatant service in non-
military uniform required a continuous period of one and half times the length of military service, while those who refused any association with the 
SADF could serve a continuous period cl one and half times the length cl mlitary service doing community service in a government, provincial or 
municipal department, up to a maximum of six years. OSO Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/61/14/1, vol.5, box 211, confidential report regarding 
the proposed legislation on religious objection (undated). 
162 DSO Chief of the SADF, group 2, 101n1s. box 9C, letter from the Humanist Association of South Africa to the Minister of Defence 1 December 
1984. This group complained to the SADF that ·an the debate was in church circles", but this was the only way the SADF felt it could regain control 
of the conscription discourse. 
163 DSD Chief of the SADF, group 2, 1071715, box 49B, confidential report: briefing regarding the proposed legislation regarding religious objectors 
~undated). 
64 Cawthra, War and resistance. p.8. 
165 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/6111211, vol.10, box 210, report on the functioning of the Board for Religious Objection 3 October 1983. 
Of the January 1984 intake, for example, 377 indicated they would take a religious objector stance, but 80 were prepared to do non-combatant 
service and the rest were Jehovah's Witnesses. In the July intake only 83 men had indicated they would apply for objector status and au were 
prepa-ed to do non--combatant service. Historical Papers A 2558, folder 11, legal assistance for CO: a memorandum on the Defence Amendment 
Act no.34of1983October1983. 
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However, the conscription debate of the preceding decade had consolidated a clear understanding of the link 
between apartheid and conscription in a number of quarters and opposition began to regroup. While the state had 
hoped to deflect attention away from the issue of conscription and the legitimacy of the conscripting authority 166 and 
direct it towards the new legal alternatives to military service, the churches were not co-opted by this partial 
accommodation of CO. The SACC and SACBC continued to insist that "just war" objection was a legitimate Christian 
response, and to demand the recognition of objection on humanitarian and ethical grounds. 167 The terms and 
conditions of alternative service thus became an important plank of the ECC platform, one which united the churches 
and liberal and humanitarian groupings, and attracted international interest.168 
The SADF's hopes of containing or dividing the CO movement were also doomed, as the state's actions encouraged a 
greater push for unity amongst groups concerned about conscription. A 1982 conference by COSG and the SACC 
Commission on Violence and Non-Violence was unable to find a comfortable accommodation between NUSAS's 
political stance and religious objection. By the July 1983 COSG conference, however, the threat of the new legislation 
encouraged the acknowledgement of common ground, as the churches called for recognition of non-religious 
objection, and the radical left on campuses acknowledged the political potential of religious objection. 
Moreover, as the new legislation limited the returns of an individual CO stand the CO movement began to broaden its 
focus. When Black Sash proposed an organisation specifically concerned with conscription at its April 1983 
conference, this call was positively received in the existing CO support bases. As NUSAS noted, conscription 
opposition would be "less threatening than CO, while retaining personalised appear, tapping the "reluctant attitude· 
many students had to the SADF while reinforcing links with black, church and liberal groupings, as well as exploiting 
liberal concerns such as freedom of choice and the PFP's call for a volunteer army. 169 
The July 1983 COSG conference formally proposed an organisation to oppose conscription. The backgrounds and 
experience of the approximately 100 participants who endorsed this motion demonstrated the range of people now 
interested in conscription issues. They included objectors - both universal pacifists and those whose objection was 
166 De Gruchy, The church struggle in South Africa, p.143. A similar situation obtained with the exemption board. Once again the SADF retained a 
measure of control over exemption because the board was staffed by members of the labour department and the PF, rather than representatives 
from commerce and industry, yet the SADF could represent it as a separate entity. Moskos and Chalmers, The new conscientious objection, p.131. 
167 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/6111411, vol.5, box 211, response to proposed legislation regarding COs as given at the briefing to the 
churches by the SADF 5 January 1983, the United Congregational Church of South Africa. Letter from Douglas Bax to the Minister of Defence 17 
March 1983. Vol.6, box 211, letter from Archbishop of Cape Town Philip Russell to the Minister of Defence 23 May 1986. Chief ofthe SADF, group 
2, 107nt5, box 90, letter from the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of South Africa to the Minister of Defence 7 November 1986, ECC 
statement on conscription signed by six prominent Cape Town church leaders, SADF date-stamped 14 May 1986, letter from Secretary of the 
SACC Desmond Tutu to the Minister of Defence 7 August 1984. 
168 The "This is Joe" graphic on the title page of Chapter Two, for example, iDustrated a fact sheet released by the ECC detaifing the choices facing 
conscripts, Sue Bnttion's personal papers. 
169 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder H1, NUSAS anti-conscription committee report: the can to end conscription (undated). 
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highly selective - and their friends and family, ministers of religion and academics, Christian students and student 
politicians, left wing radicals and liberals, as well as office bearers in sympathetic organisations, including the current 
NUSAS president and a prominent official from the SACC. Some of the participants at the conference became integral 
to the functioning of the ECC, while others continued to focus on conscription issues from within the rationale of their 
own organisation. Both were necessary to develop the CO movement into a broader anti-conscription movement.170 
The early CO movement thus contributed significantly to the emergence of the ECC, and to its character and goals. 
While the initial CO opposition indicated the political potential of conscription, the multiple foci of the organisations 
involved both divided them from one another and limited their effectiveness. The ECC, however, was able to draw on 
the wide range of experience and resources which had coalesced around CO, while avoiding much of the conflict and 
diffusion of energy by concentrating on the single issue of conscription. The CO movement also created a common 
vocabulary, and established conceptual parameters and a platform of issues which continued to be used by the ECC 
in its battle with the state. However, as the ECC explored the COSG conference charge to Qraise awareness and build 
opposition" to conscription171 it developed the existing CO protest into a wider, and consequently more effective, 
opposition movement. Lastly, CO raised public interest in, and tolerance for, conscription debate, making it more 
difficult for the state to control. Unlike 1974, where the media roundly condemned CO, by 1983 a Cape limes cartoon 
epitomised a new acceptance of the CO position, and a questioning of the validity of the state's response to it. Two 
convicts, a thug-like criminal and a weedy, bespectacled CO, compared their respective sentences: six years for 
armed robbery, assault and battery versus nine years for pacifism.172 
Thus the ideological challenge of CO reinforced the manpower challenge inherent in white conscription, while also 
undermining the state's attempts to contain the costs of its conscription demands by encouraging individuals to 
accommodate the burden of conscription in order to protect the broader self-interest of white society. As CO 
encouraged debate about the political, economic, moral and spiritual implications of conscription in the white 
community, it became clear that for every Peter Moll or Richard Steele who confronted the state head on, there were 
others who had began to avoid SADF service through emigration or non-compliance. The opposition work of the ECC 
between 1983 and 1988 was to build on the existing manpower challenge inherent in white minority conscription, and 
on the early CO movement's ideological confrontation with the state's security discourse, moral authority and definition 
of white self-interest. 
170 Sue Brittion's personal papers, registration for CO Conference in Durban July 1983. 
171 Historical papers AG 1977, folder A1, the End Conscription campaign: a chronology (undated). 
172 Cape Times 10 March 1983. The ECC and COSG adapted this cartoon when the 1983 legislalion was passed. At the time of the cartoon the 
state was stiU debating how long the period of alternative service should be. 
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From the context of the previous two chapters it is clear that attempting to campaign against conscription among 
whites would be difficult. The state, increasingly reliant on the military to perpetuate itself, used its powers 
continuously to narrow the political space to oppose conscription while simultaneously increasing the costs. The state 
had also developed a security discourse that appealed powerfully to white self-interest, so that white liberals were 
inclined to see the SADF as a necessary stabilising force during the process of reform,173 while conservatives viewed 
it as a critical bulwark against the forces of revolution. The success of the ECC's ability to shift white perceptions of 
the cost:benefit ratio of conscription was related to a number of factors ranging from its organisational capacity to 
socio-economic trends over which it had no control; from the changing impact of the inherent contradiction which 
formed the basis of the ECC's campaign to the increasing coercive capacity of the state to prevent it from making its 
case. Discussion of the ECC's work will therefore be divided into three phases, from a slow beginning in 198311984 to 
the greater profile generated by the peace festival in July 1985; the growth phase of the well-received "Troops Out" 
and "Working for a Just Peace" campaigns of late 1985 to mid 1986; and lastly, the changed emphases needed to 
survive and campaign in the greater repression from mid-1986 to the banning of the ECC in August 1988. 
The ECC soon found that campaigning was not only difficult within broader white society. Even among extra-
parliamentary groupings sympathetic towards the ECC, interest in, and support for, conscription issues was only one 
of the many aspects of their opposition to apartheid. The ECC therefore had to compete for limited financial resources 
and personnel in the small white anti-apartheid movement, and it was three understaffed, under-funded, and over-
extended committees which set out to tackle the might of the apartheid state in one of its most sensitive areas at the 
end of 1983. 
The initial expectation of the campaign was not so much to end conscription, as to use the issue to provide a legal 
platform from which to educate people about the relationship between militarism and apartheid, raising issues like 
defence costs, challenging the prevailing security ethic and opposing the extension of conscription to coloureds and 
lndians.174 
This planning was strongly influenced by the initial structural conception of the ECC as a front, or "co-ordinating 
committee", rather than an organisation in its own right. While COSG inaugurated committees in Durban, Cape Town 
173 The lack of parliamentary opposition on defence-related matters for the first half of the 1980s and the controversy which the issue of 
conscientious objection stirred within the liberal Progressive Federal Party, which emerged as the strongest group in a reshuffling of the left wing 
opposition in 1977, indicated the success of the threat motif among many whites. J.Herbst, "Political and economic implications of South Africa's 
militarisation', The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations. vol.8, no.1, 1986, pp.68-69. 
174 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.3, Cape Town ECG paper drawn up for presentation to the Cape Town COSG weekend. University of Cape 
Town Archives and Manuscripts, BC 668, folder E, a campaign to end conscription report (undated). 
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and Johannesburg in late 1983, and COSG personnel were initially very involved in the structuring of the 
committees and drawing in other interested organisations, 175 Black Sash, NU SAS and a number of churches also 
provided a nucleus of representatives in the three committees. Committed to modelling democracy, the ECC adopted 
a structure whereby the primary decision-making forum of each committee was the general body meeting, where 
information was shared and campaigns planned. Affiliate representatives were to be the link between various 
organisations and the ECC, bringing the concerns of their organisations to the general body and taking ECC decisions 
back to their own organisations, in order to generate the necessary resources to run campaigns. In this way the ECC 
hoped to heighten affiliates' awareness of conscription issues, encouraging them to include a conscription focus in 
their normal work.176 
The ECC also expected to rely on the existing skills, resources and contacts of the affiliates. COSG's experience with 
conscription issues meant it had contacts and credibility when trying to set up the three committees, as well as the 
resources to put together information packages, like the one used by the Johannesburg COSG to establish contact 
with target groups to initiate an ECC.177 COSG also helped to disseminate the ECC's ideas within a sympathetic 
constituency by making space available in its publication Objector. Black Sash used its experience in arranging 
pickets and dealing with town councils on behalf of the ECC, as well as making space for the ECC at Sash events, 
such as fetes and conferences. NUSAS publications like "In whose defence? Conscription and the SADF" raised ECC 
themes without requiring funding or manpower from the ECC,178 while NUSAS CAG committees promoted 
conscription issues on campuses. A number of local churches made their facilities available to the ECC and umbrella 
bodies like the SACC and SACBC were an important source of funding.179 The ECC could also draw on the 
experience and overseas contacts of early COs like Richard Steele, while fellow Durban ECC member Anita 
Kromberg worked for the international Quaker organisation IFOR which proved a useful ally in raising international 
awareness and channelling much-needed funding. The ECC also hoped international contacts would give them some 
security in the face of possible government repression. 
Affiliate support had limits, however. To avoid state harassment and alienating the "broad spectrum of conscripts", as 
well as sectors within the ECC's support base, the ECC decided to have no formal contact with the ANC, although 
175 Archives and Manuscripts, BC 668, folder E, report to Black Sash national conference March 1984, "The Development and formation of the End 
Conscription Campaign (Western Cape)'. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B8.1.1, minutes of "The meeting held to discuss the launching of an 
End Conscription Committee" 13October1983. Minutes of the inaugural meeting of the ECC 17November1983. 
176 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A1, structure of the ECC committee (undated). Folder B8.4.2, report on activities of ECC Western Cape March 
1984-February 1985. 
177 Ibid. 
178 UNISA, Documentation Centre for African Studies, ECC Collection ACC 326, "In whose defence? Conscription and the SADF", NUSAS, 1982. 
179 Historical Papers AG 19n, folder H9, report on fifth national conference of COSG July 1984. Folder B8.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 19 April 
1984. 
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some individual members did keep in contact with the ANC, which remained broadly supportive of the ECC's work 
throughout its existence.180 Within South Africa, groups sympathetic towards the ECC did not necessarily want to be 
associated with one another. The ECC spent much time debating whether to allow the PFP Youth to affiliate 
nationally, as multiracial affiliates opposed the PFP's continued participation in the tricameral parliament. Similarly, the 
churches felt it would be inappropriate to be closely associated with the UDF, so the ECC allowed local area 
committees to affiliate, rather than the UDF per se. Internal limitations further affected the support of individual 
affiliates. Within the SACC, for example, a resolution calling for an end to conscription was still blocked, and the 
military chaplaincy issue remained divisive.181 NUSAS put its UDF affiliation first and indicated that its response to the 
ECC would be in the light of its UDF commitments. Organisations like Black Sash and the Civil Rights League were 
sympathetic, but already relied on heavily committed volunteers. Moreover, activists from affiliated organisations were 
often not au fait with the rationale and core values motivating the ECC. Affiliate workers' energies were diffused and 
they were frequently driven by an attraction to a specific cause, rather than a dear understanding of the 
interconnection between apartheid and militarism. 
The structuring of the ECC as a front also led to numerous bureaucratic delays. In Cape Town, for example, a meeting 
to discuss the launching of a regional ECC was held on 13 October 1983. Yet by the inaugural meeting a month later, 
a number of interested organisations had not yet been able to discuss the issue within their own structures. The 
bureaucratic organisation of the churches also delayed appeals from the ECC for endorsement.162 
As a new organisation, without national structures, a constitution, or a mission statement, much of the initial energy of 
the ECC went into determining its direction and developing credibility within the existing anti-apartheid movement. The 
varying make-up of each committee meant that there was, as yet, little common sense of direction, or a recognisable 
national identity. Thus for much of 1984 each region acted largely autonomously, having broadly similar aims but 
lacking consensus on aspects as fundamental as a name.163 As campaigning began, however, the ECC needed more 
competent spokespeople and committed personnel than the front structure could provide. Gradually, within each ECC 
a core group developed, whose primary commitment was increasingly to the ECC.164 
180 Letter from Laurie Nathan to Merran Phillips 16 May 1998. 
181 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B8.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 29 March 1984. 
182 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B8.1.1, minutes of the inaugural meeting of the ECC, 17 November 1983. Cape Town ECC minutes 13 
September 1984. 
183 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B10.2, Movement Against Conscription (MAC) minutes 5 August 1984, at this meeting the Durban committee 
decided to fall in line with the other two regions, which had already been using the name "ECC". Although only formally adopted in August 1984, the 
name ECC has been used throughout partly for convenience, and partly because it was only the Durban group which argued for alternatives. 
184 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B1.4.1, Johannesburg ECC - an assessment of 1984. Folder B8.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 13 September 
1984. 
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The motivation of these core activists influenced the structure and emphases of the three regional ECCs. The 
Durban ECC, for example, had a strongly Christian pacifist flavour, and the group's ethic encouraged an informal 
structure, with rotating positions of authority and responsibility, and a steering group, rather than an executive. 
Activists tended to be older, a number of them full-time Christian workers. The ecumenical organisation Diakonia was 
an important resource, offering space for meetings and a peace library.185 For much of the year the membership 
overlap of COSG and ECC activists made it difficult to generate a specific ECC identity, and to extend membership. 
The regional context further complicated Durban ECC work. The UDF in Natal was strongly opposed by lnkatha, 
making it difficult to establish UDF Anti-Conscription Committees (ACC) in Natal. As the ECC developed a more public 
presence in October 1984, it attracted the interest of black groups seeking a forum from which to address the 
proposed extension of conscription. This further diffused the focus of the Durban ECC as it tried to accommodate 
widely diverging interests.186 
By contrast, in Johannesburg and Cape Town the ECC found itself addressing a whites-only constituency, due to the 
presence of UDF ACCs. Students at the predominantly coloured University of the Western Cape, for example, agreed 
to be observers at ECC meetings, but reserved their active participation for UDF structures.187 Where local area UDF 
committees did affiliate with the ECC, the impact of the Group Areas Act meant that participants were predominantly 
white. 
Because of the early campaigning at UCT on militarisation issues, the Cape Town ECC had a strong student flavour, 
as students who had been prominent in the 1982 Militarisation Focus moved into leadership and working positions 
within the ECC, contributing useful experience and a clearly articulated analysis of the relationship between militarism 
and apartheid. Campus was a venue for mass meetings and concerts, as well as a resource base, giving access to 
the Student Representative Council (SRC) press and resource centre, and the support of academics like Francis 
Wilson and Michael Savage, who were pressed into service on ECC platforms. Contact with students, the directly 
conscripted group, also led to a greater appreciation of the potential of appealing to white self-interest, particularly 
white resentment at conscription, and encouraged the integration of a conscription message into youth culture. 
185 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.1.1, Durban core group minutes 5 March 1984. Folder 810.3, report on MAC for national meeting 17 July 
1984. 
186 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A5.1.1, ECC first national conference minutes, regional reports and papers 25-27 January 1985. Box H9, 
report on fifth national conference of COSG July 1984. 
18 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.1.1, minutes of "The meeting held to discuss the launching of an End Conscription Committee" 13 October 
1983. 
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Human rights organisations like the Civil Rights League and Black Sash, and campaigners with high white 
community status like past UCT principal Sir Richard Luyt also helped develop the ECC's public presence in Cape 
Town. As in Durban, the churches remained an important source of support, venues and resources, but the overall 
image of the Cape Town group was less overtly religious. A 1982 SRC report on the UCT Military Focus set the tone, 
stating that while "much of the public debate has been within Christian circles and hence couched in a Christian idiom, 
and many of the resource people are Christians, it is changing and it needs to change".188 
The structuring of the Cape Town ECC thus reflected the influence of the numerous ex-NUSAS leaders and students, 
with a greater emphasis on procedure, analysis and introspection. From the start, the Cape Town group had an 
executive - constituted as a representative forum for the most involved affiliates: UCT, COSG, Black Sash and the 
churches - with clearly defined duties and a chairperson. 
There is scant material on the early life of the Johannesburg ECC but interviews with activists suggested a radical 
Christian presence, 189 more overtly political than the universal pacifism in Durban, and that UDF affiliate, the 
Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (JODAC), and radical activist academics like David Webster and Tom 
Waspe were important influences. Regional resources included the Human Awareness Programme, which provided 
the ECC with organisational training. The ECC was also able to use the resources of the SACC, which had its 
headquarters in Johannesburg. Like the Durban branch, a number of activists were already working, making their 
participation less flexible. As in the other regions, experienced Black Sash personnel made a significant contribution, 
as did COSG, but again there was a confusion of identity between the ECC and COSG. 
In Johannesburg, leadership seems to have been defined, with an executive and a chairperson who became a 
recognisable spokesperson for the ECC, particularly with regard to the press and other organisations. However, the 
1984 September uprisings in the Vaal Triangle townships meant that the Johannesburg branch was exposed early to 
the rigours of campaigning under emergency regulations, and several Johannesburg ECC events had to be 
restructured to allow them to take place legally.190 
Thus while there was core agreement on structure and purpose, and a similar basic constituency of Black Sash, 
COSG, NUSAS, and education, church and regional democratic organisations, the ECC's impact in 1984 was 
188 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.4.1, Social Action Committee of the SRC report on the military focus at UCT June 1982. 
189 Interviews with Steve Lowry and Adele Kirsten, national secretary (4 February 1999). 
190 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder H9, report of the fifth national conference of COSG July 1984. Folder 81.4.1, Johannesburg ECG - an 
assessment of 1984 report. 
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predominantly regional, rather than national, as regions explored the nature of the white societies they were trying to 
reach, and the varying resources at their disposal. This regionalism was exacerbated by limited contact between the 
three committees due to financial and time constraints. Activists from different regions tended to meet at events 
focusing on other organisations, like COSG and NUSAS conferences, rather than initiating meetings. Nevertheless, 
there was some sharing of resources from the outset. The Cape Town group was the first to get off the ground, with a 
set of working principles, subsequently utilised by the Johannesburg group in their own start-up campaign. Similarly, 
media and resource packages developed by one committee were shared around and utilised by others where 
appropriate to their particular constituencies.191 
As the ECC began to promote its views more actively, its campaigns became a barometer of the growth of self-
awareness, identity and capability within and among the three committees. The first initiative was a survey of 
conscription attitudes, intended to raise awareness of conscription issues among the general public and affiliates. 
Affiliates were to develop and run the survey within their own constituencies, with the ECC co-ordinating the results as 
a database for future work and for release to the media. 192 This indicated the limited initial capacity of the ECC, relying 
entirely on volunteers, and emerging from a very small resource base. 
By mid-year, however, the Cape Town and Johannesburg groups had developed sufficient internal cohesion to 
attempt a more specifically ECC campaign. Converging condemnation of the SADF presence in Namibia from 
churches, NUSAS and academics led the ECC to develop a "No War in Namibia" campaign. Again, the focus was 
primarily educative, with the goal of raising questions about the role of the SADF in Namibia. By giving Namibian 
opposition spokespeople a platform at ECC-organised press conferences the ECC hoped to counter the state's "total 
onslaught" explanations for its presence in Namibia, while not overtaxing its own personnel. In Cape Town, Anton 
Lubowski, a Namibian advocate, Hans Rohr, leader of the Namibian Christian Democratic Party and Cornelius 
Kameeta, vice-president of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia, told the press that the SADF's presence in 
Namibia was illegal and unwanted and that young men were being conscripted to uphold apartheid, while in 
Johannesburg a few weeks later Lubowski and Sheena Duncan, president of Black Sash, gave a similar message. 
The resulting press suggested that the state still dominated white public discourse through intimidation, successful 
propaganda, and direct control. The sympathetic alternative press such as Objector and Grassroots carried 
191 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 14 & 22 February 1984. Minutes of Durban core group 5 March 1984. 
192 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B8.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 14 February, 8 & 29 March 1984. The payoff could be seen by the following 
year as the liberal press began to show more interest in the ECC. The 28 June 1985 Star article "Campuses spearhead growing resistance to 
military service", for example, was based on the data gathered in the 1984 survey. 
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comprehensive reports on the press conferences, but the limited readership of these publications meant that the 
ECC's profile was only raised within an already sympathetic constituency. 193 State control of broadcasting meant the 
ECC's message was effectively withheld from much of the white public, while the white press still regarded the ECC's 
message as fair1y radical, and turned in conservative, if any, reports. 194 This situation continued after the campaign. 
The Durban group attempted a letter-writing campaign but letters were either not printed or "cut to ribbons·, while an 
editor rejected an ECC advertisement because he was afraid of running foul of the law.195 
However, as a first salvo the "No war in Namibia" campaign demonstrated the organisational gains of active 
campaigning, and exposed fallow areas for future work, particular1y among white youth. Although the campaign still 
lacked a national focus, participating regions experienced considerable benefits in terms of a greater public presence 
and internal growth. Committees discovered that where the ECC offered material useful to sympathetic groups, 
greater numbers were attracted to meetings, while active campaigning encouraged regional growth, and 
subcommittee work generated a greater sense of commitment to the ECC. Media, in particular, generated excitement, 
as the ECC began to explore the power of graphic communication in posters, as well as producing an information 
sheet detailing the rationale for its existence and its achievements thus far. 
The campaign also proved an important organisational learning curve. A lack of co-ordination between the UDF and 
the ECC meant the UDF's Republic Day meeting deflected attention from the ECC's "No War in Namibia" events. 196 
The May Cape Town campaign had a strong Christian flavour, with candles and vigils featuring prominently, but 
breakdowns in co-ordination with the churches and advertising meant that the main meeting and the vigil were not as 
well attended as expected, with between 300 and 350 people, although a display on Namibia at UCT was very well 
received. When the Johannesburg ECC held its own Namibia focus in June, it experienced similar results. Events like 
pickets, a display on Namibia, a slide-tape show and a concert were most successful within the existing sympathetic 
constituency. Besides logistical problems, like too few workers, and t-shirts which arrived too late and were banned 
too soon, the campaign demonstrated that the ECC had not yet engaged many people beyond those already open to 
the anti-conscription message. Although the link between the presence of the SADF in Namibia and the call to end 
193 Historical Papers AG 19n, folder H9, ~ vol.2, no.3, 1984. 
194 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 81.4.1, Johannesburg ECC -an assessment of 1984. 
195 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 810.3, report on MAC for national meeting 17 July 1984. 
196 Sue 8rittion's personal papers, information sheet for bystanders taking part in Namibia focus week May 1984. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 
88.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 22 February, 19 April & 7 June 1984. Folder 88.4.2, report of activities of ECC Western Cape March 1984-
February 1985. 
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conscription was clear to those involved in the ECC, Namibia was geographically, emotionally and practically distant 
from the daily concerns of many ordinary white South Africans.197 
Nevertheless, the fact that even this limited campaign drew vituperative right-wing Afrikaans press, which criticised the 
state for laxity in allowing any protest against conscription, confirmed that public campaigning around conscription had 
the potential to put political pressure on the state.198 Moreover, as the ECC began to take on a specific character, so 
its reputation grew among organisations which shared its broad anti-apartheid goals. These organisations began to 
include the ECC in their own initiatives, or allowed it to use their functions as a means of publicising the ECC. In 
Durban, for example, the ECC was invited to present a display on conscription at a fl!te organised by the National 
Organisation of Women, and to make a presentation to the Association of Durban Democrats. The Cape Town group 
presented papers on the ECC at both the Black Sash and Western Province Council of Churches conferences. The 
ECC was also welcomed by community initiatives like the Grassroots newspaper, which offered the ECC space, while 
the Cape Arts Project gave the ECC media training, and made their facilities available to the ECC.199 At UCT two 
candidates standing for the SRC did so successfully on a "Unite Against Conscription" ticket, and when Namibian 
students came to speak at the University of the Western Cape the ECC was invited to state its case. Thus, while the 
ECC was hardly a dynamic force in 1984, its growing organisational and public presence continued to focus 
conscription awareness among the diverse groups which had called it into being.200 
In addition to the more academic and political debate, the emergence of the ECC also helped stimulate and focus the 
emerging cultural and emotional responses of white youth, and conscription issues began to feature regularly in 
student publications. At UCT, for example, the Psychology students' publication looked at "Mind and the Military", 
while the Christian newspaper examined the cases and workings of the Board for Religious Objection. CAG also 
continued to publicise the results of the NUSAS survey, which indicated that the majority of students supported neither 
the SADF nor conscription.201 
Conscription issues were also explored through the more accessible form of graphics, drama and poetry. UCT Varsity 
editor Steve Kromberg's poem "The Hell Bent Terror" was printed in a number of publications. After examining the 
personal terrors of being exposed to conflict situations, it asked 
197 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder E2.5, assessment of ·No War in Namibia" campaign by Mike van Graan (undated). 
198 Afrikaner 11 July 1984. 
199 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 22 February, 19 April & 11October1984. Folder 810.2, MAC minutes 5 
August 1984. 
200 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 30 August & 13September1984. 
201 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder H1, Psyche, vol.4, no.3, 1984, pp.6-7. 
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"If there isn't someone sitting in Pretoria 
Cutting out hell bent terrors", 
an image which both ridiculed the state's portentous rationale of the conflict and suggested a hidden agenda, in which 
the individual conscript was merely a pawn, despite the personal physical and emotional cost.202 
Graphics also targeted conscription. A Varsity cover depicted the conscript's dilemma. The male figure could either fall 
despairingly backwards into nakedness and prison, or step forward into army uniform, his face distorting into a violent 
snarl as he shook a black child. A shaft of light, like a spotlight, drew attention to the moment of decision; both futures 
were shaded off into darkness, equally bleak. This was an emotionally powerful depiction of the unpalatable 
alternatives facing young men, and their lack of choice. Cartoonists were also attracted to conscription issues. The 
NUSAS Law Directive, for instance, showed P.W.Botha as a recruitment-style Uncle Sam proclaiming, "The SADF 
wants you!" while the majority of the approaching potential recruits peeled off to the left and right, into exile, hiding or 
jail, and a lone figure took the straight path to Botha, a visual representation of the opinions students had expressed in 
the NUSAS survey.203 This tradition of visual argument and analysis continued to be incorporated into the posters, 
banners and stickers which characterised later ECG campaigns.204 
However, if conscription issues were gaining some momentum among ECG affiliates by mid 1984, the ECG had to 
resolve a number of organisational difficulties in order to exploit this interest and consolidate a national presence. An 
early August meeting of representatives of the three regional campaigns proved to be an important planning and 
strategising forum. In addition to improving structure and co-ordination by mandating each region to appoint one 
person to co-ordinate with the other regions, the meeting finally agreed on the name "ECG" and a logo, a chain with 
broken links forming the letters ECG, and stategised a new campaign intended to consolidate the ECC's national 
presence. A declaration was drawn up, summarising the ECC's analysis and demands, to be endorsed by "nobs" 
(high profile people in a variety of fields).205 The ECG hoped to use their patrons' credibility and profile to mount public 
launches of the ECG in each region simultaneously, generating an increased sense of momentum and unity.206 
Organisational challenges were also addressed at the meeting. While the ECC remained committed to the front 
concept, ongoing work had made it clear national structures were necessary to facilitate planning and co-ordination. A 
202 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder H1, Varsity fragment. 
203 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder H1, Law Directive fragment. 
204 This aspect of the ECC's opposition will be discussed in chapter nine. The non-ECC graphics described here are shown on the title page of 
chapter two. 
205 See Appendix One. 
206 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1.1, Wilgerspruit reports 22 July 1984, Cape Town ECC report January 1985. Folder 810.2, MAC minutes 
5 August 1984. 
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working conference was planned for January 1985, at which delegates would be mandated by their regions to make 
decisions regarding the future direction and structure of the campaign. 
The ECC was also forced to confront its financial crisis. Despite hopes of funding its running costs through affiliate 
subscriptions, by August the Cape Town ECC had no money at all and the other regions were not much better off. 
The second half of 1984 thus saw the ECC beginning to fund itself through its own efforts, a further boost to its identity 
as an organisation. The Cape Town group, for example, held several concerts featuring popular local bands and a 
short conscription message. These proved hugely successful, attracting crowds of up to 1 000 white youth, while 
generating profits as high as R1 200 a time. Wearable media, such as badges and t-shirts, also proved popular and 
profitable, while offering the ECC free advertising.207 
Through its own efforts the Cape Town ECC was able to end the year in the black, but campaigns were very 
expensive and local and international donors were critical for the ECC to be able to project itself nationally. At the 
August meeting the ECC decided to apply for aid to a number of international groups and peace organisations as 
soon as possible, rather than waiting for January to draw up a comprehensive budget. Once again the ECC was aided 
by the reputation and contacts of previous objectors, such as CO Peter Moll, who undertook to meet with various 
organisations on his forthcoming overseas trip. Within South Africa the churches remained the single biggest sponsor, 
and a channel for international funds.208 The declaration launch, for instance, was funded by a R4 000 donation from 
the SACC. Prominent clerics such as Denis Hurley also wrote letters of recommendation to accompany ECC requests 
for international aid.209 
As the costs indicated, the declaration launch was the most ambitious campaign thus far, serving both as mission 
statement of the ECC's goals and rationale for its existence, a statement of identity and intent.210 The declaration was 
in three parts, each separated by the refrain: "We call for an end to conscription". It began by categorising the South 
African state as "unjust", "unequal" and "in a state of civil war", a direct challenge to the official line of "total onslaught", 
which identified the South Africa conflict as being externally fermented. The second part looked at the conscript, his 
role in maintaining the "illegal occupation of Namibia" and assisting in the "implementation and defence of apartheid 
policies", and his lack of options. Again, this was a challenge to the total onslaught emphasis on the patriotic duty of 
201 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.4.2, report of activities of ECC Western Cape March 1984-Februal)' 1985. Folder 88.1.1, Cape Town ECC 
minutes 26 July & 30 August 1984. 
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• Historical Papers AG 1977, folder G2, letter from Steve Lowry to a German CO 19 May 1986. 
209 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 27 September, 11 October & 8 November 1984. Folder 810.3, Durban ECC 
r~ort to national conference 25 January 1985. 
21 In 1985 the ECC drew up a constitution to facilitate fundraising, but the declaration remained its primary document in media work as the most 
succinct expression of the ECC's identity and goals, and as a basis for affiliation. 
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servicemen, and their protective function in the face of outside forces of degradation and destruction. "Total 
onslaught" propaganda used terms like "boys on the border", while the declaration focused attention on the fact that in 
reality servicemen were deployed in another country. The third section looked at the costs of conscription, both 
financial and in terms of increased division within the country, particular1y if conscription were to be extended to other 
race groups. Again, this challenged the "total onslaught" legitimation of an ever-increasing percentage of the budget to 
defence. The ECC argued that the costs were not worth it, and that the inherently unequal allocation of resources was 
the root cause of the conflict in the first place. The declaration concluded by claiming that the exercise of conscience 
was a "moral right", and calling for an end to conscription and for a "just peace". This, too, challenged the state's 
security discourse, undermining its attempts to confine moral debate around conscription to the narrow parameters of 
universal pacifism. 
From August, the three committees began to collect signatures of support from prominent people and pro-democracy 
organisations in each region. This was a time-consuming process, but the ECC was later able to brandish this support 
base of some 50 organisations when making representation to government, the UN and the numerous international 
bodies it approached for funding.211 
The declaration campaign was intended to establish a national profile for the ECC but the lack of national structures 
hindered co-ordination and each region eventually organised its own timetable of events. While all three regions 
recognised the need to draw people in with engaging activities rather than just political speeches, the Cape Town 
group was the most successful. A "cultural roadshow" was specifically developed, including the play "Somewhere on 
the Border" (which had been on the commercial circuit in 1982), poetry and a slide-tape show. Preceding the launch 
was a "Rock against the Ratel" concert at UCT attended by an estimated 1 000 people, as well as a prayer vigil for an 
end to conscription, and a press conference to allow prominent people to explain their endorsement of the declaration. 
Academic Michael Savage, regional Black Sash chair Mary Burton, Presbyterian minister Doug Bax, and conscript 
and doctor in the deprived black area of Crossroads Ivan Toms, modelled the range of opposition to conscription. 
The success of the Cape Town launch can be gauged by positive indicators like an attendance of some 1 400 at the 
launch meeting, as well as opposition such as the disruptive presence of the NP funded National Student Federation 
211 These included churches, women's and students' movements, human rights organisations, black movements like COSAS, the UDF, as well as 
33 prominent individuals, including academics, ministers, two members of provincial councils, and the presidents of both Black Sash and the UDF. 
Bureaucracy again retarded the process of endorsement. Archbishop Philip Russell of Cape Town, for example, supported the declaration in his 
personal capacity, but could only sign it once it had been endorsed by the Provincial Standing Committee or the Synod of Bishops. Historical 
Papers AG 1977, folder B8.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 16 & 30 August 1984. 
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(NSF). The launch generated sufficient state interest to justify an October special situation report on the ECC to the 
SSC, suggesting that even the modest gains of the ECC worried the apartheid state. The report indicated the state's 
concern about the ECC's future momentum, given the convergence of anti-apartheid activism around conscription, as 
demonstrated by the ECC's international contacts, growing support for the ECC on NUSAS campuses, and the ANC's 
encouragement of conscription resistance. 212 
By contrast, the Johannesburg ECC launch coincided with unrest following the deployment of the SADF in Vaal 
Triangle townships, leading to a ban on all meetings. The ECC held a press conference with public support from anti-
apartheid activist Helen Joseph, SACC general secretary Beyers Naude, NUSAS president Kate Philip, and academic 
David Webster, to demonstrate the range of support for anti-conscription work. In order to remain legal, however, the 
launch itself had to be converted into a f~te, with affiliates taking stalls. 
Durban ran perhaps the most conservative launch, with a public meeting addressed by anti-apartheid activist Zac 
Yacoob of the Natal Indian Congress, the Reverend Wesley Mabuza, Christian youth worker Paul Graham, and CO 
Richard Steele, which drew an estimated audience of 200. Perhaps more significantly, an organisational workshop, 
which also formed part of the launch, attracted 40 people from a wide variety of organisations and indicated multiracial 
support for the call to end conscription. 
In both Durban and Johannesburg low attendance figures indicated the ECC was still struggling to move outside its 
existing support base. Although the launches had the positive effect of drawing affiliates together and involving them 
more closely in ongoing ECC work, these ECCs did not feel they were drawing new people into the movement, nor 
attracting significant press coverage. In all three regions those doing the work were still the same small group and 
distribution of media remained an ongoing problem. As the Johannesburg branch noted, conscription had not yet 
caught the popular imagination and so was not prioritised by many organisations. 213 Moreover, although the 
declaration represented a cogent analysis of the interconnection between apartheid and militarism, the implications of 
the radical call to end conscription were too risky for many whites. The state continued to try to shut down conscription 
debate, banning the issue of Objector which first carried the declaration, but the limited support of the white press 
212 DSD, lnsam, box 40, special situation report 85/84 30 October 1984. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A16.1, ECC press release 16 October 
1984. Folder 88.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 30 August & 13 September 1984. Folder 88.4.2, report of activities of ECC Western Cape March 
1984-February 1985. 
213 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 81 .4.1, Johannesburg ECC - an assessment of 1984 report. 
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suggested that it too, remained committed to a "total onslaught" rationale of both the conflict and the state's 
conscription demands. 214 
If the ECC was unable to raise support for the call to end conscription outside of extra-parliamentary cirdes, other 
aspects of conscription were nevertheless gaining momentum as opposition issues. The deployment of the SADF in 
black townships in September 1984 and Minister of Law and Order Louis le Grange's statement, that such deployment 
would continue if necessary, gave a new immediacy to the ECC's arguments as conscripts faced township call-ups. 
This brought the interdependence of the apartheid state and its military muscle into much sharper focus for whites. 
The state issued a blanket ban on the release of information regarding the deployment of troops in the townships by 6 
November 1984, but the use of conscripted troops in the townships encouraged ongoing discussion of the link 
between the SADF and continued apartheid rule. The liberal press discussed what patriotism meant in a South African 
context, and the public was made aware that SADF conscripts were being used in South African townships, despite 
the state's polemic about needing to increase the period of national service because of the external threat. 
By 1984, in significant contrast to the concerted white condemnation of the 1974 Hammanskraal Declaration, the 
internal deployment of the SADF created moral unease among whites and exacerbated existing political 
differences.215 The SABC radio programme "Microphone In", for example, found that the majority of callers who 
responded to a conscription show favoured a professional volunteer army and an end to conscription, and indicated 
that the use of troops in the townships had been a major influence on their thinking. The PFP faced an angry internal 
debate on its conscription policy, and the greater public debate around conscription which ensued led the liberal 
press, in particular, to adopt the position that conscription had implications for traditional liberal concerns like freedom 
of speech, human rights, and the rule of law. Although the English press and the PFP were still far from endorsing the 
ECC's declaration, there was an increasing acceptance that conscription opposition was a legitimate position, and an 
issue which had a place in public discourse.216 
While the debate around conscription in the latter part of 1984 neither encouraged a convergence between extra-
parliamentary and parliamentary initiatives on conscription, nor significantly raised the profile of the ECC,217 it 
indicated both that conscription was a fertile opposition issue, and that it had the potential to be politically divisive. In 
214 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B8.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 13 September 1984. See chapter seven for a more detailed analysis of the 
relationship between the press and the ECC. 
215 Daily Disoatch 21 November 1984, Cape Times 21 November 1984, Sunday Star 25November1984, Cape Herald 1 December 1984. Historical 
Papers AG 1977, folder 0, PFP Comment October 1984. 
216 Am.Iii 18 October 1984, Sunday Tribune 25November1984, Am.Iii 26 November 1984, Financial Mail 30November1984. 
217 An ECC press release questioning the suppression of news coverage of unrest, for example, was not published, although other organisations 
were raising the same issue and being recognised. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A16.1, ECC press release 9 November 1984. 
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such a context there was renewed scope for the ECC. The January 1985 national conference was an important step 
towards taking advantage of these new conditions, as structural changes gave the ECC a new organisational strength 
and focus. 218 Another significant aspect of the conference was to allow regional activists to spend time together, 
developing a sense of the ECC as a national movement and planning campaigns which would clearly project the 
ECC's message in order to avoid diffusing the limited available energy and resources.219 
The ECC also expected gains from working collaboratively, especially on the International Year of the Youth (IYY) 
projects emerging from the UN's 1985 focus on youth. Youth had been one of the ECC's most receptive 
constituencies thus far, and the churches and the UDF planned to take up the IYY campaign too. The ECC aimed to 
add a uniquely anti-conscription message to IYY, while recommending a joint focus with other groups in areas of 
common concern such as a proposed national day of protest commemorating the SADF invasion of Sebokeng. 220 
However, the ECC was also determined to create its own momentum, drawing other groups into its concerns, and to 
this end planned to focus both local and international interest on a high profile peace festival planned for June/July. 
The ECC intended to expand into new regions too. In Pietermaritzburg, Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth there was 
support for the formation of new ECCs. Pietermaritzburg activists were close enough to Durban to attend some ECC 
meetings there, stimulating interest in the ECC. In the eastern Cape, the "Dad's army" call-up of the commandos had 
brought conscription issues to the fore. In Grahamstown an advice centre on national service, Gracons, had been set 
up and received considerable publicity for exposing the attempts of the local commando to enrol those who were not 
eligible, while Rhodes student Dave Hartman had aroused local interest by challenging the theistic tenets of the Board 
for Religious Objection by objecting as a Buddhist. 221 While Port Elizabeth was considerably more conservative and its 
university was not a NUSAS affiliate, a number of ECC activists had relocated there, such as CO Pete Hathorn, 
journalists Mike Loewe and Gavin Evans, and Janet Cherry who had filled a number of leadership positions at UCT. 
These people had leadership skills and an understanding of ECC structures and principles, invaluable in an area with 
a very small white progressive movement. 
218 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B8.1.1, Cape Town ECC minutes 22 November 1984. 
219 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B8.8.3, a glaring example of how little national impact the ECC had had beyond existing constituencies was 
the enquiry in late 1984 by the government department handHng International Year of the Youth funding, offering a government subsidy if ECC 
g;ogrammes and projects were in keeping with the goals of the government! 
0 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A5.1.1, ECC first national conference Botha's Hill 25-27 January 1985. 
221 DSD Chief of the SADF, group 2, 107/7/5, box 90, memorandum on the Hartman case 4 February 1985, the SADF was deeply concerned that 
Hartman could have an advocate to argue his case, but because the SADF was not officially part of the Board for Religious Objection, and since the 
Board did not have the funds, it would not have an advocate. The SADF was particularly concerned that if Hartman won it would "open the door for 
any CO to apply and be categorised". 
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However, none of these three proposed regions had a branch of COSG, which had played an important role in 
getting the original three committees off the ground. The January conference therefore created the position of national 
organiser. The job involved keeping the regions connected, being a spokesperson for the ECC, conducting research 
and monitoring the public profile of the ECC in the press, helping in the creation of new ECCs, as well as liasing with 
sympathetic umbrella organisations like the UDF, SACC, SACBC, and international groups. Weaker established 
regions, like Durban, also hoped an ECC worker would stimulate the campaign there, as activists were overworked.222 
Laurie Nathan was unanimously chosen as national organiser, and he brought boundless energy and passion to the 
job, sometimes signing himself, with an almost biblical dedication, "the bricklayer".223 Through numerous handwritten 
circular letters he kept the regions in touch with one another, as well as making contact with overseas donor and 
support agencies. His enthusiastic grin began to appear in newspapers as he gave statements and interviews on 
behalf of the ECC. He appeared on public platforms and in debates representing the ECC and was so successful that 
the next national conference had to deal with the issue of how to develop more leaders and tone down his role. In 
1985, however, his energy was an important propellant. 
Although Nathan only earned R500 per month, such ongoing expenses necessitated plans for a more secure financial 
base and greater centralisation of finances. 224 A system of national and regional access to funds was established, with 
Steve Lowry as treasurer. This was a thankless job as enthusiastic activists were often careless bookkeepers, but 
financial accountability was crucial, not only to win overseas backers, but also because the state was able to use 
fundraising laws against anti-apartheid groups reliant on donor agencies. In 1985 more than half of the ECC's funding 
came from overseas groups. In many cases money was nominally sent in return for ECC pamphlets, stickers and 
other media in order to bypass fundraising laws. Sometimes it was quietly channelled through sympathetic 
organisations, predominantly the SACBC and SACC.225 
Final financial control was vested in the new national committee (initially called the national council) established by the 
national conference to improve communication and planning. Mandated to meet several times during the year, this 
222 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A5.1.1, ECC first national conference Botha's Hill 25-27 January 1985. 
223 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.2, letter from Laurie Nathan to "Dave· 11 April 1986. 
224 As a point of comparison, in 1985 a junior teacher's salary - one of the worse paid professions - was between R800-R900, depending on 
~nder. Natal Education Department salary advice slip February 1985. 
5 CO Richard Steele was also given introductory letters from the wee. This, together with his own contacts built up through his CO stand and 
overseas travel, allowed him to appeal to German aid organisations for some R27 000 and to approach overseas agencies for funding via their 
Africa desks. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A5.1.1, ECC first national conference Botha's Hill 25-27 January 1985. Box G2, ECC: monies 
promised and received 1985/1986. 
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body comprised one representative from each region, and the national organiser was responsible to it.226 The ECC 
was still strongly committed to participatory democracy, and so carefully hedged the national committee's authority, 
but it became a useful communication and discussion forum. 
Aside from constitutional and planning matters, as the most representative forum of the ECC the January conference 
also had to take decisions on potentially contentious issues which had arisen in its first year of operation, such as 
opening affiliation to the PFP Youth. Once again regional differences affected activists' views. The Johannesburg 
branch planned to challenge the PFP to a debate, as a means of raising the issue of conscription within its essentially 
liberal and left wing constituency, while multiracial affiliates in Cape Town opposed the PFP because of its continuing 
parliamentary participation. The conference thus decided that each region should decide on its relationship with the 
PFP. This proved a wise decision, as the Port Elizabeth branch, constituted later in the year, found the PFP a useful 
ally in a region with very limited extra-parliamentary white opposition.227 
Even the Cape Town group recognised the importance of liberal establishment contacts in generating "righteous 
indignation" in the face of state repression. An indication of what the ECC could expect was a security police raid on 
the last day of the conference. Although no arrests were made, papers were seized and formed the basis of a special 
situational report to the SSC. Since the ECC later identified one of the participants at the conference as a government 
spy, the intention of the raid may have been intimidation, as much as information gathering.228 
The January conference thus set a national direction for the ECC, put national structures in place and prioritised 
national campaigns for 1985, while also recognising that significant regional differences remained. In 1985 Cape Town 
and Johannesburg continued to have active input from UDF affiliates, while the multiracial component of the Durban 
group diminished as the threat of an extension of conscription faded in black areas and black activists increasingly 
focused on conflict in the townships. 229 Durban retained a strong Christian pacifist flavour. It contributed non-violent 
direct action training to the other ECCs, but its small size meant it sometimes was forced to rely on media from other 
226 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A5.1.1, ECC first national conference Botha's Hill 25-27 January 1985. 
227 Ibid. Folder B8.1.1, Cape Town Minutes 25 October & 8 November 1984. 
228 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1.1, Cape Town ECC report to national conference January 1985. DSD lnsam, box 40, Special Situation 
Report 25/85 11 April 1985. Cock, Colonels and cadres, p.143. Interviews with Steve Lowry and Durban member Sue Brittian (1998). The 
Johannesburg ECC identified Joy Harnden as a spy. Many of the ECCs were infiltrated by spies, although Brittian noted that they were often very 
easy to pick out and were given boring, non-sensitive tasks. However, the constant threat of state action also created a paranoia which may not 
always have been justified. A Pietermaritzburg ECC member responded to my questionaire with some bitterness saying that she felt that some 
elements within the Pietermaritzburg ECC had decided she was a spy, without giving her a chance to state her case. She was hesitant to answer 
the questionaire, and did so anonymously (1999). 
229 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B10.2, Durban ECC minutes 12 November & 10 December 1984. 
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regions. In Cape Town, by contrast, the popularity of the media subcommittee at times led to a lack of cohesion 
between itself and the general body. 230 
The lack of personnel in Durban also meant that proposed campaigns, like "Peace in the Park", with art and cultural 
inputs, became impractical, and existing campaigns, like a particular focus at the time of the call-up, were kept simple 
due to fears of over-committing the group. A more successful effort was to take advantage of the existing April Durban 
film festival, which already drew a more "alternative" crowd of whites. The ECC held a public meeting on campus, 
coinciding with screenings, and drew 150 people. This group was also outside of the normal ECC constituency, and 
proved interested in the talks, although not uncritical of the ECC's media and viewpoint.231 Cultural events were thus a 
means of drawing in a sympathetic fringe, but unlike in Cape Town where cultural activities were tightly linked to the 
ECC - such as the roadshow which operated as a subcommittee for part of the year - in Durban the culture group 
which developed towards the end of 1985 only had loose links to the ECC. 
Regions also continued to have differing procedural emphases. The Durban ECC remained committed to a highly 
participatory style, and only reluctantly agreed to a permanent chair for public relations purposes. It opposed the 
growing directive role of the national committee in the course of the year, arguing strongly that significant decisions 
must only be taken at the yearly national conference, where there was the greatest possible representation, and 
issues could be discussed on a person-to-person basis. The style of Durban general body meetings also emphasised 
highly personal interaction and mutual support among activists,232 whereas Cape Town and Johannesburg tended to 
be more activity- or information-centred. Cape Town valued procedure as a means of facilitating greater efficiency, 
and the group explored how to structure meetings so that subcommittees and people drawn in through open forums 
could be integrated better. In Johannesburg the ECC was largely driven by the initiatives and decision-making of the 
executive. While the executive would have preferred to reproduce activists, rather than having such a directive role, 
the front structure continued to produce a more distracted affiliate-based general body.233 
Active affiliate support continued to be a problem in all the regions. Few affiliates contributed to or attended the 
Durban film festival meeting and the church constituency did not participate at all. The Johannesburg ECC had a close 
230 Ibid. 
231 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 810.2, Durban ECC minutes 10 December 1984 & 24 April 1985. 
232 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 810.2, Durban ECC minutes 10 December 1984, 20 February, 3 April, 11 April & 2 November 1985, the 
minutes noted, for example, that the group cried with a member who had witnessed police brutality and "felt her pain about the terrible situation in 
SA". These shades of a 1970s encounter group were totally foreign to the brisker, more academic and political styles of Johannesburg and Cape 
Town. Similarly, the sharing of uplifting newspaper articles to generate a positive attitude was far removed from Cape Town's envisaged education 
of activists via a 15-minute information slot in meetings. 
233 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.1.2, Cape Town ECC minutes 28 February 1985. Folder 81.2, Johannesburg ECC executive meeting 10 
March & 9December1985. 
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relationship with JODAC, with joint projects like a stall at the Yeoville flea market, but other organisations tended to 
contribute to specific functions, such as a joint ECC-Black Sash picket before Republic Day. Affiliates' internal policies 
could also be problematic. JODAC, for example, took a hard line on participation in the SADF, excluding those who 
had served or were serving from publicly representing it,234 yet by 1985 the ECC was concerned not to develop an 
image which alienated the individual serving conscript. Nevertheless, affiliates remained important to the ECC. Both 
the Cape Town and Johannesburg branches began regional newsletters, designed to keep affiliates more in touch 
with the ECC. The Durban ECC articulated the reality of the affiliate-ECC relationship in all three regions, however, 
when it noted that the "ECC is becoming its representatives, not its affiliates".235 
Despite these regional differences, the common national focus did help to build a national ECC profile in 1985. A 
measure of the growing credibility of the ECC is that by midyear it was asked to contribute not only to the alternative 
Christian publication SA Outlook, but also to an academic project exploring aspects of militarisation and to a book on 
the freedom charter.236 However, the ECC was still learning how to use campaigns and events to maximise exposure 
and to push its own agenda. Although IYY had seemed to have great potential, targeting the youth, and supported by 
both the UDF and the churches, in practice it largely wasted the ECC's energy, and proved too nebulous to be a 
useful vehicle for ECC issues or the development of an ECC profile. Joint IYY meetings allowed for networking, but 
the ECC was fitting into others' campaigns rather than drawing them into ECC projects.237 Moreover, those directly 
affected, like white scholars, were targeted by the state's own IYY programmes, and the ECC did not have easy 
access to them.238 Durban pamphleteering of white schools, for example, provoked hostile white press.239 
By contrast, the March Uitenhage shootings by the security forces provided a more concrete platform for ECC 
demands and in all three regions public meetings were hastily arranged with other progressive organisations, drawing 
an estimated 500 in Johannesburg and 150-200 in Durban. While the Johannesburg ECC complained that working 
with other organisations could involve a large amount of effort but little visible public profile at the event,240 in April the 
joint meeting between the Cape Town Civil Rights League and the ECC to mark the fortieth anniversary of the defeat 
of fascism attracted favourable press. By linking itself with a military victory, the ECC hoped to emphasise the specific 
South African context of its opposition to conscription. Although part of the ECC's support base came from pacifist 
234 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 81.2, Johannesburg ECC general body meeting 21 May 1985. 
235 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 810.2, Durban ECC minutes 24 April 1985. 
236 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.1.2, Cape Town ECC minutes 29 May 1985. 
237 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.8.3, general report from the Youth Committee to ECC 14 February and April 1985. 
236 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 81.3, general report from the Cape Town ECC education subgroup. 
239 Natal Mercury 1 June 1985. 
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organisations like the Quakers, the high profile of a decorated soldier like Sir Richard Luyt helped move the ECC's 
profile beyond that of a peace organisation. 
Nevertheless, the ECC's contention that South Africa was in a state of civil war remained a problematic concept for 
whites. The Cape Town city council, for example, demanded the removal of the words "civil war" from ECC posters 
and both the Argus and Cape Times refused to print an ECC advertisement containing the term, daiming it had 
"awesome implications and should only be used with great care and circumspection and appropriate qualifications". 241 
This conservatism was exacerbated by renewed smear attempts linking the ECC to the "total onslaught" in an attempt 
to undermine its credibility. While pamphleteers found the general public slightly more sympathetic than previously, the 
ECC had to contend with incidents like the spraying of its slogans on buildings in Johannesburg - implying it was an 
uncouth organisation of vandals - and overt counter-pamphleteering, like an NSF pamphlet which claimed the ECC 
was playing Russian roulette with peace, continuing "total onslaughr themes by suggesting the ECC was 
irresponsible, and a pawn in the devious hands of the USSR.242 
The debate "SADF shielding the nation or defending apartheid?" between David Webster and PFP leader Frederick 
Van Zyl Slabbert in Johannesburg on 5 June further demonstrated the difficulties of getting the ECC's message into 
the white community. Given the delicate truce within the PFP on security matters, it is not surprising that Slabbert was 
scathing of the ECC position, labelling the ECC "dangerously nai"ve" and "counterproductive", or that the liberal press 
sympathetic to the PFP should endorse him. While the PFP Youth disassociated itself from Slabbert's comments and 
apologised to the ECC, it was clear that the ECC still had a long way to go in winning over even liberal whites, and 
that security issues remained highly divisive on the left.243 
Nevertheless, the debate renewed interest in conscription, so that three weeks later an ECC press release advertising 
its peace festival achieved a surprising amount of coverage in the English-speaking press. The ECC's developing 
international profile, boosted by actions like Richard Steele's address to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 
Geneva in March, encouraged overseas participation and interest in the peace festival. Locally, the SACBC's 
strategically timed statement denouncing conscription just before the festival further enhanced the profile of the 
241 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 68.1.2, Cape Town ECC minutes 25 April 1985. 
242 Historical Papers AG 19n, folder 68.1.2, Cape Town ECC minutes 10 January 1985. Folder 61.2, Johannesburg ECC minutes 16 April 1985. 
243 fil§!: 6 June 1985, Transvaler 24 June 1985. 
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ECC,244 while the refusal of visas to Monsignor Bruce Kent of the Campaign for Nudear Disarmament and human 
rights activist Cardinal Paolo Ams of Brazil, linked conscription issues with freedom of speech. 
The peace festival itself was a watershed in the early existence of the ECC. Slick promotional media, a professionally 
mounted, multifaceted event, and international speakers combined to draw press attention. The views of Carole 
Tongue, British member of the European parliament and member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, were 
well reported locally. The wealth of visual interest encouraged several newspapers to reproduce ECC media or 
showed ECC personnel against a backdrop of ECC media, encouraging further interest in the ECC, and making 
readers aware of its message. 
The festival tried to explore all aspects of conscription, from plenary sessions to debates and from cultural events to 
the personal stories of objectors. Visual displays were mounted to maintain the conscription theme even when moving 
between venues while wearable media took the message of the festival out into the wider commu_nity. As children 
were being introduced to non-violent games in creches, clerics Beyers Naude and Desmond Tutu were making an 
explicit connection between apartheid and conscription. Monsignor Bruce Kent sent a recorded message from 
London. Laurie Nathan explained how troops aggravated the situation in the townships. Past SWAPO official 
Mokganedi Tlhabanello told the festival why SWAPO had no reason to trust Pretoria and lay down its arms. Molly 
Blackbum, Port Elizabeth PFP Member of the Provincial Council for Walmer, gave eyewitness evidence of the costs of 
increased militarisation in eastern Cape townships and reported that troops were being used to carry out apartheid 
policies such as forced removals.245 This input was given added impact by the non-appearance of scheduled speaker 
Stone Sizane of the UDF, whose absence struck a sinister chord after the recent disappearance and death of fellow 
activist Matthew Goniwe. 
The peace festival thus represented the spectrum of objection from the personal to the political, from religious to 
secular objection, as well as moral and political CO. It gave whites insight into the impact of the SADF on blacks 
through the testimony of a Cape Coloured Corps objector, and speakers from SWAPO and the UDF, while 
demonstrating the uniting power of a common issue, with an estimated 1 000 people attending some of the events. 
The peace festival also drew more than 100 messages of support both locally and internationally, and the ECC's 
lobbying for these messages and the post-festival reports of people like Tongue helped to establish a greater 
244 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A16.1, ECG press release. Dailv News 24 June 1985, Citizen 24 June 1985, Star 24 June 1985. 
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international awareness of, and sympathy for, the ECC.246 Work on the festival further encouraged links between 
affiliates, while its success created the perception of a developing anti-war culture. While the state noted with 
satisfaction that a lack of funds and the absence of Kent and Arns had somewhat inhibited the festival, it was 
concerned that the ECG had succeeded in "attracting a broad spectrum of anti-government people and organisations" 
and was "developing an escalating following especially among students". 247 
The festival was therefore another important step towards encouraging public debate on conscription issues and a 
recognition of the validity of aspects of the ECC's position. While some reporters wrote with amusement of a "hippie" 
feel to the peace festival, in the liberal press the peace and justice themes were represented as essentially 
irreproachable, and the ECC's emphasis on traditional liberal values like freedom of choice drew a positive response, 
in contrast to condemnation of the clamp down on freedom of speech demonstrated by the state's refusal of visas to 
prospective festival participants. For the first time the ECG was able to gain some control over the kind of media 
attention it received and to shape its own image. After the festival the ECG was accorded a new respect in the local 
press as the "student longhairs" were perceived to have grown up.248 
As the ECG moved into higher profile campaigns from mid 1985, this growing openness to the conscription debate 
among whites contributed further to the pressures on the apartheid state, and ECG activists began to be targeted for 
state harassment. Soon after the festival on 21 July 1985 the state declared a partial state of emergency in parts of 
the Cape and Transvaal, giving it greater repressive powers and control over public meetings and publications. These 
new powers were used to harass activists like Clare Verbeek who had played a major role in organising the festival. In 
September five Johannesburg members were subjected to raids on their homes and to questioning. Document 
seizures further indicated that the ECG was becoming a sufficient threat for the state to consider ways to undermine 
and limit its appeal among whites. 
From slow beginnings in 1984, the ECG had emerged by mid 1985 as a movement with significant regional variation, 
but sufficient national cohesion to influence and encourage public discourse around conscription. In part this was due 
to organisational changes, in part due to campaigning, and in no small measure due to the actions of the apartheid 
state itself. As the NP was increasingly forced to rely on its security forces to maintain control in the face of a more 
246 A glaring exception is the conservative Orange Free State where the ECC never gained a foothold, although there was some very scattered 
underground opposition to conscription there too. The ECC monitored its impact through a press clippings service, but the results suggested the 
ECC had virtually no mainstream impact in the Orange Free State. Documentation Centre for African Studies ACC 326, Calender, vol.1, no.3, 
August 1985. 
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active externally-based ANG guerrilla campaign, as well as growing resistance within the country, the ECC's 
campaigning, limited as it was, presented a threat by encouraging pressure from the left for faster reform and 
demands from the right for increased control. ECG campaigning had also drawn attention to the moral and personal 
dilemmas inherent in conscription, undermining the state's "total onslaught" security discourse which encouraged 
white unity by redirecting white attention from the costs of conscription to the role of the SADF in promoting white 
security. 
WHERE1S THE BORDER NOW? 
SADF GET OUT! 
~c:o~ Chapter Four 
July 1985 - June 1986: 
The campaign takes off. 
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By mid 1985 a combination of tactics - including the integration of culture with protest, using big names to draw 
attention to conscription, and increased organisational capacity - meant that while regions continued to exercise their 
individuality,249 the ECC had become a recognisable entity, both nationally and overseas, and had proved capable of 
stimulating and influencing white public interest in conscription issues, particularly within the English-speaking 
community. 
Building on these gains between September 1985 and June 1986, the ECC continued to grow. The number of 
branches doubled, with more in the pipeline, facilitated by increased organisational efficiency. The ECC also began to 
address the Afrikaans community directly. Its international profile was maintained by a submission to the UN, and 
European and American tours by activists, while unambiguous and accessible campaigns widened the range of local 
support for the ECC, particularly where it called for alternatives to, rather than the ending of, conscription. A context of 
economic decline, political insecurity and growing social dislocation, together with unease at the internal deployment 
of the SADF further boosted white support for calls for alternatives to military conscription. Thus while the ECC was 
only a small part of the rising tide of opposition which forced the state to implement a full-scale state of emergency by 
June 1986, the emergency regulations specifically targeted the ECC, suggesting that the ECC's mobilisation of white 
youth and its expansion into the broader white constituency were perceived as a real threat by the apartheid state. 
This chapter will examine how and why the ECC was sufficiently successful between September 1985 and June 1986 
to warrant this kind of repression. 
In September 1985 the ECC launched a three-week "Troops Out" campaign, which involved individual and group 
fasts. This seemingly passive activity was an active challenge to the state on a number of levels, and the fact that the 
state began its first real repression of the ECC by detaining four members just before the fast indicated that it 
recognised this.250 Fasting was familiar to both the religious and human rights sectors of the white opposition, an 
action associated with crisis and penitence, and a means of protesting a wrong. In choosing to fast the ECC was thus 
signalling to whites that something was amiss within their society, as opposed to "total onslaught" which ascribed the 
source of the conflict to outside forces. In calling for a "fast for a just peace" the ECC was explicitly condemning the 
status quo as unjust, and by extension, the state's forceful protection of it. Fasting is often the weapon of prisoners, 
who have lost all other power. Through fasting the ECC was also encouraging white individuals to reclaim power and 
249 Despite their differences. the regions exercised a commendable degree of compromise. The declaration, for instance, was drawn up by Cape 
Town, and although both Durban and Johannesburg would have liked to have changed some of the wording, they proceeded rather than endlessly 
rewrite the document. Similarly, Cape Town appeared to have felt a little upstaged by the peace festival, and experienced difficulty integrating with 
local activists while in Johannesburg, but the overall perception of the festival was nevertheless positive. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A 15.1, 
ECC assessment of festival, conference and Laurie's role 29 July 1985. 
250 Janet Cherry was detained earlier during the July peace festival, but her wide involvement in progressive organisations made it unclear whether 
her detention was aimed at the ECC per se. 
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choice. The authoritarian discourse of apartheid society set decision-making as the right of the state and obedience 
as the duty of the citizen. By using individual conscripts to focus attention through their fasts, the ECC was revitalising 
the moral power of the early CO struggles, demanding that individuals be allowed to follow their consciences. 
Furthermore, the "Troops Out" campaign was a means of counteracting the state's attempts to deflect white interest 
from conscription issues and to contain the flow of information about its internal troop deployment. Even the timing of 
the campaign became part of the protest, beginning on the UN's International Day of Peace, 17 September, and 
ending on 7 October, a month after the first anniversary of the deployment of troops in the townships. In this way the 
ECC drew attention both to the state's year-long presence in the townships, and to the extent to which South Africa 
was out of step with the international community. 
By advertising the fast as "a democratic commitment to a just peace and to express solidarity with people suffering 
throughout South Africa", the ECC invited a wide range of participation, further underlined by the number of entry 
levels: a continuous three-week fast, relay fasts, public fasting, and private fasting, all culminating in a 24-hour fast 
which was to be as widespread as possible, finishing with church services and public meetings. Because it was a 
relatively unthreatening activity, the fast was suited to a white community with little activist history. It was also difficult 
for the state to contain. Not only could people participate as publicly or as privately as they chose, but if the state 
banned a fast "for a just peace", this would highlight its repressive role and raise questions about its moral authority, 
bringing it into direct conflict with the mainline churches which opened their facilities for the fast. 
Cognisant of the pressures on the apartheid state which had led to the internal deployment of the SADF in the first 
place, the ECC was under no illusion that its demands would be met However, precisely because the state could not 
afford to withdraw troops from the townships, it was vulnerable to the ECC's focusing of liberal and human rights 
protest on this issue. The "Troops Out" campaign was therefore intended to expose the essentially political nature of 
the conflict, the interrelationship between apartheid and militarism, and the costs this inflicted on both black and white 
communities. By building on existing white unease, the ECC also hoped to draw more whites into opposition. 
This campaign had additional impact because it ran in six, rather than the previous three, urban centres. Even before 
the peace festival, two new ECC branches were initiated in Pietermaritzburg and Port Elizabeth, and work in 
Grahamstown was in progress. 251 COSG had played a crucial formative role in the initial regions, but no COSG 
251 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.1.2, Cape Town ECC minutes 9 May 1985. 
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branches existed in the new regions. The greater organisational capacity of the ECC was thus an important factor in 
its continuing growth. The national organiser was able to build up contacts, circulate material, and represent the ECC 
publicly. These outside resources were important because the new regions had a less developed culture of white 
opposition, while the eastern Cape experienced particular1y harsh state repression. Branches in this region 
encountered ongoing harassment at a much higher level than existing branches. In the case of the Port Elizabeth 
branch this was the case from the day of inception, as some 60 University of Port Eiizabeth students attended the 
inaugural meeting and tried to vote the ECC out of existence before it got started. Co-operation with PFP Youth was 
thus not a matter for abstract debate, but rather afforded additional security in a dangerous confrontation with the 
state, particularty as the small size of the branches, and the overlap of activists' commitments made them more 
vulnerable to the state's targeting of individuals, like Port Elizabeth chair Janet Cherry, who was subjected to endless 
harassment, eventually detained and later released subject to severe restriction of her activist work. 
Although these new branches took varying amounts of time to become officially active, all were able to use the 
"Troops Our campaign to develop a public profile and to encourage affiliate action. In Grahamstown, for instance, 
conscription had already been taken up by NUSAS through the 1984 survey, an advice bureau on conscription was 
established in 1984, and the Grahamstown Committee of Democrats also raised conscription issues. The "Troops 
Out" campaign allowed the small local ECC interim steering committee to combine the opposition of churches, 
prominent individuals, academics, the local PFP, Black Sash and NUSAS. 
Like the eartier campaigns of the initial regions, the new Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown branches relied heavily on 
"nobs", people with status and credibility within the white community, to promote the fast. Academics, clerics, black 
leaders and PFP leaders were asked to fast in relay, and cultural activities and debates were arranged to draw further 
attention to the campaign. Grahamstown academic Andre Brink, for example, attracted an audience which the 
fledgling ECC could not, and when the SADF reneged on a planned debate with him, his scathing comment that the 
SADF seemed "only able to communicate through the barrel of a gun" was well reported. An ·Arts for Peace" concert 
also drew in people not necessarily interested in political issues. The detention of black leaders in the eastern Cape at 
the time of the fast encouraged further publicity for the ECC as the media supported the ECC's call for peace and 
dialogue and its questioning of the SADF's role.252 
252 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 86.1, Grahamstown ECC peace campaign report. Grocott's Mail 8 October 1985, Eastern Province Herald 4 
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While existing regions ran more sophisticated "Troops Out" campaigns, the common time frame of the campaign, 
together with the work of the national organiser, meant that information about the activities of the various regions 
could be fed into press releases, communication with affiliates, and sympathetic international organisations. This 
encouraged a stronger national picture of the ECC, which in turn benefited the emerging regions. 
In Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg, where conscription was more established as an issue, individual conscripts 
undertook to fast for a three-week period. During the day they were in public venues so that people could visit them to 
show support or discuss conscription. In Cape Town Ivan Toms declared that to serve in the SADF would put him in 
conflict with the people he felt called to serve as a township doctor. In Durban CO Richard Steele's credentials 
included being jailed for his pacifist convictions in 1980. In Johannesburg student Harald Winkler faced a January call-
up and was in the process of applying to the Board for Religious Objection. These regions were therefore able to 
move beyond the use of prominent people outside the ECC to draw in their constituencies, and to focus instead on the 
impact of conscription on ordinary people. 
Toms attracted the most publicity. His work among the poor in Crossroads and his public refusal to render further 
service in the SADF gave him considerable credibility in Cape Town. The local press ran regular updates on his 
mental and physical health during the three-week period, providing ongoing free publicity. Media interest in the fast 
also emphasised the range of objection, as the Cape newspapers noted the interfaith support for Toms from the 
Jewish and Moslem community, while a Weekly Mail interview with Steele and Winkler contrasted their pacifist and 
"just war" positions.253 
Concurrent events were designed to raise further questions in the white community, drawing attention to the 
campaign. In Johannesburg affiliates hosted a series of lunchtime meetings which explored the implication of troops in 
the townships through debates, cultural programmes and the testimonies of COs. A meeting of black and white 
mothers was particularly well reported in the media, although the meetings themselves did not attract large numbers. 
In Cape Town local artists contributed to an ECC "Art for Peace" exhibition at the Baxter Theatre, which attracted the 
attention of the local arts page in the Cape Times, reaching a wider audience than speeches and meetings.254 
The climax of the campaign in all regions was a 24-hour fast, a concrete expression of support for the call "Troops 
Out". It drew a response from sources as diverse as the Baxter Theatre staff, ECC affiliates, prominent individuals, 
253 Weekly Mail 27September1985. 
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ordinary people, and overseas groups like the War Resisters International (WRI), who staged a vigil outside the 
South African embassy in London.255 The Cape Town meeting to mark the end of the fast attracted particularly 
significant media attention. A multiracial crowd of some 4 000 people filled the city hall, sending an unmistakable 
signal to the government that conscription was an issue which concerned a broad range and a large number of 
people, making it a serious threat. 
"The "Troops Out" campaign thus raised public awareness of the ECC and sympathy for its demands by channelling 
existing liberal unease at the internal deployment of the SADF, strategising an accessible campaign with a clear 
demand, and establishing the link between the state's use of conscripts and the call to end conscription. Once again 
the state's own repressive mechanisms gave the ECC additional publicity. As an introduction to the campaign the 
ECC was able to use the court martial of conscript Alan Dodson to highlight the moral dilemma and lack of choice 
facing conscripts called to serve in townships. Unlike COs who refused to serve at all, Dodson could neither be 
written off as a "drop-out" or a "shirker". A lawyer doing his articles, he had an exemplary military record and had been 
awarded the Pro Patria medal. His objection centred directly on being called up to serve in the townships. While the 
judge president of the court reiterated the "total onslaught" line that South Africans "are standing with our backs to the 
wall and are fighting for our survival" and that the SADF was "trying to maintain the lawful society and protect the lives 
and property of citizens who do not have wherewithal to do so", Dodson's defence lawyer reminded the court that in 
most western democracies it was the role of the police to suppress domestic resistance, and that there was 
widespread opposition to the internal deployment of the SADF.256 The fledgling Pietermaritzburg ECC was then able 
to capitalise on the publicity generated by the trial of the former Pietermaritzburg student, holding a mock trial of the 
SADF at the university as part of their introduction to the "Troops Out" campaign.257 
The detention of Durban activists Richard Steele, Anita Kromberg and Sue Brittian, and Cape Town chair Mike Evans, 
just before the "Troops Out" campaign also stimulated public interest, just as the denial of Cardinal Arns' visa had for 
the peace festival. The detentions raised civil rights questions in the media and highlighted the state's repressive 
response to opposition. The state appeared to be attempting to investigate what the ECC was trying to achieve, to 
cast doubt on its legitimacy and intentions, and to remove activists from circulation. The four who were arrested noted 
that interrogation focused particularly on the history and structure of the ECC and COSG and the relationship between 
the two, ECC affiliates, alleged UDF and ANC links with the ECC, local and overseas finance for the ECC, overseas 
trips, and ECC work in schools. The Durban three were released when the court accepted their lawyer's argument that 
255 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A16.2, messages of support. Folder 88.1.2, Cape Town ECC minutes 10 October 1985. 
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Section 29 of the Internal Security Act allowed for arrest based on the subjective judgement of the arresting officer 
and was thus virtually impossible to disprove. Evans was released shortly afterwards in Cape Town, possibly to 
prevent a similar precedent in the Cape courts. 258 
Both the campaign and the repression increased the ECC's international profile. The ECC used its contacts to bring 
the detentions to the attention of Amnesty International and the Quaker UN office in Geneva, which in turn notified the 
western missions in Geneva. Sympathetic organisations were also sent "Troops Out" campaign material, approached 
for finance and given suggestions about how to take up campaigns in their countries. Solidarity fasts were held in 
London, Berlin, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Amsterdam, New York and Washington, raising awareness of the 
connection between militarism and apartheid and leading to actions like the resolution of the Ecumenical Commission 
for Church and Society in the European Community suggesting sanctions against South Africa and stating that South 
African COs should be given support, including refuge. Public figures like Cardinal Arns assured the ECC of their 
continuing support and influence. The campaign also raised the ECC's credibility among organisations committed to 
similar work abroad, like the WRI and the War Resisters League (WRL), leading to an invitation to the ECC to take 
part in an international conference tour in December, which further built the ECC's international profile and fund-
raising capacity. 259 
The fast was thus successful in raising questions and stimulating debate on a number of fronts, indicating that the 
scope of conscription as a mobilising force among whites was growing. While some ECC communications were still 
quite amateurish, such as handbills asking readers to set off a chain reaction by making ten copies and giving them to 
friends, in general the ECC's ability to develop a newsworthy campaign was becoming increasingly sophisticated, 
while interest in conscription issues was radiating beyond a student base. The "Troops Out" campaign generated 
renewed interest in conscription on the NUSAS university campuses in Durban and Johannesburg, but both 
Johannesburg and Pietermaritzburg noted that an older constituency was being drawn in too. The campaign further 
emphasised the power of integrating conscription and culture. While only 300 people attended the Johannesburg 
meeting to mark the end of the fast, an estimated 1 000 attended an ECC "Troops Out" campaign concert.260 
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Although "Troops Out" demonstrated the power of a single-issue campaign to generate a national profile, regional 
assessments suggested that differing conditions and emphases at the local level still affected the ECC's power to 
infiltrate white communities. No other region approached the support achieved by the Cape Town rally. In Durban, for 
example, the largely religious pacifist image of the ECC, together with the detention of key figures shortly before the 
fast, meant that only an estimated 150 attended the closing ceremony, although the fast and detentions stimulated a 
higher profile for the ECC on the Durban campus, with four students fasting. By contrast, just 100 kilometres away in 
Pietermaritzburg, despite the region's fledgling status, the fast stimulated great press interest, and some 200 people 
attended the final meeting. 
The other new regions, Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown, found that the fast promoted internal growth, encouraging a 
committed core to develop, and facilitated interaction with township groups, so that in Port Elizabeth the concluding 
ceremony drew some 250 people. Relay fasts, however, lacked the human drama of a three-week fast, and unlike 
Toms' numerous daily visitors, the Grahamstown branch reported that the fast had not drawn in visitors or built 
interest. The limited personnel of the new regions also meant activists were exhausted by the campaign.261 Moreover, 
some post-campaign reviews expressed concern that the fast had been too narrowly Christian in orientation, and 
questioned whether the image of the ECC as a peace movement, developed through the peace festival and the 
"Troops Out" campaign, was appropriate.262 
Despite these ECC reservations, clearly the state felt threatened by the campaign. The context of growing white 
discontent at continued call-ups and internal SADF deployment, together with the lack of resolution of South Africa's 
economic and political turmoil, played an important role in the ECC's growing national profile. The state attempted to 
counter this by muddying the ECC's image and creating public confusion about its goals. In addition to harassment of 
activists before the campaign, and General Malan's accusations on 21 September 1985 that the ECC was aiming to 
break down law and order by weakening state machinery, harassment of the ECC continued after the campaign. The 
SADF released a pamphlet attacking the ECC. In October major Afrikaans Sunday newspaper Rapport, in an article 
designed to undermine the ECC's credibility and justify any state action against such a "dangerous" and "subversive· 
organisation, accused the ECC of being a front for the ANC. Similarly, the Sunday Times carried a full page NSF 
advertisement which backed conscription as a patriotic duty, and argued that the ECC had a hidden agenda, linking it 
to the ANC and UDF, while claiming that it ignored important "realities" of the South African conflict.263 This increased 
261 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 81.4, evaluation of "Troops Out Campaign" and "Fast for a Just Peace" {undated). Folder 85.3, Port Elizabeth 
ECC assessment of "Troops Out Campaign" {undated). Folder B6.1, Rhodes University ECC report October 1985. 
262 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 81.1.4, evaluation of "Troops Out Campaign• and "Fast for a Just Peace· {undated). 
263 Bmm2!127 October 1985, Sunday Times 6 October 1985, filfil 21 September 1985. 
70 
level of attack suggested that the overall impact of the ECC was disproportionately large, given its small numbers 
and limited resources. The relatively weak Pietermaritzburg group, for example, noted that despite their limited 
regional impact, the level of harassment they faced indicated that the state took them seriously.264 
The successes of the peace festival and the "Troops Out" campaign meant that by the time the ECC met for its next 
national conference in January 1986 it was a significantly more visible and co-ordinated movement. Difficulties chiefly 
resulted from the relative weaknesses and constraints faced by the regions, and the challenges of campaigning with a 
small group of activists in the face of the state's aggressive "total onslaught" propaganda and repressive capacity.265 
The ECC's shifting volunteer base of activists, and particular1y the large student component meant a high turnover of 
membership. The Pietermaritzburg branch, for example, stood to lose ten members at the end of 1985, a significant 
number in a small branch. Other activists became burned out by the workload and left ECC, since, as Durban activist 
Paul Graham put it, "it became impossible to do everything and have a life".266 
Growth also created organisational challenges. The national organiser could no longer cope with all the work. At a 
local level, an ongoing concern was the successful integration of new members and affiliates drawn in by national 
campaigns and regional profile-building activities such as regular stalls at flea markets. There was the danger that 
long-term members' shared activist vocabulary and experiences, and their often intimidating level of commitment 
could alienate or threaten newer, more tentative members. Within the ECC there was a tendency for campus ECCs to 
be exclusively campus-centric, and for subcommittees to be task-oriented, rather than relating to the wider functioning 
of the ECC. Art and cultural groups in particular were attracted by the ECC's message, without necessarily wanting to 
become full-time activists. In Durban "Artists against Conscription" was set up as a subcommittee of ECC, but 
remained only loosely affiliated, and in Cape Town a group specifically called the "loosely-affiliated group" agreed to 
produce t-shirts as long as it was not required to attend meetings.267 Trust also took time to develop in a climate rife 
with the threat of state infiltration. The Port Elizabeth group, for instance, was plagued by the leakage of documents, 
like those used by Rapport to suggest the ECC was in cahoots with banned organisations. To counter these trends 
264 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1, Johannesburg ECC annual report and evaluation 12 January 1986. Folder 811.3, Pietermaritzburg ECC 
refort (undated). 
26 Johannesburg had 30 regular participants at general body meetings and Durban eight by the end of 1985. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 
A3. 1, Johannesburg E CC annual report and evaluation 12 January 1986. 
266 Interview with Durban ECC member Paul Graham (1998). 
267 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1.2, ECC Cape Town annual assessment in preparation for the national conference January 1986, Durban 
ECC report February 1986. 
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ECC branches set up consolidation efforts ranging from Johannesburg affiliate newsletters to Cape Town orientation 
groups, and the national organiser was charged with planning regular skills workshops. 268 
The regional context of branches continued to affect their impact and emphasis. In Port Elizabeth the ECC had 
contributed to township pressure in a business boycott which forced a temporary withdrawal of troops from the 
townships. The ECC in Port Elizabeth thus argued for a new emphasis on the cost of the war, targeting business.269 In 
Cape Town the concerns of a parents' group led to a "Cadets Out" campaign. In Johannesburg there was sufficient 
Afrikaans interest in the ECC to initiate an Afrikaans subcommittee. Context also affected the success of actions. The 
Pietermaritzburg branch, for example, noted that it had gained few activists, and suggested its members needed to be 
less introspective and more positive. However, it was more difficult to encourage an ECC culture in Pietermaritzburg, 
known locally as "sleepy hollow", than in Cape Town, where an ECC focus could be added to a more vibrant existing 
cultural base. Cape Town's numerous local bands, for instance, facilitated big concerts. 
In addition to problems of internal cohesion, the ECC continued to face a tension between its nominal commitment to 
the front structure and the reality that the ECC was increasingly an independent organisation, 270 particularly as the 
multiple focus and limited activist base of affiliates continued to limit both the penetration of an anti-conscription 
message into affiliate organisations and affiliate involvement in ECC. However, in weaker areas, like Pietermaritzburg, 
the front structure remained important, with the affiliate PACSA, for example, taking over conscription work among the 
churches. In the eastern Cape the extent of state repression and the small size of white opposition also made the 
contribution of affiliates particularly valuable. 
As the ECC's most representative forum, the 1986 national conference was mandated to address these problems, set 
direction, and facilitate greater organisational efficiency. It will therefore be useful to examine the decisions and goals 
of the conference, and how these were implemented. 
The Afrikaans community was particularly targeted for 1986. This was a bold move as some of the most vituperative 
attacks on the ECC had been from the Afrikaans press and anti-ECC propaganda was widely distributed in Afrikaans 
areas. However, there would be significant advantages for the ECC if it could widen its support base within the white 
268 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1.2, ECC Cape Town annual assessment in preparation for the national conference January 1986, Port 
Elizabeth annual assessment for January 1986 conference, national organiser's report to national conference, January 1986. 
269 Manuscripts and Archives BC 912, folder A5, Port Errzabeth motivation for "Working For a Just Peace" campaign February 1986. 
270 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1.2, ECC Cape Town annual assessment in preparation for the national conference January 1986. Folder 
81 .1.4, evaluation of "Troops Out Campaign• and "Fast for a Just Peace' (undated). 
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community. Afrikaans-speaking ECC members would be invaluable for drawing in more of the Afrikaans community, 
as they would have a better understanding of how to target the anti-conscription message in the light of their different 
historical and cultural background. National organiser Laurie Nathan, who was co-ordinating work within the Afrikaans 
community, noted that the ECC would have to work differently in this constituency as the ideal of freedom of choice 
was secondary to concepts of patriotic duty and obedience to authority. Moreover, academic Dawid Bosch warned 
that the Afrikaans church was too tightly tied to the government to be responsive to the ECC's message. Rather ECC 
sympathisers might face the kind of cultural isolation of a "dissident• like Beyers Naude. The Afrikaans press, too, was 
largely impervious to the ECC message until the emergence of Die Vrye Weekblad in 1988. 271 
Campuses proved slightly more amenable. From 1985 the ECC had been putting out feelers in Pretoria, where UNISA 
Theology Department staff had expressed interest, and in Stellenbosch, where there was potential support from 
campus. In both areas much of the initial work relied on personal contact, both from members of the ECC and the 
national organiser, as these regions lacked any significant opposition or activist structures. Laurie Nathan and Cape 
Town ECC member Mike Rautenbach did considerable spadework at Stellenbosch, meeting with a wide range of 
lecturers and student leaders to explain the ECC's demands and to assess Stellenbosch students' views on 
conscription and the role of the SADF,272 so that during orientation week ECC media could be tailored to an Afrikaans 
constituency. In Johannesburg, contact with Rand Afrikaans Universiteit (RAU) academics also helped initiate an 
Afrikaans subcommittee of the ECC called Eindig Nasionale Diensplig (END), which began operating by March 1986. 
This slower, more tentative approach was inevitable in a largely unsympathetic constituency. By the mid 1980s there 
were some dissident Afrikaans voices, like rock singer Koos Kombuis, but overall the response to the ECC still tended 
to be hostile or indifferent, and Afrikaans ECC posters tended to be torn down particularly fast.273 Moreover, the state 
had considerable power to intimidate this sector of white society. In 1985, for example, a group of Stellenbosch 
students had intended to visit the ANC in exile, but were intimidated into staying at home. Nevertheless, the internal 
deployment of the SADF seemed to concern Afrikaans students too. ECC media targeted this issue, with t-shirts 
asking 'Waar is die Grens Nou?" and the modification of the popular Afrikaans film series "Boetie gaan border toe" to 
"Boetie gaan Athlone toe".274 
271 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1, ECC Johannesburg annual report 1985, minutes of national conference 1-3 February 1986. Manuscripts 
and Archives BC 912, folder A 19, national organiser news 28 May 1986. 
272 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B9, ECC branch set up in Stellenbosch, newsletter from Laurie Nathan 20 March 1986. 
273 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1, ECC Johannesburg annual report 1985, minutes of national conference 1-3 February 1986. 
274 A black residential area where troops had been deployed. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B9, ECC branch set up in Stellenbosch, newsletter 
from Laurie Nathan 20 March 1986. 
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The social action aspects of the "Working for a Just Peace• campaign also had appeal for Afrikaans students, and 
by 25 March 1986 a working group of some 25 students was set up to generate projects at Stellenbosch. The Pretoria 
branch took longer to constitute. The headquarters of the SADF, Pretoria was a city with a strong military ethos and 
presence in the white schools, and the ECC made little headway at the Afrikaans-medium Universiteit van Pretoria. 
The potential of the Pretoria branch was further limited by the imposition of a state of emergency soon after it began 
operating. Nevertheless, its very existence represented a defiant gesture. 
Despite the limited success of the ECC's attempts to organise in the Afrikaans sector, its efforts quickly attracted 
repression. Stellenbosch rector Mike de Vries banned the ECC on campus, severely restricting its ability to organise 
and advertise. In Johannesburg Joy Harnden, later identified as a spy, was the contact person between the English 
and Afrikaans groups, suggesting the state wanted to monitor this development closely. There was also evidence of 
state infiltration in the developing Stellenbosch branch.275 
However, the ECC's work in the Afrikaans community was only one aspect of its increasing constituency. Another was 
the focus on cadets. From 1976 the school cadet programme had been administered by a standing interdepartmental 
committee comprising representatives of the army and Education Departments, with the Defence Ministry carrying the 
budget. A requirement in all state schools, the cadet system was intended to prepare school pupils physically and 
psychologically for the SADF. Although the 1957 Defence Act gave parents the option of refusing to allow their sons to 
participate, a combination of peer pressure, ignorance about the provision of the act and apathy meant that generally 
only Jehovah's Witnesses objected.276 
The importance of cadets for the state can be seen in its allocation of resources. The 1984/1985 budget for cadets 
was expected to run between R61 and 62 million, and teachers were given incentives like CF credit for serving as 
cadet officers. Teachers doing national service were also pre-selected for officer training and encouraged to earn 
medals, thus presumably inspiring boys with their heroism. This suggested that while the state hoped to attract boys to 
cadets, targeting their "adventurousness, youthful liveliness and natural dare-devilry" by giving them the opportunity to 
handle weapons, participate in marching bands, visit military bases and go on survival camps, the essence of cadets 
275 Mark Behr, later exposed as a state spy, supported the ECC in Stellenbosch, even making a public opposition stand, so that he was bracketed 
with Ivan Toms and Philip Wilkinson in the CllR publication Countrv and conscience (London, CllR, 1988). DSD lnsam, box 40, 25/85, special 
situation report 11April1985. Cock, Colonels and cadres, p.143. 
276 Between 1983 and 1985 I taught at a predominantly Afrikaans high school in northern Natal, where a significant sector of the staff insisted 
Jehovah's Witnesses be excluded from consideration for prefectship because they refused to do cadets. Since adolescents are notoriously unwilling 
to stand out from the crowd where this might involve ridicule, objection to cadets was not common, but rather required a considerable degree of 
religious or political conviction, and thrived best in a supportive liberal environment. 
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was ideological, rather than just the knowledge and skills to prepare boys to be more effective soldiers.m The cadet 
programme gave the state a unique opportunity to inculcate "total onslaught" thinking into future conscripts, 
encouraging them to accept the state's definition of patriotism, its identification of the enemy, its analysis of the nature 
of the conflict, and hence, its conscription demands.276 
From December 1985 a section of the Cape Town ECO began to develop a "Cadets Out" campaign. As with 
conscription, it was illegal to dissuade anyone from participating, but it was still legal to campaign to end cadets.279 
However, schools were a difficult constituency. Unlike the mobile, independent student group, pupiis lacked a high 
level of political awareness and could be restricted by their parents and teachers, denying the ECO access. The 
campaign therefore concentrated on media with instant eye appeal, cartoons, stickers, and items of direct use like 
timetables. Slogans like "schoolyard today, townships tomorrow - no thanks!" questioned the state's justification of 
conscription and its deployment of the SADF, and indicated that cadets had a choice. Like its adult campaign, the 
ECC's "Cadets Out" campaign also appealed to school pupils' self-interest. A "Cadets Our pamphlet began, "Many 
school students feel that cadets is a waste of time .. ." Another pamphlet appealed to parents, addressing concerns 
about the impact of conscription on their sons and advertising the Conscription Advice Service.260 
In general, private schools proved a much more fertile ground for protest than state schools. In all the regions most 
school participation in ECO camp(ligns was by private schools, and more specifically by individual concerned 
teachers, rather than the schools per se. During the "Working for a Just Peace· campaign the ECO "Cadets Out" 
group contacted principals and asked for an opportunity to speak to pupils. Private schools responded more 
sympathetically, but since many of them already offered alternatives to cadets the ECO was still preaching to the 
converted. 
In Cape Town a "Pupils Awareness and Action Group" was formed at the end of 1985, in conjunction with UCT. This 
group tried to raise conscription issues among its peers at schools, and produced a newsletter. While the 
Pietermaritzburg ECO expressed concern that the ECO should not impose ideas on scholars or do their organising for 
them, in practice the school constituency did not effectively organise itself on a sustained basis. The campaign did 
create new avenues for attracting affiliates, however, through groups specifically concerned with education issues. 
mDSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MV/61/1211, vol.11, box 209, memorandum from the Minister of Defence November 1984. Vol.11, box 210, 
memorandum 18 July 1985, the fact that no cadet officers were to be used for 'unrest' control also suggested a strategy of keeping cadets separate 
from the more contentious area of the internal SADF deployment. 
278 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MV/61/12/1, vol.11, box 209, memorandum from the Minister of Defence November 1984. 
279 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A7.5.6, minutes of a workshop around the 'Cadets Out" campaign 7December1985. 
280 Manuscripts and Archives BC 1102, folder F2, 'Cadets Out' pamphlets. 
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Despite the limited impact of the campaign, the state's concern at the potential extension of the ECC's reach can be 
seen in repressive measures like the banning of an ECC picket of Cape Town schools, and the arrest of two 
pamphleteers. 281 
A third new constituency within the white community was that of "campers" (those with outstanding CF camps). Those 
currently serving in the SADF were almost impossible to reach, due to the punitive pressure the SADF could exert and 
its anti-ECC propaganda, but those with continuing CF commitments formed a large group potentially open to 
demands such as the withdrawal of troops from the townships or the extension of alternatives to military service. 
Some were also politicised, or at least disillusioned, by their first-hand experience of the dehumanising effect of the 
military or the moral dilemmas created by their experience of, or participation in, SADF actions. A return to civilian life 
also emphasised the burden of conscription as camps interrupted progress in the personal and professional lives of 
returning conscripts. The ECC was concerned that its ability to mobilise this group was limited by the perception that it 
was "anti-soldier". In developing contact with conscripts, the ECC thus emphasised its interim demands, the legality of 
its campaign, and the internal deployment of the SADF.282 
In addition to identifying new constituencies for 1986, the January national conference examined how to consolidate 
and expand the ECC's public profile. Cultural actions had proved particularly appealing among youth. The December 
1985 release of ECC record and tape "Forces Favourites", for example, demonstrated that an anti-conscription 
message could be successfully integrated into popular youth culture. Subverting the title of a radio programme of 
music requests for servicemen, the music featured local bands addressing conscription dilemmas through a range of 
styles and from a number of perspectives. In a market notoriously unsympathetic to local musicians, the ECC only 
aimed to sell 10 000 copies, but within the first week the initial pressing was sold out. 
Besides spreading the ECC's message, music also reached constituencies which were otherwise problematic. 
Despite the difficulties of mobilising the school population, "Forces Favourites" prompted several school pupils to 
contact the ECC, and the record also led to music reviews in the press, while the process of recording cemented ECC 
relationships with musicians. The whole project further established the ECC as a contemporary movement, in tune 
with the mood and problems of white youth. Moreover, the impact of conscription also affected musicians, reinforcing 
the ECC's contention that conscription was a burden for whites, an imposition which interfered with their dreams and 
281 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 811.7, programme for 1986 schools sub-group ECC Pietermaritzburg 13 February 1986. 
282 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1, minutes of national conference 1-3 February 1986. Folder A3.1.2, provisional agenda for 1986 national 
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careers. The ECC planned to use appropriate cultural events to attract an older audience too. The Cape Town 
group noted that the "Art for Peace" exhibition had "created a ripple effect within the arts community", enhancing the 
ECC's reputation as a "dynamic political organisation". 283 
Another important part of the ECC's ability to spread its message into the wider white community was continuing work 
with the press, sending out regular press releases and developing relationships with sympathetic journalists. 
Supportive press coverage of the September detentions and the "Troops Out" campaign indicated the potential of 
concerted press work. In Pietermaritzburg good press coverage in the Natal Witness helped the new ECC in its 
struggle to establish a profile. Regions like Durban felt they had developed good relationships with local journalists, 
while ECC members who were journalists pushed ECC stories. The ECC was thus able to create a media impact out 
of proportion to its numbers. 284 
In addition to this building of a national profile, the campaigns of 1985, together with the December/January 
international conference tour by Laurie Nathan and CO Pete Hathorn stimulated overseas interest in the ECC, and 
encouraged activists by demonstrating the range of potential and existing support for anti-apartheid activity. Nathan 
was able to report that an anti-apartheid rally at Trafalgar Square attracted 100 000 people, while the Arns visa 
debacle had been instrumental in the Brazilian government imposing sanctions against South Africa in July 1985. 
The WRI conference also made ECC activists aware that they had not "even begun to realise the full potential of 
international solidarity networks". Numerous European radio, newspaper and television interviews allowed Nathan and 
Hathorn to explain what the ECC stood for, and contributed to responses from a range of groups and individuals 
seeking more information on the ECC, and supporting its work.285 The fact that the ECC contributed to multiracialism, 
as well as the social upliftment implicit in its planned "Working for a Just Peace" alternative service project, gave it 
considerable overseas appeal, and by early 1986 the ECC had been asked to make a presentation to the UN Special 
Committee against Apartheid and to tour the USA under the auspices of WRI. 
Although the state tried to block the ECC by denying visas to several ECC members, Gavin Evans was able to 
present the ECC submission to the UN in March. He used affidavits collected by Black Sash from township residents 
283 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1, minutes of national conference 1-3 February 1986. Folder A3.1.2, ECC Cape Town annual assessment 
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to argue that the SADF was the apartheid state's primary means of upholding minority rule by force, and urged UN 
member countries to "do everything in their power to end apartheid", and to give political asylum and refugee status to 
those who conscientiously refused to serve in the SADF. In addition to its impact on diplomats, the speech was 
covered by Reuters and the BBC, reaching a wide international audience.286 
After addressing the UN, Evans embarked on a six-week tour of the USA He met with over 50 national peace and 
anti-apartheid organisations as well as ten congressional aides and congressmen, gave interviews to over 35 
newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations, and spoke to numerous community, religious and student 
groups. He was able to communicate both a CO and political objector stance which further consolidated the range of 
support for the ECC in the USA However, while trying to propagate the ECC's message, Evans tried to avoid giving 
the state reasons to clamp down on the ECC, and was therefore concerned when people at meetings called for 
disinvestment "off their own bats". He tried to avoid associating with the ANC both at a personal level and on public 
platforms despite their common opposition goals, and the fact that a number of ANC members were known to him.287 
This growing overseas interest in the ECC had a number of organisational implications. Firstly, within South Africa it 
was easier for women to play a high profile role in the ECC, as men often feared being victimised by the SADF if they 
were associated with the ECC.288 The outside world, however, wanted to hear the conscript's voice. The ECC's 
participatory style, the single issue campaign and the growing threat it faced largely contained the potential for internal 
gender conflict over leadership and representation as pressure increased for men to represent the public face of the 
ECC. 
Secondly, overseas interest significantly increased the workload of the national organiser. In assessing Nathan's work, 
the national conference expressed some concerns. Regions had tended to rely on Nathan for national co-ordination 
and public speaking, giving him a high public profile similar to that of a national president. Campaigns like the peace 
festival led him to take on a greater co-ordination role as the national committee met only every couple of months. The 
nature of the job meant that he had a better overall grasp of the ECC than many regions, while his enthusiasm and 
energy made him a good interviewee. During the September detentions, however, it became clear that over-
centralised co-ordination could be a problem, while Nathan was concerned that he might set too fast a pace for new 
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regions. 289 These concerns demonstrated the tension between the commitment of the ECC to the ideal of non-
hierarchical participatory democracy, and the practical reality that over-committed activists were often delighted to let 
Nathan take charge, while outside influences, like the press, demanded authoritative spokespeople. 
Nevertheless, having a national organiser had benefited all regions. New branches had been encouraged, both in their 
start-up phase and during initial campaigns, by the presence of the national organiser and his ability to round up 
material, personnel and "nobs". Even in established regions the national organiser had been able to give a wider 
perspective. For instance, when the Cape Town branch encountered temporary setbacks in 1985, Nathan was able to 
remind them of the wider gains of the ECC.290 The success of the national organiser encouraged the national 
conference to create another salaried position, that of national secretary, first held by David Shandler. This job 
involved co-ordination, press work and international liaison as well as public relations to consolidate existing contact, 
and in anticipation of further international attention, as well as to free the national organiser to concentrate on 
organising new and future regions. The national secretary was to operate from a proposed national office in 
Johannesburg because of the proximity of major press networks like SAPA and Reuters. 
In addition to these functions of setting direction and streamlining organisation, the 1986 national conference also had 
to decide how to deal with the realities of harassment. Some areas had been under a partial state of emergency since 
the peace festival. Following Ivan Toms' high profile during the "Troops Out" campaign, he was briefly detained in 
October 1985, and his premises searched. In Port Elizabeth, harassment was a way of life as activists were singled 
out for intimidation.291 
In Johannesburg, harassment, including detentions and house searches, had forged tighter bonds between members, 
producing a "defiant spirir and a renewed sense of urgency and purpose. Harassment could also be used to further 
the ECC's cause. Toms had become a public figure and his detention made the news, unlike the many faceless others 
detained. On other occasions action against the ECC made the state look foolish or unduly aggressive. In December 
1985 a candlelight procession by 23 Cape Town organisations, including the ECC, was broken up by security police, 
prompting numerous cartoons and news columns deriding the state's actions. In January 1986 the Cape Town ECC 
built a sandcastle in the shape of the Cape Town castle, emblem of the SADF. The security police ordered them to 
demolish it, again provoking much ribaldry from the English press, and questions in parliament. These kinds of 
289 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A6.1, national organiser's report to national conference January 1986. 
290 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1, minutes of national conference 1-3 February 1986. 
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creative actions involved a minimum of effort and expense, and by exposing the authoritarian repression of the state 
encouraged opposition from a sector of white society not necessarily sympathetic to the ECC per se. Regional 
exploitation of harassment also drew local attention. In Johannesburg, for example, the city council decided to deny 
maternity leave to all employees whose husbands were COs and the ECC and others campaigned against this 
decision.292 In Port Elizabeth the ECC began to highlight the stand of local CO Philip Wilkinson, who faced a trial and 
possible jail term following his rejection by the Board for Religious Objection in February 1986. 
Perhaps the most significant work of the national conference, however, was to strategise the national campaigns for 
1986. The major national focus for the first half of 1986 was to be the "Working for a Just Peace" alternative service 
project. While the ECC's "civil war" analysis had been difficult for many whites to accept, and the ECC had been 
criticised as an essentially "anti" movement, the "Working for a Just Peace" campaign allowed the ECC to exploit the 
wider appeal of its interim demands, while demonstrating an alternative understanding of patriotism, and emphasising 
its positive goals of freedom of choice and a just peace. The campaign also modelled democracy as service projects 
were set up in consultation with black communities. 293 
The campaign posed a direct ideological challenge to the state. As the state was forced into increasingly repressive 
measures, including a partial state of emergency from July 1985 to March 1986, the "Working for a Just Peace" 
campaign focused on the claim that peace without justice was untenable and that justice required active white 
participation. The campaign slogan "Construction Not Conscription• challenged the state's positive associations of 
reform with conscription, rather suggesting that conscription was essentially negative and destructive, and focusing on 
alternatives which would build communities and encourage multiracial dialogue. 
Durban ECC activist Beatrice Schofield suggested the significance of the ECC's contribution thus lay not in 
"presum[ing} to understand township politics" but in targeting "an important symbolic centre of apartheid - the 
military . ..294 The call for alternatives was a particularly successful oppositional move, as the ECC represented the 
extreme left of the discussion, but it encouraged less radical calls, like the PFP's recommendations for a volunteer 
army and the church's insistence on a widening of CO. Thus while prominent church leader Michael Cassidy of Africa 
Enterprise would not endorse the ECC Declaration in 1984 because he felt focusing on the Defence Amendment Act 
292 Historical Papers AG 19n, folder B1.11, proposed objection to Johannesburg Management Council regarding proposed maternity leave 
amendment (undated). 
293 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A3.1, minutes of national conference 1-3 February 1986. 
294 Interview with Durban ECC member Beatrice Schofield (16 May 1998). 
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offered a "more realistic chance of success",295 by 1986 the "Working for a Just Peace" campaign showed that the 
ECC had learned how to incorporate moderate conscription objection, thus extending the conscription debate in white 
circles and consequently increasing pressure on the state as it had few non-military options in the face of increasingly 
organised and vocal black opposition. 
The state attempted to counter growing criticism of conscription and its CO provisions by setting up the Geldenhuys 
Commission in 1985 to investigate the national service system. While concerned organisations were invited to make 
submissions, the consultation was largely cosmetic. The committee reported to the SADF, not parliament, thus 
avoiding debate of its findings, while the staffing of the committee with newly appointed head of the SADF, General 
Jannie Geldenhuys, two officers from the SADF and a representative from Armscor, meant a predictable conclusion 
that the existing system was "satisfactory".296 The state then used the Geldenhuys Commission's findings to justify 
turning down all calls for changes to the conscription system. 
There were a number of reasons why the state remained obdurate. Firstly, the SADF had become an important player 
in state decision-making and the SADF was extremely concerned about its manpower capacity. Secondly, in the face 
of political threats from the CP and a worsening socio-economic climate, the state remained committed to a threat-
based conflict analysis, intended to maximise white cohesion. It therefore could not allow ideologically based CO 
within the white community, as this would legitimate alternative analyses of the South African conflict. Thirdly, as 
conscription demands on whites increased, it was important to be seen to spread the load as fairly as possible. Any 
further widening of exemption could aggravate white dissatisfaction. The state therefore refused even to consider 
releasing religious objectors for service in welfare and religious organisations, despite its difficulties in placing them in 
government departments.297 Lastly, SADF records suggested that Defence Minister Magnus Malan was an 
authoritarian whose personal style militated against strategic compromise. The ECC focused white attention on the 
bankruptcy of the state's policies precisely because its demands were not met. Given the size of the ECC, and its 
relatively small support base, accommodation of its CO proposals could well have buried the movement, and indeed 
PFP politicians Philip Myburgh and Graham Mcintosh, who were unsympathetic towards the ECC, urged the state to 
do just that, pointing to the low application rate encountered by the Board for Religious Objection. However, revealing 
episodes like Malan's determination to punish CO Charles Yeats, and his suggestion that teachers who refused 
295 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 811.1, letter from Michael Cassidy of Africa Enterprise to Jae Boulle 9 August 1985. Like many white South 
Africans Cassidy became more sympathetic to the dilemmas of conscripts when the issue touched his family directly. In 1988 Cassidy's nephew, 
18-year old Charles Bester was sentenced to six years in prison for refusing to serve. 
296 The Conscriot, vol.2, no.3, 1986, p.4. DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MV/61/14/1, vol.6, box 211, letter from the Minister of Defence to Philip 
Myburgh 24 July 1986. 
29 DSD Chief of the SADF, group 2, 107/7/5, box 90, report on the condition of religious objectors 11 April 1986. 
81 
training as cadet officers should be "removed from teaching" 298 indicated that he took opposition personally, and 
was determined to confront and crush such opposition. As a result of the state's refusal to widen its definition of 
objection and its continued punitive accommodation of objectors, not only the ECC, but also churches and human 
rights organisations mobilised around alternatives to military service, while the state's inability to accommodate these 
demands kept the issues alive. 
The "Working for a Just Peace" campaign focused a dual spotlight on the continuing deployment of troops in the 
townships, as well as the lack of alternatives to military service. The ECC's alternative service demands thus proved 
to be one of its most widely accessible and popular platforms. The campaign made concrete demands which were 
perceived as more realistic, while still allowing the ECC to question the state's reliance on, and deployment of, the 
SADF, while highlighting the consequent denial of choice and of freedom of conscience to individual conscripts. Form 
letters sent out to win support for the campaign continued to reiterate the analysis of the declaration and "Troops Out" 
campaign, that the root cause of the violence was an unjust society, and that conscription was forcing white South 
Africans to take up arms against fellow South Africans. However, the ECC now emphasised that its actions were a 
positive protest, an attempt to "contribute constructively to improving the nature of our society", encouraging 
individuals to believe that their actions could make a difference.299 
The campaign took place in April 1986, with regions staggering events as they saw fit. Like the "Troops Out" campaign 
fast, the activities of the "Working for a Just Peace" campaign were, in themselves, above reproach. Community 
upliftment was a concern both of churches and human rights activists. Painting creches and hospital wards, planting 
gardens and running children's holiday programmes drew some 600 volunteers nationally, and created media interest. 
Like the "Troops Out" campaign, these activities also carried an implicit ideological challenge, inviting comparisons 
between the state's authoritarian imposition of "reformed" apartheid and the ECC's consultation with communities, the 
negative impact of military intervention in the townships as opposed to the positive contribution of service projects, 
and contrasting the number of volunteers exercising choice in alternative service with the lack of choice facing 
conscripts, particularly in terms of township duty. 
Once again, the ECC drew attention to its "Working for a Just Peace" campaign projects through a series of creative 
and culture-based actions and vibrant media. In the planning stages, symbolic actions like beating a sword into a 
298 DSD Ministry of Defence, group S, MVN/61/1212, vol.45, box 216, undated concept response by the Minister of Defence to a letter from a 
teacher refusing to undergo leadership training 31 August 1984. 
299 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B11.1, "Working for a Just Peace" circular letter (undated). 
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ploughshare, planting olive trees to symbolise peace, and sowing wheat as a sign of regeneration in SADF-occupied 
townships were considered, although most regions eventually settled on more practical, conventional activities. 300 
The established regions planned more adventurous events, like a peace picnic and a peace ribbon, incorporating the 
declaration demands, which was painted by prominent people in Johannesburg. Durban planned an art exhibition 
featuring prominent artists under an ECC umbrella. Cape Town hosted a section of the Cape Town Film Festival. PFP 
member of parliament Alex Borraine addressed the opening night, and the ECC included a number of free screenings 
at UCT as part of the festival, which played to full houses. A "Live Jive" concert at the Baxter was studded with big 
name musicians from Cape Town, generating further press interest.301 The ECC also held a photographic exhibition at 
the Baxter Theatre, entitled "South Africa in Conflict: Protest, Resistance, Power", which was estimated to have drawn 
"hundreds each day". The exhibition was very successful and the ECC planned to tour it, and to create a book around 
the photographs, with a historical contextualisation by Professor Colin Bundy, who also opened the exhibition. 
Like the "Troops Out" campaign, the "Working for a Just Peace" campaign intended to maximise its impact by 
culminating nationally on 30 April. The most high-profile events were rallies planned for Johannesburg and Cape 
Town. The Cape Town rally was attended by an estimated 3 500 people, and drew prominent Cape Town speakers 
like PFP Member of the President's Council Di Bishop, UDF speaker Trevor Manuel, and Archbishop Tutu. The 
Johannesburg rally drew about 1 000 people, and the ECC's message was given added impact by the public arrest of 
CO Philip Wilkinson just before the meeting.302 
Even smaller regions were pleased with the impact of the "Working for a Just Peace" campaign. Although the 
Pietermaritzburg branch was less than a year old, some 350 people attended its "Working for a Just Peace" campaign 
meeting, and 70 volunteers participated in work projects. The Grahamstown group, although still not officially 
launched, noted that this "type of activity seems to make a favourable impact on the liberal constituency''. In this 
region the campaign also led to closer contact between town and campus ECC groups as well as township 
organisations, although not drawing significant numbers of new people into the ECC.303 
300 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.1, update from national secretary David Shandler 26 March 1986. 
30
' Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.1, Cape TaNn ECC newsletter 12 April 1984. Folder B8.1.3, Cape TaNn ECC minutes 24 April 1986. 
Folder 88.8.3, report on photographic exhibition (undated). 
302 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.1, newsletter from David Shandler to the various overseas groups supporting or sympathetic to the ECC 
21May1986. 
303 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.2, Grahamstown ECC report to national committee May 1986. 
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Overall, the "Working for a Just Peace" campaign was extremely successful on a number of fronts. Firstly, it drew 
volunteers into the ECC. Secondly, it provided human-interest stories, encouraging good media coverage of the 
campaign. Thirdly, it encouraged a more positive public perception of the ECC. In strategising the campaign, the ECC 
had wanted a clear finish to activities so the organisation would not turn into a peace corps or service agency. The 
campaign was so beneficial, however, that Laurie Nathan urged regions to consider ways to run further "Working for a 
Just Peace" campaign actions, as a means of continuing the campaign gains: numerical growth for the ECC, 
excitement generated within affiliates, and the enhancement of the ECC's image as it was seen to be "doing, not just 
talking and protesting". Within the black community the campaign also helped to counter the anti-white feelings 
generated by security force actions in the townships.304 
By May the ECC was thus considerably strengthened. It planned to run a survey which it intended "more as a political 
intervention than a sociology exercise". With General Malan refusing to release conscription figures, the ECC planned 
to gather an alternative data base, while interviews with a proposed 50 000 white South Africans would make the ECC 
better known on the streets, and encourage people to think about conscription. A pilot survey in Johannesburg 
indicated that while only 30 per cent of those surveyed knew about the ECC, between 70 and 80 per cent supported 
the idea of choice rather than conscription into the SADF.305 This suggested that ongoing alternative service work was 
a fertile area for developing white opposition to conscription. 
The ECC was also building on the gains of the "Working for a Just Peace" campaign, feeding those attracted by the 
campaign into progressive organisations and surveying non-governmental bodies as part of a campaign to push for 
the accommodation of COs outside of government departments. "Working for a Just Peace" campaign work 
continued. The Stellenbosch branch, for instance, attempted to organise white visits to Crossroads, both to distribute 
goods, and as a deterrent to security force action there. The banning of the ECC on Stellenbosch campus also 
generated publicity as the media took up the ECC's attempts to reverse this. Further work in the Afrikaans community 
included the inauguration of the Pretoria branch on 16 May, and a meeting at RAU in Johannesburg where two 
veterans shared their experiences. Middleburg, Bloemfontein and East London had also expressed interest in the 
ECC and the national organiser was investigating the viability of new branches, while campuses were asked if a third 
national p9sition should be considered, that of national campus co-ordinator who would facilitate their work. To further 
consolidate the successes of "Working for a Just Peace" the ECC began planning for a concerted action around the 
304 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.2, Grahamstown ECC report to national committee May 1986, letter from Laurie Nathan to "Dave• 11 
A~ril 1986. Folder A4.2.1, Cape Town ECC newsletter 12 April 1984. BoxA5.2, ECC memorandum to the churches March 1986. 
30 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B1 .4, motivation for a "Working for a Just Peace· survey 9 March 1986. 
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July call-up, and a December cultural festival in Cape Town, which would draw a multiracial spectrum of art, dance, 
music and theatre around anti-conscription themes.306 
However, the context of ECC work was becoming increasingly difficult. As the state felt more threatened it acted more 
repressively, and as it did so, its actions increased strategic and ideological tensions within the wider anti-apartheid 
opposition movement. The Johannesburg "Working for a Just Peace" campaign meeting, for instance, had to juggle 
the agenda as black speakers refused to appear with a white speaker involved in the National Convention movement. 
Even within the ECC there was conflict between the Johannesburg and Cape Town ECCs over the participation of 
controversial Afrikaans activist Breyten Breytenbach on an ECC platform.307 
Increasingly harsh state actions also worked in the ECC's favour in some cases. SADF raids on frontline state capitals 
in May 1986 were a potent reminder of a central tenet of the ECC's campaign: that the apartheid state used the SADF 
to perpetuate white rule through military force. The raids encouraged collaboration between the ECC and its affiliates 
to mount an impromptu mini campaign. The forceful public arrest of Philip Wilkinson also generated publicity for the 
ECC. High-profile speakers at the "Working for a Just Peace" campaign meeting denounced the arrest, and attention 
was once more focused on the use of conscripts in townships and the lack of alternatives to military service. The 
SACBC committed itself to publicising and funding the Philip Wilkinson campaign, while the ECC's national secretary 
kept international backers updated as the ECC prepared to campaign around Wilkinson's trial. 
As the bombing of the frontline capitals suggested, the apartheid state was increasingly running out of momentum. 
Threats like renewed Commonwealth and US demands for an end to apartheid increased the state's reliance on the 
military to defend the status quo internally and to push for regional advantage. On 12 June 1986 the state's repressive 
capacity was unleashed against the growing opposition movement, as a nationwide state of emergency came into 
effect, giving the security forces wide-ranging powers and indemnity, while imposing stringent limits on the flow of 
information and the activities of opposition movements. 
The period between September 1985 and June 1986 thus saw the ECC achieving considerable success because of 
increased organisational capacity, as well as growing experience in how to present an accessible anti-conscription 
message to the white community. While the ECC was only a small part of the opposition which was building within the 
306 Histolical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.2, letter from David Shandler to the various overseas groups supporting or sympathetic to the ECC 21 
May 1986. 
307 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.2, letter from Dr Alex Boraine to Marlene Powell 5 May 1986, memorandum to ECC regions from 
Johannesburg ECC (undated). 
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country, it nevertheless represented a peculiar threat to the apartheid state. The inherent tension of the state's 
conscription demands on the white community had encouraged sufficient interest in conscription as an opposition 
issue that the ECC was formed in late 1983. As this tension intensified between 1985 and 1986 so the ECC had 
increasing scope to campaign, as well as a more receptive white constituency. Growing black opposition intensified 
the state's need for a strong coercive capacity, making it vulnerable to the ECC's call for alternatives to military 
service. However, where the state was forced to use military containment of internal opposition, this was not so easily 
explained by "total onslaught" propaganda. The ECC thus posed a secondary threat in that its continual focus on 
troops in the townships and its articulation of white discontent around conscription and consequent call for alternatives 
exacerbated political divisions among whites and undermined the ideological power of the state's security discourse. 
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The specific targeting of the ECC in the June 1986 emergency legislation demonstrated that the state recognised 
the organisation's unique oppositional challenge to the security discourse. State of emergency regulations changed 
the opposition landscape, undermining the ECC's platform and intimidating its constituency. However, as the ECG had 
always claimed, the burden of conscription on whites was an inherent contradiction of the apartheid state, not an issue 
created by the ECG. The increased coercive capacity of the state thus did not resolve its fundamental difficulties. 
While the state of emergency limited the flow of information, it could not disguise the existential realities of general 
economic decline and social dislocation. Although emergency regulations increased the state's power to act against 
its opponents, they simultaneously intensified the demands of conscription on white individuals, families and the 
economy. Despite the state's attempts to curb the conscription debate and its continued use of the security discourse 
to maintain white political cohesion, this changing cost:benefit ratio of conscription for whites meant that the ECG 
continued to have both a platform and an audience. This chapter will examine how the state's contraction of the legal 
space for extra-parliamentary opposition after mid 1986 forced the ECG to re-evaluate its campaign, but was 
ultimately unable to limit the opposition potential of conscription issues. 
Initially, the state's attempts to disrupt and undermine the ECC were effective. State of emergency legislation made it 
an offence to produce or distribute "subversive statements" that could "incite the public to discredit or undermine" 
conscription, thus curtailing the legal space to campaign.308 Harassment of the organisation and its activists further 
limited the ECC's capability. Within two weeks of the declaration of the state of emergency 30 ECG members were in 
jail and 50 ECG homes had been raided, sending the remaining activists into hiding. ECG regional offices closed. 
General body meetings ceased, as did media and campaign work. In the Western Cape the ECG was prohibited from 
making "any utterance", while in the Eastern Cape it was barred from holding any meetings whatsoever. 
As Laurie Nathan later noted, "The repression was not simply intended to stop high profile campaigning. It also aimed 
to disorganise us by intimidating our members." The new periphery drawn by "Working for a Just Peace" quickly fell 
away in the face of a state crackdown including house searches, detentions and even threatened deportations. 
Moreover, as the ECG responded by tightening security, avoiding the telephone, destroying documents and changing 
meeting places, it increasingly looked like an underground organisation, which exacerbated the problems of 
maintaining and attracting membership, as well as affecting its image among the broad white public, and even on the 
308 Manuscripts and Archives BC 912, folder A13, ECG reviews 198615 February 1987. 
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white left. The state of emergency thus increased the costs of supporting the ECC, while at the same time 
undermining the credibility of the ECC and the urgency of its issues among whites. 309 
While the ECC had not penetrated much beyond the liberal white sector, even liberals' support of the ECC was 
eroded by the state of emergency. Privileged whites were not spurred by the political and socio-economic oppression 
of apartheid, so the state could more easily intimidate and confuse them by curtailing the flow of information and 
criminalising extra-parliamentary opposition. Moreover, a situation of continuing conflict and disinformation diluted the 
liberal outrage utilised by the ECC during the "Troops out Campaign". This was particularly true of Natal where 
escalating conflict between lnkatha and the UDF led some black communities to express a preference for troops 
rather than police in the townships.310 
Support for the positive alternatives suggested by the "Working for a Just Peace" campaign was similarly undermined 
by the repressive conditions under the state of emergency. While some white liberals followed the lead of Ors Slabbert 
and Borraine in abandoning parliamentary politics in disgust, the rising emigration statistics of the period suggested 
that many others, despairing of economic and social stability and political reform, were withdrawing from the country 
altogether. By mid 1987 the replacement of the PFP by the CP as the official opposition created further "hopeless 
anger" and "despondency" among the ECC's existing and potential constituency, as well as demonstrating the 
continuing ability of the security discourse to limit white parliamentary opposition to apartheid.311 
In addition to this confusion within its primary constituency, the state of emergency circumscribed the ECC's public 
programme, making its call seem less differentiated from other peace calls. This led to a new pressure from the 
broader democratic movement - itself under stress - to abandon the single-issue position and move closer to the 
multifaceted opposition of the UDF. The state of emergency thus not only targeted the ECC's platform, organisational 
capacity and constituency, but also led to a questioning of the ECC's role from within the opposition movement 
itself.312 
309 Ibid. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.2, minutes of the ECC national committee meeting 17-19 October 1986. 
310 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.3, national committee report May 1987. 
311 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.2, minutes of the ECC national committee meeting 17-19 October 1986. Folder A2.1.3, ECC: the future 
(undated). Box H8, coalition workshop report 22 February 1987. 
312 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.3, national committee report May 1987, the UDF expressed concern that the ECC was trying to win 
support among conservative elements of the white community. While the ECC took the UDF's criticism seriously, in its internal planning a key 
question regions were asked to discuss was in which sector the ECC was seeking legitimacy. The ECC noted that "some of our success is due to 
the fact that we distance ourselves from the [National Democratic Movement]". While the ECC maintained cordial links with the UDF the internal 
debate eventually produced a decision that the ECC's primary constituency was still the white community. Archives and Manuscripts BC 912, folder 
A13, box A13, ECC reviews 1986 15 February 1987. BC 1072, box L6, Cape Town ECC minutes 14 April 1987. University of Natal, 
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Earlier in the ECC's existence these pressures might have succeeded in crushing it, but by mid 1986, the ECC's 
internal organisation and external contacts had given it a measure of resilience. Within a month of the declaration of 
the state of emergency, national secretary David Shandler began to activate the ECC's support base, and soon 
messages of support for the ECC and condemnation of state repression were received from British opposition 
politicians Neil Kinnock and Dennis Healey, American senator Edward Kennedy, civil rights leaders Philip Randolph 
and Bayard Rustin, as well as humanitarian, anti-war and church groups, and individuals in Europe and America. 313 
As it recovered from the first blow of detentions the ECC began to explore the extent of the remaining legal space to 
campaign. At first, regional ECCs worked with other local groups concerned about the curtailment of rights and 
information, such as the "Coalition for the Right to Know" in Johannesburg, which drew some 1 000 people to a public 
meeting. After consultation with lawyers, the ECC was reassured that it could still use its name and campaign for a 
just peace, and this, together with the release of 43 of the ECC detainees by September, encouraged the organisation 
to begin campaigning again. 
The September "Right to Speak" campaign used the repression itself to draw attention to conscription, by demanding 
that, as a legal organisation, the ECC be allowed to state its case. 314 Once again the ECC drew on the endorsement 
of prominent figures to legitimise and publicise the campaign through their participation. The main thrust of the 
campaign was a newspaper advertisement, endorsed by 45 church leaders, members of parliament, authors, 
academics, sportsmen and other well-known personalities, calling on the government to recognise freedom of 
conscience. In Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Pietermaritzburg high-profile people headlined ECC public 
meetings calling for the right to speak, while an intensive media blitz used teasing slogans like "Would you like to 
know our views on conscription? Sorry we can't tell you.· 315 
The ECC further tried to empower the white public by encouraging them to participate in a postcard campaign calling 
on President P.W.Botha and PFP leader Colin Eglin "to recognise the right to express opposition to military 
conscription and end the silencing of the End Conscription Campaign". In this way, despite the limited capacity for a 
specifically anti-conscription thrust, the ECC was still able to generate opposition by encouraging whites not to accept 
the state of emergency, and by demonstrating how the state was eroding white freedoms. 
313 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A6.4, national secretary's report December 1986. 
314 Archives and Manuscripts BC 912, folder A13, ECC reviews 198615 February 1987. 
315 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A16.3, ECC press release 24 September 1986. Folder 81.7, declaration for the "Right to Speak· campaign. 
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The ECC soon found, however, that it was now operating in a very different context. Cape Town had always been 
its most supportive region, yet a turn-out of only between 700 and 800 people at the September "Right to Speak" 
meeting demonstrated how badly the state of emergency had frightened the white public. Similarly, the September 
and October yellow ribbon campaign - based on Vietnam War protest using yellow ribbons as a tangible 
demonstration of protest against repression - had limited success in Johannesburg and Pretoria. A strong security 
force presence meant that ribbons were quickly taken down in the streets, while the ECC's limited public profile made 
it difficult to impose the ECC's opposition message over entrenched associations of yellow with cowardice.316 
Despite the ECC's renewed ability to campaign, the state of emergency also inhibited national cohesion. Limited 
communication and travel opportunities meant that national workers like Laurie Nathan felt isolated from the branches, 
while branches often seemed to have turned inward, lessening their concern for the national impact of the ECC, and 
focusing their energies on protecting the activists and activities of their particular region. All the regions noted a need 
for internal education and a drive for new membership, further demonstrating how the state of emergency had 
disrupted both the internal functioning of local ECCs and their capacity to reach their communities.317 
The state of emergency also limited the support of affiliates. The front had never worked effectively. With the ECC in a 
state of flux it came closer to collapse. Affiliate participation in ECC activities dropped, as affiliates also struggled with 
limited personnel and an increased need for security. While the more difficult conditions encouraged the ECC to 
overcome qualms about the PFP Youth, which was finally admitted as an affiliate in October 1986, and Slabbert's 
quitting parliamentary politics led to a new rapprochement between his new Institute for a Democratic South Africa 
{IDASA) and the ECC, the state of emergency also exacerbated tensions on the left. The University of the 
Witwatersrand ECC branch, for example, found that tensions within NUSAS spilled over into the campus ECC.318 
These more difficult national conditions led to a rash of regional campaigns at the end of 1986. The Durban group, 
with its strong pacifist influence, took up an "Anti-War Toys" Christmas campaign. This was endorsed by local 
churches and gained some sympathetic press. In Johannesburg, the deployment of troops in township schools was a 
matter of such concern that the Johannesburg ECC adopted a dual focus, "Right to Speak" and "Troops Out", 
316 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.2, newsletter from David Shandler to the regions 18 September 1986. Folder A 16.3, ECC press release 
24September1986. 
317 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.2, letter from Laurie Nathan to "Dave 12 September 1986. 
318 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.2, minutes of the ECC national committee meeting 17-19 October 1986. Folder A4.2.2, Johannesburg 
newsletter 7November1986. Folder 810.1, Durban ECC newsletter 17October1986. 
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including a women's protest stand outside Witwatersrand Command. In Cape Town a "War Is No Solution" 
campaign looked at the costs of the war. 319 
Once again, however, the repressive capacity of the state was an important limiting factor. Some projects, such as a 
book arising from the April photographic exhibition in Cape Town, were cancelled altogether. The state barred outright 
some ECC actions, like the proposed peace walk to a local Cape Town township, while actions such as the women's 
protest outside Witwatersrand Command were quickly dispersed. In December further detentions - including nine 
ECC activists in Cape Town and four in Johannesburg, with a further 12 being issued with restriction orders- together 
with a tightening of the emergency regulations and a proposed amendment of the Defence Act after Buddhist Dave 
Hartman won a Supreme Court case against the Board for Religious Objection, suggested that the state remained 
determined to block forcefully the oppositional potential of both the ECC and conscription. 320 
Thus although harassment was an ongoing reality for much of the ECC's campaigning, it is perhaps most relevant to 
discuss it here, as the state of emergency of 1986 gave the state unprecedented powers against its opponents. The 
state also began concerted smear campaigns. Physical harassment was intended to limit the functioning of the ECC 
by breaking up planned activities, confiscating material and detaining leadership, while smears aimed to undermine 
the credibility of the ECC's message among its target audience. This combination of physical and ideological 
harassment increased significantly the costs of supporting the ECC, while forcing the organisation onto the 
defensive. 321 
Detentions and bannings did not just disrupt the organisation; they also increased the costs for individual activists. A 
19-year-old Durban woman was interrogated 12 times, sometimes by as many as 15 security policemen during a 16-
day detention. A Port Elizabeth activist was involved in a minor traffic accident and subsequently arrested for 
attempted murder and held for three days before this charge was dropped. A Grahamstown activist was threatened 
with previous shoplifting charges. Those holding foreign passports feared deportation, while other activists faced 
ongoing levels of stress as they were aware of being under surveillance, and received obscene and threatening phone 
calls. 322 Johannesburg chair Claire Verbeek was detained for 98 days, 11 weeks of which were spent in solitary 
319 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.2, Johannesburg newsletter 7November1986. 
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confinement, and was described as "fragile" after her release. At least three ECC members received psychiatric 
treatment as a result of their detentions, and Port Elizabeth activist Mike Loewe's hospitalisation for asthma and 
depression after two weeks in solitary confinement is further evidence of the personal costs of opposition.323 Laurie 
Nathan later suggested that because activists were often "young and cocky" they were confident that being white 
would be a protection again harsh state action. He and Gavin Evans made a media opportunity out of their adventures 
escaping out of windows and using disguises, offering their stories to sympathetic newspapers like the Weekly Mail. 
However, Grahamstown activist Sue Lund's comments to supporters that "I have never felt as ignorant and helpless 
as I do here"324 indicated the grim reality of living through indefinite detention without trial. Clearly, the state had 
considerable power to oppress ECC activists in this period. 
If detentions were a means of immobilising activists, other forms of harassment were intended to scare, damage and 
disrupt. A substantial part of the national office's mail was misdirected. Numerous vehicles owned by ECC activists 
were tampered with, from regular tyre slashing to sabotage. Attacks on activists also ranged from intimidation, like the 
January 1986 visit of security police to Pietermaritzburg activist Anton Krone's employer, to physical assaults on 
activists who were mounting placard stands or staffing ECC information booths. In 1986 and 1987 respectively, a 
Johannesburg ECC home and the Cape Town office were petrol bombed.325 
This intimidation campaign had a number of successes. In Pretoria, foreign-born Black Sash leader, Annika van 
Gylswyk, was forced to leave the country, and the Grahamstown branch reported that two members with foreign 
passports had withdrawn from ECC.326 Similarly, while the front was strong enough to take over the limited Cape 
Town campaign after the leadership was detained in December 1986, the removal of experienced activists in smaller 
and newer regions both affected the capacity of the group to maintain a public presence, and intimidated potential 
members. The Port Elizabeth branch only began campaigning again in March 1987, while the fledgling Pretoria 
branch virtually collapsed.327 As repression limited campaigns, all the branches found that ECC members became 
323 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A22.8, update on repression against ECC 7 August 1986. Folder A4.2.2, letter from David Shandler to the 
Director of the UN Centre for Human Rights. 
324 Archives and Manuscripts BC 912, folder A24, Sue Lund prisoner of conscience pamphlet. l.Suttner, Cutting through the mountain (Sandton, 
Viking, 1997) p.183. 
325 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A10.5.6, report on the period from July 1986 to September 1987. Folder A 11.1.5, letter from national secretary 
Adele Kirsten to Bob Woito director of World Without War 8 September 1987. Folder A22.2, Durban ECC list of harassment AprR 1986-January 
1987. Folder B8.4.4 Cape Town ECC harassment report February-August 1988. 
326 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A22.3, Grahamstown ECC repression report (undated). Folder A22.4, update on repression against the ECC 7 
August 1986. 
327 The older demographic of this branch made activists particularly vulnerable. Activists had children. careers, financial commitments and "tittle 
activist background to sustain them•. Steve Lowry interview. Moreover, Adele Kirsten suggested that in both Pretoria and Stellenbosch the 
Afrikaans activists drawn to the ECC were often very hard tine, having little patience with strategic compromises, because the cost of opposition in 
their context was so high, Adele Kirsten interview. 
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demotivated and new workers were not drawn in. Although subcommittees continued to operate, the democratic 
functioning of the ECC was also affected by a lack of centralised decision-making and discussion of issues. 328 
Nevertheless, the ECC used the continuing detention of its activists to focus public attention on the state's repression 
and on the call to end conscription. In Port Elizabeth, for example, a series of innovative press campaigns reminded 
the public that Janet Cherry was still detained without charge. Her right to vote in municipal elections was debated in 
the press, a romantic story was created around another ECC member being arrested for trying to talk to her through 
her cell window, and she was nominated for the .filgr Woman of the Year "Rising Star" award. In November 1986 
Amnesty International adopted her as its "Prisoner of the Month", while the ECC was also able to stimulate high-level 
French interest as a result of Cherry's 1985 trip to France.329 Similarly, the detention of Steven Markovitz, the son of 
Cape Town's mayor, was a media opportunity for ECC to highlight both the state's repression and the plight of its 
activists.330 Within South Africa these detentions also aroused the support of liberals. PFP Law and Order 
representative Helen Suzman demanded ''When people like Janet Cherry have been in detention since August 1986 
... tell me how we differ from a police state." While emergency regulations prohibited calls for the release of detainees 
or even the publication of their photographs, the ECC was thus able to use the apartheid state's very power to repress 
it as an opposition issue. 331 
However, the ECC wanted to campaign actively, rather than merely defensively respond to the state. Previously, the 
ECC had used cultural events to great advantage within the white community, such as concerts which attracted youth. 
As so many other avenues of public work were blocked by the state of emergency, the ECC's planned cultural festival 
in Cape Town in December 1986 - to "promote culture as a progressive medium of political communication" - was 
expanded beyond a purely ECC event, to act as a "massive public spectacle of resistance culture in the midst 
of ... repressive conditions". Speakers from the UDF, COSATU, the ECC and churches were to be given platforms 
amongst the cultural activities, while the symbols of the apartheid regime were to be subverted through activities like a 
planned candle-light tribute to heroes of struggle on 16 December, a holiday which endorsed the apartheid position 
that white dominance, gained through military force, was sanctioned by God.332 
328 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A6, ECG notebooks (undated). Folder A22.4, update on repression against the ECG 7 August 1986. Folder 
610.1, Durban ECG newsletter 17October1986. 
329 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.2, newsletter from David Shandler to the regions 12September1986. 
330 Star11 May 1987, Caoe Times 19 May 1987. 
331 Cherry received over 500 letters of support from church groups, peace movements and individuals from four continents. Many prominent 
individuals and groups petitioned the government for her release. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A22.6, Port Elizabeth repression report 1 July 
1986. Interview with Port Elizabeth member Dominique Souchon (1999). Cory Library for Historical Research MS 17804/1 Glover collection, ECG 
gam phlet: state versus peace. 
32 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A15.2; report by festival organiser Mike van Graan (undated). 
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The festival was planned in traditional ECC format with high-profile public events, but the state of emergency 
context created new difficulties for white sector opposition. Black oppression under apartheid meant that black 
communities were sympathetic to the idea that opposition to an illegitimate system was not bound by the rules of that 
system. By contrast, support for the ECC came only from particular sub-sections of the privileged white community, 
and was limited by the broader normative understanding of whites that "the rule of law" and "parliamentary 
democracy" were not only operating, but were central to the reform process, thus limiting support for opposition 
outside of the law. Consequently, when the state banned the arts festival there were no legal avenues to salvage it, 
raising questions about future high-profile ECC public work. 333 
Not only high-profile events attracted harassment. In Grahamstown, for example, a proposed 1987 "Working for a Just 
Peace" project was stopped by the detention and restriction of activists, while a peace fair was disrupted by the 
dumping of a large amount of sneeze powder where it was due to take place. In Cape Town a helicopter was used to 
mount a smear pamphlet attack on an ECC fair in 1987. An October 1986 ECC cabaret in Johannesburg received 
bomb threats, the venue was vandalised with graffiti, and the manager later closed the show after a visit from police, 
which included the interrogation of performers and the audience. Another intimidation tactic was to note participants at 
ECC events, such as security force videotaping of those painting the peace ribbon or the photographing of 
picketers.334 
The impact of the ECC on schools was an area of particular concern to the state, as indicated by increased measures 
to keep the ECC out of state schools. In the Transvaal conservative women's group Women for South Africa compiled 
a lengthy condemnation of the ECC and distributed it to all the principals of schools in the region.335 A school 
inspector harassed Johannesburg ECC member and teacher Annemarie Rademeyer after she had been detained. 
Where private schools were more accommodating, they faced intimidation, such as the security branch visit to St 
Joseph's in Cape Town after a 1987 ECC event there. As small independent anti-conscription school pupil groups 
began to operate - the Pupils Awareness and Action Group (Cape Town 1985), the Pupils Peace Group (Durban 
1987) and Linx (Johannesburg 1987) - these, too, were targeted for attack. Pupils reported intimidation from teachers 
333 Ibid. 
334 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.3, Johannesburg ECC harassment report for national committee 14 May 1987. Folder A16.5, ECC press 
release (undated). Folder A22.1, incidents of harassment Cape Town ECC 1986. Folder A22.2, Durban ECC: list of harassment April 1986-January 
1987. Folder A22.3, Grahamstown ECC repression report (undated). 
335 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1. 3, Johannesburg E CC repression report for national committee 14 August 1987, the difficulties of making 
headway in the state school system can be gauged by incidents like the Transvaal Education Department notification to all school heads telling 
them not to allow the distribution of the ECC calendar or to allow pupils to attend the Johannesburg ECC POW art exhibition in March 1987. 
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and pupils at school and the Durban schools' groups reported attempts to infiltrate meetings, while articles in the 
pro-government Citizen suggested the ECC was the covert mastermind behind such groups.336 
The state further harassed the ECC by attempting to limit its finances. Both mounting campaigns and countering state 
harassment required funds. This was an area in which the ECC was particularly vulnerable since much of its funding 
came from overseas donor agencies (some 53.2 per cent in 1985, for example), while emergency regulations limited 
its capacity to be self-supporting through sales and events.337 Prior to the state of emergency the state had introduced 
legislation to limit foreign donations to opposition groups. When the ECC's books were confiscated in 1986, it 
expected to be prosecuted under the Fundraising Act.338 Eventually the case was dropped due to insufficient 
evidence, but fears of falling foul of the regulations led the ECC to return donations, despite being very short of funds. 
While donors still supported the ECC through the SACBC, which the state chose not to confront openly, ECC records 
after June 1986 show the regions were consistently struggling for money.339 
At the same time that it restricted the ECC's funds, the state of emergency also increased the organisation's financial 
needs. With limited campaigning ability, the importance of mailing lists as a means of publicising ECC issues 
increased. Servicing a mailing list of some 50 000 people cost R7 500 in 1987, while pamphlets cost on average ten 
cents each so that the ECC estimated its pamphlet costs for 1988 at R86 400. Where these were banned or 
confiscated this represented a considerable financial loss, as well as the loss of potential publicity and membership.340 
The ECC thus avoided the most obvious confrontations with the state. "Forces Favourites", a book of short stories 
which was to have been published under ECC auspices in 1986, was no longer directly connected to the ECC, while 
the ECC video "Marching Orders" was withdrawn. Nevertheless, the ECC's message was fundamentally a challenge 
to the state, and so material continued to be banned on the basis that it "stir[ed] up or foment[ed] feelings of hatred or 
hostility in members of the public" towards the security forces, essentially giving the state licence to limit much public 
expression of conscription objection. While the ECC could appeal, this was costly, running to some R350 per appeal, 
and where the ECC won, the victory was often essentially moral, as material such as the 1987 diary was time 
336 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A22.4, Johannesburg ECC repression report 14 August 1987. 
337 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A10.1, ECC balance sheet for 1985. Folder A10.2, ECC financial report 1985. 
338 Cory library MS17804/1, treasurer's report by Stephen Lowry January 1988. 
339 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.3, national committee report August 1987. Folder A 11.1.5, letter from ECC to donor 9 June 1987. Folder 
B8.1.4, Cape Town ECC minutes 3 September 1987, minutes of Cape Town annual general meeting 19 November 1987, treasurer's report. Letter 
from ECC treasurer Stephen Lowry to Bishop Napier 12 September 1987. Folder A 10.3.1, balance sheet at 31 December 1986. Folder A10.2.1, 
ECC income statement for the year ended December 1986, some R93 450,00 was channelled through the SACBC in 1986, for example. On the 
advice of lawyer Edwin Cameron Lowry redid the ECC's books, erasing all records of foreign donors and attributing all donations to the SACBC, 
Steve Lowry interview. 
340 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A10.3.1, ECC budget for July-December 1987. Folder A10.5.6, ECC application for funding 1January1988-31 
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sensitive.341 In the case of the 1987 national campus comic "War Is No Solution" the ECC tried to pre-empt seizure 
by obtaining a lawyer's letter beforehand, attesting to the publication's legality. However, legal fees were a further 
financial drain, totalling some R4 400 of a six-month budget request from July to December 1987. Moreover, legal 
advice was no guarantee of the success of proposed actions, as a bill for R1 666 for legal advice regarding the 
abortive Cape arts festival demonstrated. 342 
Despite these costs, direct harassment was easier to counter than the smears which became increasingly frequent 
and sophisticated by 1987. A variety of organisations were involved, generally following a "total onslaught" line, 
attempting to link the ECC with the ANC, SACP and UDF. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
investigations later showed that a number of these smear campaigns were state-funded, so that small groups like 
Veterans for Victory, for example, could afford glossy pamphlets, and the small NSF affiliates had the funds to attack 
the ECC. Smear campaigns were also fed information by the state. The Aida Parker Newsletter, for instance, used 
information confiscated from the ECC by police and an intercepted letter from Gavin Evans' 1986 overseas trip. The 
publication also quoted with impunity from the banned ANC's internal documents.343 The state attempted to establish 
these smears as fact, introducing the Aida Parker Newsletter as "an authoritative source on issues of this nature" in a 
Grahamstown trial, for example.344 Moreover, those smearing the ECC could use national television. Head of the 
500 000 strong Vrouefederasie Gabriella Malan used a prime-time television slot to criticise the ECC as cowardly, and 
accused the organisation of having a hidden agenda under the guise of seeking peace, but the ECC could neither 
make its case nor offer a rebuttal on national television. 
While the ECC could write off much of the content of the smears as "ridiculous", the smear campaign fostered and 
legitimised ongoing violence against the organisation, as well as contributing to the attempt to criminalise it in the eyes 
of the white public. The ECC became suspicious of attempts to trap it, as people posing as reporters asked for 
interviews, and a letter purporting to be from a serviceman requested addresses of banned organisations.345 As early 
as 1985 drugs were planted in Janet Cherry's house. Shortly before a police raid, homosexual pornography was also 
sent to a Johannesburg campus member, presumably to incriminate him during the search. Such actions attempted to 
341 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A17.15, annexure to banning order against the August 1987 Out of Step. Folder 810.9, judgement of the 
A~pelraad oor Publikasies case no.80/87 7 March 1987. Folder M1 .1, letter from the publisher Taurus to Steve Lowry (undated). 
34 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A6 ECC notebooks (undated). Folder A10.2.1, ECC financial report 1987. Folder A15.2, ECC financial report 5 
March 1987. 
343 The TRC exposed the fact that SADF secret projeets covered a range of activities such as publications and front organisations like "Vroue vir 
Suid-Afrika". SADF consultants were used in covert front organisations like "Veterans for Victory," as well as giving support to surrogate groups and 
publications including the Aida Parker Newsletter. The NSF was also "financed through a business trust until press disclosures led to its 
dissolution", TRC, vol.2, pp.525-530. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.3, national committee report October 1987. Folder 88.1.4, Cape Town 
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344 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.3, national committee report May 1987. Folder B1.8, Wits regional report 22 October 1987. Folder G1.2, 
trial documents, state v. Louise Carol Vale. 
345 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.1, letter to the ECC 21 April 1986. 
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establish a connection between the ECC and behaviour which went against the official norms of white society in 
order to imply that, by extension, ECC politics were also deviant and detrimental to the wider white society. 
Besides attacking the ECC as an organisation, as well as individual members, smears were also intended to counter 
the message of particular campaigns. During the April 1987 "Day of Mourning• action smear posters went up claiming 
that the ECC was mourning dead ANC victims. Visuals of a baby with a tyre around its neck directed attention to the 
least sympathetic aspects of the freedom struggle. Similarly, during objector Philip Wilkinson's trial look-alike 
pamphlets vilifying Wilkinson appeared, and "coward" stickers were plastered over the slogan "apartheid war resister" 
on Wilkinson posters. 346 
The ECC was determined to counter these smears, spending some R1 130 to refute the Rapport allegations in 1985, 
and R600 in fees and transcripts for a Media Council hearing against the Aida Parker Newsletter in 1986. In cases like 
a 1987 SABC "Network" programme, which explicitly linked the ECC to the ANC, the ECC's lack of access to the 
television medium made it difficult to counter these charges. Similar1y, during the March 1987 Durban Rag float parade 
television cameras focused on an NSF float carrying slogans like "ECC sucks", while ignoring the ECC float 
altogether. Although the ECC had greater freedom to make its case in the press, here, too, rebuttals were not always 
published, as management was increasingly nervous of overstepping the myriad of new press regulations. The ECC 
thus feared that the continuous repetition of ECC-ANC links would eventually become accepted as fact among whites, 
particular1y where accusations that the ECC was undermining the state's ability to fight communism came from the 
Minister of Defence himself, giving them added weight and guaranteeing them media space.347 Even where the ECC 
did successfully oppose smears this did not necessarily stop them. Although the ECC won a media council ruling 
against the Aida Parker Newsletter in 1986, the council had very limited powers, and the issue containing allegations 
against the ECC continued to be distributed to schools and army bases, where the ECC had little or no sway. While 
the media council's decision against the Aida Parker Newsletter was widely published in the English press the 
exercise was costly, and further ECC complaints against the publication were turned down as the council claimed the 
ECC was essentially revisiting the same complaint. 
The state's criminalisation of the ECC had a ripple effect in the regions. Local municipalities were more wary of the 
ECC, leading to difficulties in hiring major venues like the Johannesburg city hall, and demands for exorbitant 
346 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B5.1, Port Elizabeth ECC report (undated). Folder B8.7, ECC press release 28 April 1987. 
347 8.00pm TV1 news Tuesday 26 May 1986. Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.2, national organiser news 28 May 1986. Folder A10.2.1, 
Johannesburg financial report 1986. 
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deposits. The Pietermaritzburg city council withdrew permission for an ECC stall at the local flea market and the 
Cape Town city council became increasingly punitive about ECC posters and pamphlets.348 In Grahamstown a local 
printer took a policy decision not to print any more ECC media after a visit from the security police, despite assurances 
from the ECC that a lawyer had vetted material.349 
This increased and ongoing harassment demonstrated the state's determination to limit the opposition of the ECC and 
to regain control of the security discourse, and support for the ECC was certainly limited by the harshness of the 
repression. For much of its existence, however, the ECC had represented the very small public face of a much larger 
opposition to conscription, which was more often expressed in individual non-compliance or emigration. Although 
many of the ECC's records for this period were destroyed, items like an anonymous postal order for R25 from 
someone leaving the country on an alternative passport, and the donation of a car from a UCT lecturer relocating to 
Zimbabwe, indicated that conscription remained a major problem for a number of whites, who supported the ending of 
conscription, although being unwilling to face the personal costs entailed by public opposition. 
Moreover, while support for the ECC per se remained limited, the continuing conflict and the burden of conscription 
encouraged a new acceptance of the ECC's interim demands, such as the call for alternatives to military service and 
the widening of the parameters of the Board for Religious Objection. In Cape Town, for example, the extension of the 
"Dad's army" call-up encouraged older whites to become involved in conscription objection, with articulate 
spokespeople, like UCT Law professor Denis Davis. In Johannesburg the Conference of Headmasters and 
Headmistresses of Independent Schools also passed a resolution on community service as an alternative to military 
service.350 
By the end of 1986 the ECC was determined to draw on this existing opposition to regain the initiative, with the 
October national committee meeting pushing for a big national campaign to build the ECC internally by attracting 
supporters and raising morale in subcommittees, as well as re-establishing the ECC's national profile.351 The resultant 
"War Is Not Compulsory, Let's Choose a Just Peace" campaign indicated the extent to which the state of emergency 
had derailed the ECC's opposition. 
348 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A 10.2.1, Cape Town financial report, 1986. Folder A22.4, list of Johanesburg ECG harassment 1983-August 
1986. 
349 Cory Library MS 17804/1, Grahamstown ECG report to national committee May 1987. 
350 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A4.2.2, letter from ECC national secretary David Shandler to the secretary of the Conference of Headmasters 
and Headmistresses 27 November 1986. Folder A10.2.1, ECG financial report 1987. 
351 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1.2, national committee proposal for a national campaign around the February call-up (undated). 
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Firstly, the overall organisational structure of the ECC had been weakened by continuous harassment. Previous 
campaigns had been planned at national conferences, with a broad democratic consensus and clearly strategised 
goats and demands. After the dedaration of the state of emergency it was too risky for activists to meet for a 
conference. The national committee thus did much of the campaign planning, leading to discontent in the regions. 
Regions themselves had to reorganise for active campaigning again. As the Johannesburg branch noted, those drawn 
in since the state of emergency had no campaigning experience or exposure to the broader white public. At the same 
time, there were changes in national personnel with Nie Borain taking over as national organiser and Adele Kirsten as 
national secretary in January 1987.352 
Secondly, the state of emergency diffused the ECC's focus so that the campaign became a kind of "catch-all" for the 
remaining legal aspects of conscription opposition, including the cost of war, the effects of militarisation, "Working for a 
Just Peace", alternative service, the cadet issue, and "Troops Out". This wide-ranging approach took a toll on both 
activists' energies and public interest. The focus of the campaign was further undermined by the need to reassert the 
ECC's credibility among whites while campaigning.353 Regions began an intensive information campaign designed to 
counter the state's attempts to criminalise the ECC. Pamphlets addressed the issues used in smears, such as 
whether or not the ECC was "patriotic", or a pawn of the ANC. In June a comprehensive rebuttal, "ECC in 
Perspective", was issued as an insert in the Weekly Mail. The ECC also put out militarisation fact sheets to highlight 
problems associated with conscription. By using official emigration figures, the Auditor General's comments that the 
SADF was the main culprit in wasted state expenditure, and SADF suicide rates, the ECC hoped to move away from 
its propagandist image.354 
Thirdly, state harassment not only limited the scope of the campaign but also undermined its execution. The campaign 
was initially planned to climax around the February call-up, but ECC detentions in Johannesburg and Cape Town in 
December 1986 meant postponements, while the December banning of the arts festival also encouraged the ECC to 
move away from single high-profile events towards a continuous ECC public presence through ongoing actions. 
Building on previous successes, the "War Is Not Compulsory, Let's Choose a Just Peace· campaign featured vigils 
around the designated "Day of Concern" on 23 April 1987, which tried to draw attention to the costs of the conflict and 
to involve the churches. Regions ran various "Working for a Just Peace· type actions. Creative actions like a Cape 
Town fair, and peace boats on the Umsinduzi River in Pietermaritzburg, as well as the Durban ECC sending 
352 Clare Verbeek was elected as a second national organiser but was only able to take up the post in August 1987 as she was detained in the 
December 1986 swoop and then restricted. 
363 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 68.7, press release 28 April 1987. 
354 Sue Brittion's personal papers, "War Is Not Compulsory' and "ECC in Perspective' pamphlets. 
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alternative call-up papers to Magnus Malan, draw media attention to the campaign and to the ECC's call for 
alternatives to military service. The campaign also used current events, like the May general election to focus on the 
SADF's role in government, using slogans like "The trouble with this general election is we don't know which general 
we're electing", and ''Will this budget kill your son?"355 
Just as Alan Dodson's objection to township duty had personalised the "Troops Out" campaign, so CO Philip 
Wilkinson put a human face on the call for alternatives to the current system of conscription. Wilkinson had been 
rejected by the Board for Religious Objection, arrested for refusing to serve in April 1986, and then detained and 
restricted under the emergency regulations. By April 1987 he was preparing to stand trial, having once more been 
charged with failing to report for a camp. The Port Elizabeth branch took up his trial as its "War Is Not Compulsory, 
Let's Choose a Just Peace" campaign, with other regions focusing on Wilkinson in a more limited way. While about 
600 people attended a Port Elizabeth church service led by Archbishop Denis Hurley in April, public support was 
difficult to maintain when the trial was postponed.356 
Nevertheless, trials held a number of benefits for the ECC. Witnesses inadvertently revealed useful information. In the 
April 1985 trial of five non-reporting conscripts, the commanding officers of several Witwatersrand units acknowledged 
that some 25 per cent of conscripts did not arrive for camps. During Wilkinson's trial the commandant in charge of 
administration at Piet Retief admitted that Wilkinson was not alone in his objection, and that there was an informal 
arrangement to try to avoid confrontation by keeping such people out of the townships. 357 Trials were also an 
opportunity to make ECC issues public through trial evidence, which could still be quoted in the press. Ex-serviceman 
Steve Louw gave evidence about SADF atrocities in the black townships, while a Namibian disabled in the Kassinga 
raid testified to the devastation of SADF actions outside South Africa. The extent of this evidence and the way it was 
taken up in the liberal press eventually led the public prosecutor to complain that the trial was being used as a public 
platform. The state's attempts to end this publicity by fining Wilkinson, rather than jailing him and so possibly creating 
a martyr, indicated that objector trials had considerable potential to embarrass the state.358 Trials also reinforced and 
drew attention to the ECC's local and international support base. From within South Africa people such as Desmond 
Tutu, Beyers Naude and Sheena Duncan, and organisations such as the UDF, the PFP Youth, and the SACBC issued 
355 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, collected ECC stickers. Archives and Manuscripts BC 912, folder A8, collected ECC 
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statements of support, as did individuals and organisations in Europe and America. The SACBC funded a booklet 
on the trial, planned in conjunction with the ECC. Some 17 000 copies were eventually printed. Reading like a play, 
the booklet was intended to disseminate the information revealed by the trial evidence.359 
Overall, however, the numerous elements of the "War Is Not Compulsory, Let's Choose a Just Peace" campaign 
resulted in a very uneven impact. On the one hand, campaigning provided an active focus for membership drives 
across the regions, with a new emphasis on a differentiated membership, from the highly involved to those merely 
seeking information. Durban, for example, increased their mailing list from 800 to over 4 000, reaching beyond known 
supporters and sympathisers to publicise the ECC's case. The circulation of the Durban ECC newspaper At Ease was 
also increased from 500 to 7000.360 
Despite the difficulties of the national campaign, well-targeted regional campaigns in early 1987 showed that the ECC 
could still successfully gain publicity for conscription issues. In Natal a low-key Valentine's Day campaign attracted 
local and national press coverage as "Make Love Not War" valentines were sent to prominent leaders in the province. 
In Johannesburg, a "Prisoners of War" art exhibition drew some 800 people on the first night, and attracted excellent 
press coverage. In Port Elizabeth and Pietermaritzburg counselling services were established, and in Cape Town the 
ECC used a range of organisations to get across an anti-conscription message, participating in a "Free the Children" 
vigil, as well as supporting cultural groups who withdrew from the Cape Town festival in protest at the participation of 
SAP and SADF bands.361 Cultural activities like concerts in Johannesburg and Cape Town continued to be well 
attended, as did information meetings, such as the Johannesburg Combat Conference in August. In the second half of 
the year some regions successfully focused on the continuing SADF occupation of Namibia. The Johannesburg 
branch held a photographic exhibition "Namibia - 21 Years of War", depicting a society under siege. Such activities 
increased both membership and organisational cohesion. The ECC also continued to have an international impact, 
giving evidence before the UN Centre for Human Rights in Geneva in August 1987, for instance.362 
Regional successes, however, did not offset the fact that the ECC's loss of focus made it vulnerable to the existing 
ideological and methodological divisions within the broad anti-apartheid movement. Laurie Nathan's March 1987 tour 
of the USA demonstrated that there was international impatience with the ECC's need to be seen to be distanced from 
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360 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 810.9, the Durban campaign so far 13 March 1987. 
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the UDF and ANC, yet within South Africa the racial divisions within the opposition movement were painfully 
obvious. Prior to the May 1987 general election the PFP demanded that whites be given a definite "vote letr message, 
while the UDF opposed any actions which might seem to legitimise the tricameral parliament. The ECC was caught 
between these opposing currents. At the March launch of the UCT campus branch, for example, UDF speaker Allan 
Boesak used the ECC platform to launch a stinging attack on both the PFP and serving conscripts.363 While some 
ECC members supported the ANC and had close links to the UDF, the ECC's white constituency meant that the ECC 
had to proceed differently to the broad opposition movement. Black opposition was predicated on present frustration, 
but white opposition struggled to find a unifying focus because of white socio-economic and political fears about a 
post-apartheid future. Liberal disillusionment following the general election was consequently not translated into active 
opposition. 
In assessing the "War Is Not Compulsory, Let's Choose a Just Peace" campaign the ECC thus felt it had not 
significantly altered white perceptions or broken into the white community. Durban ECC activist Jeremy Routledge 
later suggested that the ECC's more successful campaigns "gave people a chance to make their own stand", while 
less successful ones "only had a media presence". 364 After the 1987 national campaign the ECC concluded that it was 
still largely seen as an organisation of objectors, with no message for those beyond the radical fringe. From August to 
October 1987 the ECC entered a period of introspection to investigate its conceptual and organisational difficulties. 
Analysis of the "War Is Not Compulsory, Let's Choose a Just Peace" campaign suggested that a return to the ECC's 
single-issue focus was critical, both for internal organisation and external impact. The proposed "Alternative National 
Service· campaign was intended to make a focused and potentially achievable call arising directly out of the single 
issue of conscription, by demanding that the state widen the narrow parameters of the Board for Religious Objection, 
and provide real alternatives to purely military conscription.365 
In discussions with conscripts, the ECC found that its carefully distanced position from the UDF went unnoticed. 
Rather, the ECC was attacked as being "cliquish", "elitist", "student politicos", and "out of touch with reality". ECC 
spokespeople who had never served or were not liable to serve were not accepted as credible by veterans and 
"campers". 366 The ECC was forced to accept that while some conscripts were conscientised by their national service, 
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and while it provided considerable material dissatisfaction - from boredom to bullying, career retardation to 
relationship traumas - the majority of conscripts continued to serve, in part because the alternatives of exile or prison 
were so extreme. Since ECG work had primarily focused on the moral dilemmas of conscription, serving soldiers and 
those with camps often avoided the ECG because they felt it had nothing to offer them but condemnation. 367 The 
"Alternative National Service" campaign was an attempt to shift the ECC's image from an organisation of objectors to 
an organisation which could claim to speak on behalf of unwilling conscripts. The "Know Your Rights" phase of the 
campaign was intended to empower conscripts by making them aware of their rights, since the SADF seemed to be 
wary of civilian lawyers. The ECG further hoped that by trying to achieve something practical on behalf of soldiers it 
could counter the impression that it perceived soldiers as the enemy. 368 
The dominant consensus in the white community still accepted that reform was possible through the existing 
parliamentary structures, and "law and order" were seen as critical to the process of reform. Consequently, the 
"Alternative National Service" campaign intended to win support within the white community by working within this 
framework in attempting to change the existing CO laws to include non-religious CO, to cut the length of alternative 
service to something more equitable with military service, and to allow it to be served in the non-governmental sector. 
Lastly, the campaign was an acknowledgement that there was potentially more support for opposition to conscription 
than support for the ECC.369 While the state had attempted to contain the moral force of CO by setting up the Board 
for Religious Objection in 1983, neither theological nor ethical CO had been satisfied by this move. "Alternative 
National Service" was thus an issue with both a history, and a fairly wide existing, and growing, support base including 
business, academics, families, churches, and humanitarian groups. The "Alternative National Service" campaign was 
co-ordinated with academic and church programmes working in the same direction so that pressure for alternative 
service would continue even if the ECG were banned. 
On the one hand, then, the "Alternative National Service" campaign demonstrated the power of the state to tighten the 
legal space to campaign against conscription; on the other, it highlighted the continuing power of conscription as an 
opposition issue. The ECG did not see the campaign as a dilution of the political basis of its opposition to conscription, 
but rather a "catch 22" for the state. In legitimising religious objection the state had effectively sanctioned public 
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discourse in this area of the conscription debate, yet when the ECC demanded the state engage with it over the 
issue of "Alternative National Service", the state could not afford to make concessions, since to do so would 
undermine both the manpower and propaganda pillars maintaining its continued white minority power base.370 
The manpower needs of the SADF had decreased from the critical levels of 198511986, while the increasing likelihood 
of withdrawals from Angola and Namibia by 1988 suggested a further easing of the SADF's manpower needs. By 
August 1987 the state had regained control of most townships through a combination of the deployment of black 
"kitskonstables" and its fomentation of conflict between lnkatha and the UDF. Nevertheless, blacks still refused to buy 
into co-option schemes like proposed Regional Service Councils, while ANC attacks remained bold and popular, 
forcing the state to continue to rely on internal coercion of the black majority. Growing white resistance compounded 
the state's manpower headache. Radical journal Work in Progress noted that by 1988 one in ten were not reporting for 
initial service, and one in four were not reporting for camps. In a climate of growing dissatisfaction about the demands 
of national service even the limited demands of the "Alternative National Service" campaign threatened the apartheid 
state, as concessions on the length and type of national service could lead to further demands and "no shows".371 
Perhaps more importantly, the concession that the security situation required anything less than full white co-operation 
would weaken the urgency of the state's security discourse, one of the few remaining avenues of appeal to white 
unity.372 
Despite being limited to the ECC's interim demands, the "Alternative National Service" campaign thus had 
considerable political potential, but in practical terms it got off to a slow start. After the organisational problems 
associated with the "War Is Not Compulsory, Let's Choose a Just Peace" campaign, the ECC recommitted itself to 
broadly democratic, rather than centralised, decision making. Only after thorough discussion by 150 representatives of 
all the regions at the February 1988 national conference did regions begin "Know Your Rights" actions. These 
included an action around the February call-up and "Alternative Service" projects similar to "Working for a Just Peace" 
actions in March and April, to demonstrate the sort of alternative service that should be available to conscripts. A 
37
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Know Your Rights• booklet, designed to inform conscripts of their rights in the SADF, was promoted at a series of 
meetings around the country in June and July 1988.373 
This implementation of the campaign was limited by the extent to which regions were still struggling under the state of 
emergency. Throughout 1987 and 1988 most regions had only between ten and 30 regulars at general body 
meetings. Cape Town claimed an unusually high 55 active members but by 1988 three of its subcommittees had 
collapsed, while Durban faced a leadership crisis, Pietermaritzburg struggled with low numbers, 374 and the Afrikaans 
regions faced continued hostility. Attendance at "Know Your Rights" meetings only ranged between 40 and 80 people. 
On campuses students were fair1y easily signed up to the ECC at orientation, but by midyear were no longer 
involved. 375 
Yet at a national level, the ECC was winning unprecedented attention, as much for events it had not initiated as for 
those it had. This allowed it to challenge the legitimacy of the apartheid state at a whole new level, as opposition to 
conscription increasingly grew larger than the ECC. The first example of this was the court martial of the "Castle 
Three". In December 1987 three serving conscripts were arrested by the SADF and in February 1988 were court 
martialled for conspiring to disclose to the ECC that the SADF was involved in producing and distributing anonymous 
smear material in order to undermine and discredit the ECC. While the SADF tried to keep the trial in camera and to 
silence the conscripts by sentencing them to 18 months in detention barracks, the conscripts successfully appealed in 
the Cape Town Supreme Court in March 1988. This evidence of SADF involvement in ECC smears encouraged the 
ECC to apply for a Supreme Court interdict against the SADF, and one was provisionally granted on 29 March, 
although the ECC was not able to make this public for over a month and even then was prevented from disclosing the 
details of its application until the matter could be heard in full later in the year. Nevertheless, SADF harassment of the 
ECC made the news for three months, first piquing public interest because of the secrecy surrounding the allegations, 
before compounding this with revelations of the SADF's manufacture of posters, t-shirts and pamphlets discrediting 
the ECC, as well as its use of a helicopter to drop smear pamphlets.376 As the state was moving to ban, in all but 
name, some 17 organisations (including the UDF) and tabling new legislation to enable it to cut off foreign funding to 
these and other organisations, 377 repression of the ECC was beginning to create a different momentum, giving rise to 
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questions about how the SADF was utilising its resources, as well as the methods it was using against its own 
citizens and legal opposition organisations. 
A second source of renewed attention to conscription issues was CO trials. By September 1987 Ivan Toms was 
touring the country to publicise his decision to refuse to do a camp. Unlike the largely unknown Philip Wilkinson, Toms 
had recognition and credibility in a number of constituencies. He represented the face of serving soldiers, having 
previously attained the rank of lieutenant. He had experience of the negative impact of SADF activity in Crossroads. 
The fact that he was a doctor serving an underprivileged community also emphasised the waste of talent caused by 
imprisoning objectors and drew attention to the rising emigration rate in response to the lack of alternatives faced by 
conscripts. Support flowed in from the ECC's supporters overseas. In South Africa, prominent church leaders 
endorsed Toms' character and beliefs, and community leaders decried the waste of sending such people to prison. In 
March 1988 when Toms was eventually sentenced to 21 months in prison for refusing a 21-day camp, there was thus 
considerable public discussion and outcry. 378 
Toms was interviewed by foreign journalists in trial recesses and the trial was also extensively reported in the South 
African press. The testimony of prominent people demonstrated the extent of opposition to conscription. Anglican 
Bishop of Grahamstown The Right Reverend David Russell told the court that Toms was being obedient to his church 
and to the bible by refusing to serve in the SADF, and that he had the backing of the Anglican Church. John Dugard, 
Professor of Law at the University of the Witwatersrand, compared the role of SADF conscripts to soldiers in Nazi 
Germany, arguing that in terms of international law conscripts faced a "Waldheim dilemma" by serving in the SADF, 
since in 81 other countries they could be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of "aiding apartheid". Secretary to the 
Ovamboland Assembly in Namibia Pastor Oswald Shivuti testified to some 632 complaints of SADF mistreatment of 
civilians. 379 
Toms' imprisonment encouraged a movement to have COs declared political prisoners, a further source of 
embarrassment for the state since it underlined the political basis of objection. Incidents like an attack on Toms by 
another prisoner kept him in the public eye. The personal cost of such objection, however, was revealed by his 
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complaints to his support group that he felt neglected. Whatever the political gains, the individual prisoner still faced 
the issue of whether his great personal sacrifice was worth the cost. 380 
Nevertheless, by June 1988 another objector, David Bruce, was on trial. Because he had not yet served at all, he 
faced a possible six-year sentence. Toms' objection had highlighted the lack of alternatives for Christians who were 
not pacifists. Bruce's trial emphasised the dilemma facing young graduates, giving the ECC the opportunity to remind 
the public of the high emigration rate, particularly among graduates, and to publicise academic research which 
suggested that conscription was an important factor in graduates' decision not to stay in South Africa. Again trial 
evidence provided opposition to conscription with a public voice. Bruce told the court that he refused to serve because 
of the racist nature of military service. The testimony of Soweto civic leader Nthatho Motlana allowed whites to hear a 
dramatically different voice, as he claimed that Bruce would be viewed as hero by blacks and be greatly admired for 
his stand on racism. Bruce also told the court that the SADF had offered him non-combatant posts and encouraged 
him to emigrate rather than take a public CO stand, further evidence that the SADF was concerned and embarrassed 
by the increased public profile of C0.381 
Yet if trials won the ECC and the "Alternative National Service" campaign publicity and sympathy, they also presented 
problems. Because the bureaucratic details were out of the ECC's control, it was difficult to sustain interest throughout 
a lengthy process. Wilkinson, for example, was in a pre-trial limbo for the best part of a year, and the trial itself was 
postponed. Toms' calls ups were also withdrawn and rescheduled for more than six months, so that the campaign 
faced a stop-start momentum, with tours and promotion of the issues, followed by letters explaining to supporters that 
matters were under review. As Cape Town chair Paula Hathorn wrote to the other centres, "Ifs frustrating to have 
one's timing dictated by [the SADF]." It was also costly to promote a CO. Toms' travel costs, for example, were 
estimated at R31 000.382 
Toms' trial further emphasised the difficulty of maintaining a single-issue focus. While his trial drew support from 
across the spectrum of ECC sympathisers, with JODAC calling him a "symbol of hope in our striving for a non-racial 
democratic and united South Africa" and the UDF noting its appreciation that "Ivan is refusing to take up arms against 
our comrades in the townships", the Lesbian and Gay Organisation (LAGO) took issue with the ECC for downplaying 
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the convergence of political and personal motivation behind Toms' stand because of concern about the reaction 
from its broader constituency, which it assessed as essentially homophobic. Certainly the rash of smears targeting 
Toms' sexual orientation suggested that the state perceived this issue as a means of undermining white sympathy for 
his stand.383 
Individual trials were only one aspect of a growing objector movement, however. In August 1987 23 Cape Town men 
held a press conference and stated their intention not to serve further in the SADF. They emphasised that they took 
this position independently of the ECC, but the fact that many of them belonged to the ECC and that few faced an 
imminent call-up limited the public impact of their stand.384 By contrast, when a public objection was staged in August 
1988, a week after Bruce's sentencing, the number had grown to 143, and the major urban centres each had several 
objectors, kindling regional interest too. While denying involvement in the stand of the 143, the ECC was at pains to 
point out that 36 of the men had served in the security forces, some in the SAP and two in the PF. The press made 
much of Afrikaans objector, Andre Zaaiman, who resigned his rank of captain in the SADF, and at the press 
conference quoted Boer general J.B.M.Hertzog's speech, objecting to the conscription of South African soldiers forthe 
occupation of Namibia in 1915. Significantly, more than half the western Cape objectors were from Stellenbosch, 
suggesting that, despite the fact that the ECC was not allowed on campus, anti-conscription feeling existed in 
Afrikaans areas too. 385 
General Magnus Malan's response was quick and vicious. He accused the ECC of being "in the vanguard of those 
forces that are intent on wrecking the present dispensation and its renewal", and both Beeld and the Burger, generally 
seen as mouthpieces of the NP, suggested that action against the ECC was imminent.386 In part the intensity of this 
response was related to the third factor encouraging opposition around conscription: conscript losses in Angola. On 4 
October 1987 Malan reluctantly admitted to the South African public that SADF troops were in Angola. The state 
officially acknowledged some 63 white SADF and SWA TF deaths between September 1987 and June 1988, many of 
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them conscripts. This resulted in increased criticism of the external deployment of the SADF and led to calls for the 
withdrawal of troops from Angola.387 
At the beginning of July 1988 even the NGK's official mouthpiece Die Kerkbode questioned the ethics of a continued 
SADF presence in Angola, particularly as this might lead to further losses. The normally supportive Beeld conceded 
that parents and taxpayers had a right to ask whether the sacrifices made in the operational area were always 
justifiable.388 The pro-government press further criticised the secrecy surrounding military operations, while the liberal 
press demanded details of deaths and called for troop withdrawals. An opinion survey by the South African Institute of 
Internal Affairs showed that while most whites were still confident about the capacity of the SADF to defeat SWAPO in 
the long term, the number of whites favouring negotiations with SWAPO had risen from 39 per cent in 1982 to 58 per 
cent in 1988. By July 1988 newspaper articles were also starting to question the SADF's military supremacy, 
particularly in the air. 
Newspapers, academic journals and popular magazines increasingly focused on signs of white social dislocation, from 
concern at the "brain drain'', to discussion of emerging symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome and family 
murders, and research on the economic and psychological implications of conscription. Women's magazines Fair 
Lady and Cosmopolitan ran articles about the impact of conscription on whites, from mothers bewailing the death of 
their sons, to young women complaining about a dearth of lovers, stimulating an outpouring of emotional letters in 
subsequent issues. 389 The state tried to try to deny these concerns, either by outright repression, such as General 
Malan's threats against any further women's magazine artides, or retraction, such as the "contextualisation" of the 
Kerkbode article by NGK moderator Johan Heyns, issued, significantly, by the SADF.390 Such actions could not 
disguise the fact that white South African society was manifesting a number of signs of war-weariness by mid 1988. 
The state may have considered making some accommodation of the ECC's "Alternative National Service" demands in 
June in order to contain the growing white criticism. For the first time it met with the ECC at the ECC's request, 
although remaining determined to control the meeting. The SADF delegation refused to discuss anything except 
alternative service and insisted the ECC cancel the scheduled post-meeting press conference, and merely issue a 
bland joint statement to the effect that "the tone of the meeting was cordial and conducive to better mutual 
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understanding". In assessing the meeting the ECC noted that the delegation had been senior "in respect of staffing 
matters", and concluded the SADF might be trying to appear reasonable in light of the upcoming interdict hearing, or 
might be hoping to hold out dialogue about "Alternative National Service" as an incentive for the ECC to tone down its 
public campaigning.391 
Whatever the SADF's motivation, events soon overtook the meeting. In July the Kerkbode article was published, 
"Know Your Rights" meetings began in earnest, and by the end of July David Bruce had been sentenced, to loud 
condemnation. A week tater the 143 made their stand, while the ECC's interdict hearing against the SADF was set for 
31 August. The editor of the Star was rallying support for the ECC's "Alternative National Service" campaign, and 
some churches were planning their own ·Alternative National Service" campaign in competition with the Board for 
Religious Objection. By posing the limited and seemingly reasonable demands of "Alternative National Service", the 
ECC had thus successfully used conscription to focus white discontent, despite the limited legal space to campaign. 
By August, the growing profile of objection was sufficiently politically embarrassing - particularly with the forthcoming 
ECC interdict hearing and a number of important by-elections looming in October - that the state felt it had little option 
but to ban the ECC outright. 
On 22 August the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, justified banning the ECC on the grounds that it was a link 
in the "so-called struggle against apartheid", and a stooge of the ANC.392 Yet the state could not afford to credit the 
ECC with too much power, so that while Vlok claimed that "many" had been influenced to refuse military service, he 
asserted that their motivation had not been political. Since religious objectors were accommodated by the Board for 
Religious Objection, and the Bruce trial had clearly demonstrated the costs of objecting, Vlok was essentially claiming 
that "many" were putting themselves in a dangerous conflict with the state for no reason. This descent into a garbled 
and unconvincing impasse indicated that the apartheid state was increasingly unable to limit the conscription 
discourse. 
Analysis of the ECC's work after the countrywide state of emergency in June 1986 thus demonstrates that although 
the state greatly increased its power to act against its opponents, this very repression represented a crucial 
weakening of apartheid hegemony. The rationale behind the 1977 Defence White Paper, which introduced the 
concepts of "reformed" apartheid and "total onslaught", was the recognition that if the apartheid state could not co-opt 
the black majority it would not have sufficient coercive capacity to maintain power by force in the long term. The failure 
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of co-option intensified the political significance of the ECC's opposition, both challenging the state's continued 
coercive power through its predominantly white conscript army, and its capacity to maintain white political unity 
through a security discourse based primarily on white fears about the future which outweighed current costs, including 
conscription. 
Throughout the ECC's existence the state had attempted to contain its opposition by continuously narrowing the legal 
space to campaign against conscription. However, even the extensive repression legalised by the state of emergency 
did not change the fact that conscription was a critical contradiction within the apartheid regime. As long as the NP 
relied on force rather than popular legitimacy to remain in power, it could not afford to end conscription. By 1988, 
however, even the increased debate around conscription posed a political threat in the context of increasing white 
political fragmentation. This threat was intensified by the fact that as the state of emergency forced the ECC away 
from the more radical aspects of its programme, so its interim demands, if not its organisation per se, became more 
accessible to whites, while its expression of the white frustration and pain surrounding conscription increasingly 
resonated in white society. 
Chapter Six 
September 1988 - 1993: 
The end of the campaign. 
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This chapter will conclude the chronological examination of the ECC's opposition by demonstrating that although 
the ECC campaigns which channelled and directed opposition between 1983 and 1988 were important in developing 
white opposition to conscription, one of the ECC's greatest successes was that by August 1988 conscription 
opposition was bigger than the ECC. Despite the ECC's being banned, legal, ethical, theological, psychological and 
economic questions around conscription continued to feature in white public discourse, both stimulating continued 
objection to conscription and highlighting the bankruptcy of the apartheid government's policies. 
The level of reaction generated by the ban indicated where the ECC had most successfully integrated conscription 
into national white discourse. Within the liberal, church and university communities which had been the ECC's support 
base from its inception, there was vociferous condemnation of the ban.393 Authorities within these groups drew 
attention to the negative consequences of conscription, such as the "brain drain", and reiterated the point that the ECC 
was merely articulating the existing grievances and uncertainties of young white males. The ban was also a reminder 
of shrinking white freedoms, and consequently stimulated protest from the press, business and the PFP; groups which 
had been less unequivocally supportive of the ECC. Condemnation did not spill over into the Afrikaans press, 
however, indicating the very limited impact of the ECC in the Afrikaans-speaking white community. 
After the ban the state issued ECC national secretary Alistair Teeling-Smith and organiser Gary Cullen with restraining 
orders to limit their potential as spokespeople.394 By the end of the year, regional offices closed, and caretaker 
executives were appointed, but the ECC was not wound down completely. As the Cape Town branch noted, the ECC 
still played "an important symbolic function, despite its inability to act or campaign politically". Activists, however, 
began to move into other anti-apartheid organisations, some of which - like COSG, NUSAS and Black Sash - still 
addressed conscription issues. 395 
Yet even as it seemed the ECC had been mothballed as an organisation, a number of factors continued to win public 
attention for conscription issues and fuelled the call for alternatives to military service. Firstly, the ECC's court case 
against the SADF began, and the ECC was granted an interdict against the SADF in October 1988. In defence of the 
SADF, head of the South African Air Force Lieutenant General Jan van Loggerenberg declared that SADF action 
against the ECC was justified as South Africa was "in a state of war". This was an expedient about tum for a 
government which 18 months previously had been unwilling to admit the SADF was deployed in Angola. SADF 
393 Although Archbishop Denis Hurley noted it was in a sense a "tribute to the Ecc·. New Nation 31 August 1988, Daily News 24 August 1988, 
Natal Mercury 24 August 1988. 
394 Business Day 1 September 1988, Financial Mail 14 October 1988. 
395 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B8.1.4, Cape Town minutes of annual general meeting 10 November 1988. 
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testimony revealed a swaggering arrogance which was widely condemned in the liberal press, and raised 
questions about the moral integrity of the state, as well as the nexus of power within the government. The full bench of 
the Cape Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the "Castle Three" on 16 August 1989, and ordered 
the SADF to pay costs.396 While these cases might seem like posthumous victories for the ECC, the publicity 
surrounding the interdict and the revelations of SADF "dirty tricks" contributed further to white disillusionment with the 
apartheid government. This disillusionment was expressed at the polls in the 1989 general election when the NP's 
elected majority was reduced from 123 to 94.397 Significantly, when F.W. de Klerk became state president in 
September 1989, among his first acts was a downgrading of the influence of the military in civil government. By 1990 
the SSC and National Security Management System were dismantled and the defence budget was slashed. 
Secondly, CO trials continued, demonstrating the failure of the Bruce sentence to undermine this form of resistance. 
Two weeks after the banning of the ECC Charles Bester announced his refusal to serve, and in 1989 he was followed 
by Saul Batzofin. Together, they represented the extremes of CO, with Bester, fresh out of school, objecting on 
Christian grounds, while Batzofin represented an older, more politically motivated objection. Baster's trial drew press 
attention from France, Canada, Australia, the USA and Britain. The Star also noted that monitoring groups found 
many more objectors whose cases went unreported.398 New trials reignited public interest in imprisoned objectors Ivan 
Toms and David Bruce, as well as furthering calls for alternative service, particularly as the ongoing "brain drain" 
continued to make news. Objectors and the cost of objection generated human-interest stories in the press. The 
Sunday Tribune, for example, investigated not only the flight of Durban ECC member, Tam Alexander, one of the 143, 
who left the country rather than face a trial, but also the divided responses of his parents.399 
Thirdly, traditional ECC support bases continued to address conscription. SRC candidates at Rhodes and the 
Universities of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town were successful on "Alternative National Service" tickets. The 
churches continued to examine the viability of an alternative service system in opposition to the Board for Religious 
Objection. There were also new constituencies. In February "Mothers Against War" was launched in Durban, and 
groups representing about 800 mothers held simultaneous services in three cities during the February 1989 call-up 
around the demand "Give Our Sons a Choice" .400 A petition for alternative service was begun by Natal women, 
396 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A 10.2.1, ECC report on its financial status (undated). Clearly, despite the banning the ECC could stiff count on 
~erful supporters, since 1987 estimates had put the cost of applying for the interdict at some R20 000. 
97 Davenport, South Africa: a modem historv, pp.564-565. 
398 Star 5 November 1988. K. Nurnberger, J. Tooke, and W. Domeris (eds), Conflict and the quest for justice (Pietermaritzburg, Encounter 
Publications, 1989) p.388. 
399 Sunday Tribune 30 October 1988, Business Day 9 February & 15 May 1989, Sunday Star 4 June 1989, Financial Mail 15 December 1989, 
Weekly Mail 6 July 1990. 
400 Daitv News 8 February 1989. 
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drawing some 1 000 signatures. The continuing impact of conscription on families can further be gauged by the fact 
that in June 1989 there was a "huge response" to the launch of a support group for parents of children who had 
emigrated.401 
Fourthly, the success of the call for alternatives to military service in 1988 meant that this issue gained momentum 
independently of the ECC. In the liberal press numerous editorials continued to call for alternatives. Alternative service 
further bridged the divide between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition by 1989, as the PFP, 
Independent Party and the National Democratic Movement passed resolutions in support of objectors. Concern about 
the economic implications of continuing high graduate emigration levels led both the Financial Mail and Finance Week 
to come out in support of a new system of alternative service.402 Academic research also focused on the call for 
alternative service. Arising out of the "Know Your Rights" campaign, the UCT Centre for Intergroup Studies held a 
workshop on military and alternative service and CO in 1989, which drew a diverse group of participants.403 At the 
Centre for Policy Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand academic Laurie Schlemmer ran a research project 
investigating the costs of the current system of conscription, as well as the need for, and support of, alternative 
service. There was a new awareness of the long-term consequences of conscription as terms like "post-traumatic 
stress syndrome" were more commonly used in the media.404 The ECC had felt it was often seen to be disseminating 
propaganda rather than factual evidence and was investigating implementing an independent opinion survey by 1988. 
Now the convergence of material on CO and the "Alternative National Service" campaign from such a variety of 
sources gave the issue greater credibility. The Financial Mail, for instance, quoted past ECC national secretary David 
Shandler as an authority on militarisation because his work was under the auspices of the University of the 
Witwatersrand, whereas when the same facts had been presented by the ECC there had been more scepticism.405 
Lastly, the ECC's international contacts continued to draw ongoing international attention to CO, making South Africa 
the focus of the 1989 international CO day, for example. COSG was instrumental in organising meetings in eight cities 
on 15 May 1989 in the absence of a legal ECC presence. The patronage of British anti-apartheid activist Father 
Trevor Huddleston helped give added impetus to the growth of the objector movement and in September 1989 771 
resisters signed an international register of South African war resisters.406 
•01 ~4 June 1989. OSD lnsam, box 40, 55/89, special situational report 12 May 1989. 
402 Archives and Manuscripts BC 1102, folder B3, fragments of Financial Mail & Finance Week. 
403 Sue Brittion's personal papers, Centre for Intergroup Studies workshop on military and alternative service and conscientious objection 1989. 
404 Sunday Times 5 November 1989. 
405 Financial Mail 15 December 1989. 
406 The Times (London) 22 September 1989. South African Outlook. October 1989, p.133. Abel, Politics by other means, pp.107-108. 
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Despite this continued prominence of conscription issues, when the ECC "unbanned" itself on 22 August 1989, it 
struggled to rebuild its profile for a number of reasons. The decreasing conscription burden undermined a significant 
avenue of support for the ECC. In 1989 the state set up the Van Loggerenberg Committee to investigate military 
service. One of its finding was that citizen force response to call-up orders was reduced from 4 7 per cent in 1990 to 34 
per cent in 1991.407 In 1993 the ECC estimated that "probably less than 20 per cent of those called up" reported for 
service.408 Noting that large numbers of conscripts were simply ignoring their call-up instructions, the ECC concluded 
"the SADF no longer has the will or the manpower to enforce the law on a significant scale".409 Religious objection was 
also decreasing, a further indication of growing avoidance of conscription.410 
In January 1990 the Weekly Mail reported that five COs around the country were on trial and facing sentences of up to 
six years and Bester received some 2 000 cards and letters of support over Christmas 1989. However, in December 
1989 military service was halved. By February Batzofin had been freed. In April the Bloemfontein appellate division 
overturned the prevailing view that a six-year sentence for CO was mandatory. This allowed judges to exercise 
discretion in sentencing, and even to give suspended sentences. Toms was already out on bail, pending the result of 
the case, Bruce was released within the month and Bester by August. No more cos were imprisoned after that. 
Instead, objector Michael Graaf, for example, received a one-year jail sentence in November 1990, suspended on 
condition he served 2 400 hours of community service at rate of 72 hours per month.411 The Board for Religious 
Objection also became increasingly flexible in its definition of religious objection.412 While 1 300 men publicly declared 
they would not serve in the first seven months of 1990, there was not the same public interest in the issue. A 
combination of the decreased burden of conscription and greater private non-compliance thus lessened support for 
the ECC.413 
407 DSD Reports, K97/1, box 371, provisional report on CO 30 July 1991, p.11. 
408 Archives and Manuscripts BC 668, folder E, opening session of the ECC 1993 peace festival. 
409 Wee!sly Mail 2 March 1990. Archives and Manuscripts BC 1005, folder A4, report from the BBC 20 March 1989. BC 668, box E, ECC banned: 
1988 to 1990. DSD Reports, K97/1, box 371, provisional report on CO 30 July 1991, p.11, appendix D: figures of those appearing before the Board 
f R or eligious Obiection 1984-1991. 
Cateaory 1 Category 2 Category 3 Refused Total 
1984 45 4 218 2 263 
1985 62 2 203 6 269 
1986 64 279 345 
1987 51 239 291 
1988 72 210 283 
1989 61 202 263 
1990 37 226 263 
1991 15 137 152 
2129 
410 Abel, Politics by other means: law and the struggle against apartheid 1980-1994, p.118. 
411 Weekly Mail 26 January & 2 February 1990. Objector, November 1990. Sunday Star 1 April 1990. 
412 Abel, Politics by other means: law and the struggle against apartheid 1980-1994. p.113. 
413 Archives and Manuscripts BC 1005, folder A12.1, ECC press release 7 December 1989. Abel, Politics by other means: law and the struggle 
against apartheid 1980-1994, p.120. Suttner, Cutting through the mountain, p.174. 
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While the ECC was officially unbanned in February 1990 and reconstituted branches in seven of the regions, these 
branches were often nothing more than a skeleton staff.414 The reasons. for this went beyond decreased white 
discontent around conscription. As the ECC took up campaigns like the 1990 "Safe Return Campaign", organised in 
collaboration with COSAWR, and culminating in the arrival of ten exiled war resisters, it ran into the same kind of 
problems as the 1987 "War Is Not Compulsory, Let's Choose a Just Peace" campaign. Where the ECC's call was not 
significantly differentiated from similar calls from the liberation movement it neither effectively advanced conscription 
issues nor built the ECC.415 At the same time, the state continued to pose a "political problem in military terms" in 
order to predicate the possibility of negotiation on the ANC's renouncing the armed struggle, and to reinforce white 
security fears. Press articles like "Castro explains why Angola lost battle against the SADF" demonstrated a continued 
white belief that the SADF was a critical element in its security. A statistical survey of students in 1989 also revealed 
that the majority of white students in South Africa still viewed communism as a "very serious threat". 
Perhaps the most telling reason the ECC did not regain its previous levels of support was that by 1989 the conflict 
between lnkatha and the UDF had reached crisis proportions. Much of the thrust of successful ECC campaigning 
between 1985 and 1986 had focused on the internal deployment of the SADF, and utilised the white liberal unease 
this had generated. By 1989 SADF deployment in the townships was accepted by a number of liberals as the lesser of 
two evils and troops returned to Cape townships in August 1989 to a "negligible outcry".416 
In the light of these difficulties, and noting very limited membership at all branches, in May 1990 the ECC held a 
national conference to decide whether or not to disband. The consensus was to rebuild and continue campaigning, 
while moving from a protest orientation to an attempt to contribute to building the new South Africa, sending out a 
fieldworker to monitor violence in Natal, for instance. The ECC also continued to expose the state's forceful hold on 
power with a fact sheet on the Civil Co-operation Bureau, whose covert actions were just coming to light. ECC 
structures were re-established in the regions, and Roddy Payne was appointed national organiser.417 
Yet even as the ECC re-committed itself to opposition, a new factor undermined any future resurgence of support. The 
February 1990 unbanning of the liberation movements and the release of Nelson Mandela led to a shift away from the 
unifying potential of a common opposition and towards a new political competitiveness within the broad opposition 
414 Archives and Manuscripts BC 1005, folder A4, branch reports to national conference 24-27 May 1990. 
415 At Ease, December 1990, p.6. 
416 South African Outlook, October 1989, pp.130-131. Business Day 27 July 1989. TRC, vol.4, chapter 8, p.223. Business Day 27 July 1989. 
417 For example, between 1990 and 1993 at least 572 people died in more than 600 incidents of train violence, and activists David Webster and 
Anton Lubowski, both of whom had been associated with the ECC, were assassinated. IB.Q, vol.3, chapter 1, pp.29-33. Alistair Teeling-Smith's 
personal papers, fieldworker report January 1991. Price, A documentation of the exoeriences of military conscriots in the South African Defence 
Fore~ pp.371-6. 
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movement. The disbanding of key affiliates like JODAC, which encouraged its members to join the ANC, signalled 
the growing significance of party political affiliation. Increased factionalism within the anti-apartheid movement, 
together with the diminished burden of conscription, weakened one of the ECC's key strengths: the unifying power of 
its single issue focus.418 
Moreover, as it became clear that real power sharing would soon be a reality, and as the armed wing of the PAC, 
APLA, began a campaign of violence aimed at whites, so white security fears intensified. The hesitant findings of the 
Van Loggerenberg Committee suggested that the demands of the business, academic and religious communities that 
conscription should be scaled back had created political difficulties for the NP. Yet even as power bases within the 
white community tested new political alignments, the protection of their privilege and power was still high on the 
agenda for whites. Thus while the collapse of communism was a body blow to the ideological power of "total 
onslaught", white security concerns and special interests continued to limit the ECC's influence. 
The ECC took up the unconstitutionality of continued white conscription after the repeal of the Population Registration 
Act in June 1991. However, the combination of white security concerns, decreased white discontent around the 
internal deployment of the SADF and the burden of conscription, as well as the state's growing inability to contain 
evasion of conscription limited the campaign's public appeal.419 
In 1993 the ECC held another peace festival, but this was, in effect, a farewell salute as the ECC was then disbanded. 
Nelson Mandela, as keynote speaker, paid homage to the ECC, and the ECC, in tum, called for a new broadly based 
peace movement to address "the demilitarisation of our society and the promotion of a culture of peace".420 The ECC 
had always been more than a political opposition movement. It had a strong moral core made up of deeply committed 
pacifists who believed that there could be no permanent solutions based on force. The ECC had discussed future 
conscription policy with the ANC. After the dissolution of the ECC in 1993 people who had been integral to the 
functioning of the ECC throughout its existence continued to lobby, and were ultimately successful in getting 
conscription written out of the military policy of the post-apartheid South Africa. Only then could these activists feel the 
work of the ECC had truly been finished. 421 
418 Frederikse, The unbreakable thread: non-racialism in South Africa, p.10. H.Adam and K. Moodley, The opening of the apartheid mind: options for 
the new South Africa (Berkley, University of California Press, 1993) p.40. 
419 Objector, June& September 1991. 
420 Archives and Manuscripts BC 668, folder E, keynote address by Nelson Mandela to the ECC 1993 peace festival. 
421 Sue Brittian interview. Durban activist Michael Graaf nevertheless expressed disappointment because he felt the ECC had not discredited 
militarisation altogether. Michael Graaf interview (1999). 
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An examination of the ECC after August 1988 thus demonstrates how the ECC was uniquely positioned between 
1983 and 1988 to attract the resources, contacts and personnel of a wide range of organisations to further the call to 
end conscription. In this period the ECC was strengthened by its single-issue focus, as well as its articulation of 
growing white discontent at the burden of conscription, and white concerns about the implications and consequences 
of the internal deployment of the SADF. As these factors fell away, so did white interest in, and support for, the ECC. 
As conscription became less of a burden after 1990, so the ECC increasingly struggled to campaign, suggesting that 
much of the oppositional power of the ECC between 1983 and 1988 lay in its ability to link the burden of conscription 
to white self-interest. Between 1983 and 1988 the ECC was able to exploit both the moral and political aspects of 
conscription objection. After 1989 the political power of the conscription issue was largely overtaken by concerns 
about the character an~ composition of the future dispensation, while white moral outrage over the use of the SADF 
was dissipated by the intensity of township violence.422 The success of the ECC as extra-parliamentary opposition to 
apartheid between 1983 and 1988 was thus closely tied to a particular convergence of circumstances and the ECC's 
ability to exploit these. 
422 Alistair Teeling-Smith's personal papers, "Where must the war resistance movement go? A discussion document for the national committee 
meeting 3 February 1991'. 
Chapter7 
Being heard I: Changing white attitudes to conscription 
as reflected by the white commercial press. 
THERE is no, liberty of 
speech, no liberty of 
the press, and all the 
ordinary liberties of the 
public have been taken 
away. We have nothing less 
than a despotism such as we 
find nowhere else in the world 
where there is any semblance 
of constitutional gover11:ment 
••. I will do my best ... 'to 
prevent the people coming 
under slave rule .•• as a result 
of the acts of the 
minister of defence 
who would do well to 
listen to the voice of 
the people. 
(Front page of the Weekly Mail 5 August 1988. The issue was banned.) 
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The preceding chapters have examined how the ECC took up its mandate to oppose conscription, challenging the 
official security discourse by attempting to create a climate of dissent among conscripts and encouraging whites to call 
for alternatives to national service. Discussion of the extent of the ECC's success has thus far been measured largely 
by state responses, such as attempts to contract the legal opposition space through the state of emergency, and the 
banning of the ECC. 
The impact of the ECC on broader white society is more difficult to gauge. The state's opposition to conscription 
objection largely kept the issue out of areas of statistical information gathering, such as public opinion polls. The ECC 
ran surveys on white attitudes to military service but the limited reference group made their accuracy questionable. 
Psychological models are another way to try to reflect on the relationship between beliefs, attitudes and actions, but 
often reflect the norms of their period (much like histories) rather than providing comprehensive models of human 
behaviour. One of their few points of agreement relevant to this study is that people will generally act in what they 
perceive to be their own or their group's best interests, attempting to maximise positive outcomes and minimise 
negative ones.423 Yet if one applies this to observed white behaviour in the period between 1983 and 1988, numerous 
interpretations are possible. Increased emigration, for example, suggests, rather than definitively proves, a correlation 
with growing white opposition to conscription, while the relatively constant reporting figures can be explained as much 
by the harsh alternatives to national service as by support for the system. 
In the absence of hard statistical data or definitive social science theory, the commercial media becomes a highly 
significant source. Both the tone and content of newspaper articles can be used to document changes in white 
attitudes to conscription. In assessing the role of the commercial media in the apartheid years the TRC concluded that 
it "played a crucial role in helping reflect and mould public opinion".424 Radical critiques of the press in the 1980s were 
scathing about the influence of the big mining houses on the two main English newspaper groups, South African 
Associated Newspapers and Argus, and suggested that the liberal press' relative freedom from government control 
was symptomatic of how its reliance on racial capitalism made it as much part of the system as its Afrikaans 
counterparts. Yet for the purposes of this study it is precisely the influence of this underlying white wor1d view which 
makes it possible to assess changing white attitudes to the ECC and conscription issues.425 
423 D.Foster, & J. Louw-Potgieter (eds), Social Psvcholooy in South Africa (Johannesburg, Lexicon publishers, 1991) pp.127-133. 
424 TRC, vol.4, ch.6, p.165. The electronic media will not be considered in this study as it was so largely controlled by the state. Since newspaper 
readership tended to follow racial divisions, the black press will not be considered either, as the point of this analysis is to assess the impact of the 
ECC on white attitudes. 
425 IBC. vol.4, chapter 6, p.173. Manuscripts and Archives BC 1005, folder LL3, M.J.Roodt, "Ideological state apparatus•, unpublished (undated). 
K.G.Tomaselli, 'Adapt or die: militarisation and the South African media 1976-1982", pp 8-13. Michael Barkusky, 'The English press in South 
Africa· unpubfished paper, 1977. 
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Unlike the alternative media, which was largely sympathetic to the ECC from the start and which was as much 
concerned with proselytising as with circulation, the commercial orientation of the mainstream press encouraged a 
conservative tone, aimed at the "lowest common denominator" in order to ensure the widest possible readership. The 
commercial press could not afford to stray too far from its readers' comfort zone for fear of a drop in circulation and 
advertising revenue. This commercial orientation also encouraged accommodation rather than confrontation with the 
state. Although the English press liked to tout its liberal criticism of apartheid, more than 100 laws, ranging from 
outright prohibition to the threat of prosecution for "subversion", affected its operations and encouraged self-
censorship. As the state became more determined to control public discourse, confiscation and dosure became real 
threats, particular1y after the 1986 state of emergency. As editor and publisher of the Southern Africa Report Raymond 
Louw noted in a paper delivered to the general assembly of the International Press Institute, "Confiscation of a few 
issues, let alone a three-month ban, could mean the difference between profit and loss on a year's operations for a 
major newspaper - and that could result in permanent closedown . ..426 Because support for the ECC was potentially 
costly, both in terms of reprisals from the state and the danger of antagonising readers, the attention devoted to 
conscription issues by the press at any given point indicates a correlation with the attitudes and concerns of the 
readership of the particular publication. 
While neither the English- nor Afrikaans-language press was a monolithic entity, in general terms the English press 
tended to be more liberal and to oppose the excesses of apartheid, except for the Citizen, which tended to support the 
government. Most Afrikaans newspapers endorsed the NP, although newspapers supporting the right wing, like Die 
Afrikaner (Herstigte Nasionale Party) and Die Patriot (CP) were critical of the government. The first left-wing Afrikaans 
newspaper, the Vrye Weekblad, only emerged in 1988 and so has little relevance to this study. 
When the ECC was constituted in late 1983, the commercial press was not generally sympathetic towards CO, 
although the opposition press had expressed outrage at the treatment of individual objectors like Charles Yeats. 
Besides the state's coercive threat, the liberal values of the English press encouraged agreement with some of the 
tenets of the state's security policy, such as a belief in the possibility of the parliamentary reform of apartheid and the 
importance of controlled reform, as well as an emphasis on the need for law and order. White security fears remained 
a politically risky area and the opposition press thus tended to attack the state's apartheid policies while steering clear 
of security issues.427 In the pro-government press there was almost total acceptance of the state's security discourse 
and hence the need for conscription, while the right wing used white security fears to stir up opposition to the NP. 
426 Star 3 June 1988. 
427 IBQ., vol.4, chapter 6, p.186. 
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From this largely unsympathetic base line in 1983, this chapter will analyse the extent and nature of reporting on 
conscription issues from 1984 to 1988 to suggest the impact of the ECC on white attitudes to conscription and 
conscription objection. 
The available source material means that the discussion will seek to indicate trends rather than be a definitive 
analysis. The lnstituut vir Eietydse Geskiedenis at the University of the Orange Free State has detailed source 
material, giving both the placement within the publication, and the size of the article, useful for assessing its visual 
impact, but the collection is far from complete. The ECC's own collection of press clippings is an important 
supplemental source, but is also incomplete due to the destruction of documents under the state of emergency. 
Moreover, many of these articles were collected via a press clippings service and were consequently divorced from a 
sense of placement on a page or within a publication. 
The scarcity of press reports on the emergence of the ECC and its early low-key campaigns indicated that the 1983 
change in the Defence Act and the creation of the Board for Religious Objection were initially successful in deflecting 
the media interest in conscription which had developed around the objection and trials of the early cos. Yet while the 
new legislation limited the expression of opposition to conscription, it neither removed the conscription burden on 
whites nor the need for forceful coercion of the black majority. Consequently, by late 1984 the ECC's growing 
organisational capability allowed it to mount its first national campaign, and this coincided with the state's deployment 
of conscripts in the Vaal townships in September and a policy schism within the PFP over conscription in October and 
November, encouraging a burst of renewed press interest in conscription. 
The October 1984 declaration launch combined a dear manifesto with well-known patrons, while the success of the 
initial Cape launch, which drew some 1 000 people, suggested that this was a movement with some credibility, 
direction and a following. The Johannesburg and Durban branches were able to capitalise on the success of the Cape 
launch, allowing for free mass advertising of ECC events.428 Patrons drew attention to the ECC as artides about the 
launch often carried patrons' photographs, eye-catching in a page of text. 429 In the pro-government press, however, 
patrons' association with the ECC was used to warn readers that the organisation was politically dangerous. 
Headlines combined the names of apartheid opponents and conscription: "Boesak s!! diensplig moet beeindig word" 
and "Beyers in veldtog teen diensplig". A photograph of Black Sash's Sheena Duncan together with Anton Lubowski of 
428 Sunday Tribune 21 October 1984, filfil 18 October 1984. Significantly, I did not come across one newspaper article on the ECC from any of the 
Orange Free State papers throughout the five-year period. The ECC made virtually no impact on this stronghold of Afrikaner hegemony, so 
wherever the national efforts of the ECC are mentioned in this thesis, this area is always conspicuously absent. 
429 Beeld 12 October 1984, Caoe Times 9 October, 19 October 1984, Star 18 October 1984. 
124 
SWAPO at the June 1984 ECC Namibia press conference similarly reinforced the idea that opposition to 
conscription had communist links, while the right wing Afrikaner overtly accused the ECC of being communist-
inspired.430 
The increased publicity surrounding the ECC's first public campaign was duplicated in all subsequent campaigns (see 
Charts One to Five431 ), highlighting the importance of active, focused campaign work for attracting white attention. 
Greater publicity for the ECC did not necessarily mean wider acceptance of the ECC's platform, but as long as white 
society was debating conscription, the divisive aspects of the increasing costs of conscription and the decreasing 
benefits of continued apartheid rule, including the infringement of white freedoms and economic decline, could be 
introduced into public discourse too. 
The ECC had little control over the initial publicity, however. Throughout its existence, the ECC sent out press 
releases (which tended to be wordy political treaties) only to see these translated into human-interest stories, or toned 
down to bring them in line with existing liberal tolerance levels. Publicity around the declaration campaign focused on 
the voices of patrons and existing organisations like the UDF and Black Sash rather than the ECC. Similarly, an article 
on Cape Town ECC member Dr Ivan Toms, a doctor at the Crossroads squatter camp, focused on the human interest 
of his work. While the article noted his objection to national service, it did not advance the profile of the ECC.432 
Reporting on the content of the declaration further illustrated the ECC's limited impact at this point.433 The pro-
government Afrikaans press gave the ECC scant attention, while the Citizen demonstrated a predictable commitment 
to the "total onslaught" line. Although it reported on the launch, it used only selected and sanitised aspects of the 
declaration. Oppositional charges like "illegal occupation" and "wage unjust war" were cut, the conflict was reported as 
only "verging" on civil war, and the ECC's call to "choose not to serve in the SADF" was removed completely.434 
By contrast, the opposition press quoted the declaration verbatim in a number of places, but the emphasis was on 
aspects of the ECC's programme which paralleled existing liberal concerns. Areas like the unjust allocation of 
resources and the call for a redistribution of wealth were glossed over in favour of criticism of the cost of the war, an 
430 Afrikaner 31 October 1984, Burner 16October1984, ~ 12 October 1984. 
431 National ECC campaigns occurred in September/October 1984, June/July 1985, September/October 1985, April 1986, September 1986, 
April/May 1987, and July 1988. 
432 Al:gy§ 15 November 1984, Sunday Star 20 October 1984, Sunday Tribune 21 October 1984, Daily Dispatch 20 November 1984, Beeld 12 
October 1984, Rand Daily Mail 18 October 1984, Sunday Times 7 October, 14 October 1984, Cape Times 5 October, 9 October 1984, Citizen 17 
October 1984, filS!!'. 18 October 1984. 
433 See Appendix One for the full declaration. 
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issue which was even being raised by the Financial Mail and an Afrikaans professor of Economics at conservative 
Potchefstroom University. 435 
In the liberal press issues of individual conscience and the contention that South Africa was an unjust society were 
also sympathetically received. The Daily Disoatch suggested that few young men wanted "two years and more 
wrenched out of an embryo career", and indicated the potential for conflict within families by suggesting that mothers 
and fathers viewed military service differently. Encouraging the state's attempts to make accords with its neighbours, 
the Rand Daily Mail went to the heart of the issue, saying simply, "People want their boys home". The Sunday Tribune 
emphasised the human cost of conscription, reminding its readers that potential conscripts had left the country or 
gone to prison rather than serve, and suggested this would increase as the SADF was used "in the towns and cities to 
quell civil dissent by our black fellow citizens". Perhaps most significantly, Cape Times military correspondent Willem 
Steenkamp, a steadfast opponent of the ECC, warned the state that conscription only worked because • ... generally 
speaking the whites accept it even if they don't particularly like it. If you tamper with that situation you are playing with 
fire".436 
To some extent this liberal press interest surrounding the ECC launch reflected a broader white complaint that 
"something must be done". A declining economy, increasing guerrilla attacks, and the stress repeated call-ups placed 
on families and businesses were increasing existing white criticism of the state. Yet if the liberal press, and by 
implication its readership, broadly accepted that objection to conscription was a relevant moral issue in public 
discourse by late 1984, it was far from endorsing the call to end conscription. 
While the liberal press was concerned about the potential for racial polarisation implicit in the use of white troops in the 
townships, it still largely accepted the basic tenet of "total onslaught": that the external threat required a significant 
military deterrent. The call of the youth wing of the PFP for the party to adopt a position close to that of the ECC thus 
created a furore. As Chart One demonstrates, although reporting on conscription rose in September 1984 as the ECC 
began its most active campaign to date, the greatest volume of press around conscription in 1984 still centered on the 
October/November internal PFP divisions over conscription.437 The liberal press' close ties to the PFP meant that it 
continued to endorse the PFP position that while conscription should be phased out, this was only practical once a 
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professional, volunteer army was in place. The liberal press also propounded the PFP position that the SADF was 
a "neutral shield" behind which reform could take place, thus effectively implying that conscription was contributing to 
the reform effort.438 
Two editorials at the height of the PFP debate indicated the two main white attitudes to conscription objection at this 
point. The liberal Argus agreed that opposition to conscription was an understandable position, a matter of "anguish in 
many homes", and refuted the state's attempts to polarise the issues into patriotic service or alignment with the 
enemy, arguing that "people who may be prepared to lay down their lives for South Africa do not want to die for 
apartheid". The editor also adopted the ECC's vocabulary in warning the state that people who questioned 
conscription were neither unpatriotic nor cowardly, but concerned about "the justness of the cause they are being 
called on to defend, and the manner in which it is to be done", and criticised the "abrasively political" deployment of 
the SADF in the townships. However, the call was for faster reform rather than an end to conscription, because the 
editor continued to accept the SADF as a necessary "shield that prevents hostile interference" during the process of 
political reform.439 
By contrast, the pro-government Citizen editorial denied that any opposition to conscription was acceptable, claiming 
that "anything that weakens the SADF is a shameful betrayal of this country". The ECC was firmly aligned with the 
country's enemies, from the headline "Deplorable", to the suggestion that the ECC was a front for "leftists", "radicals" 
and the UDF, which would like to "see the country's security forces weakened so that they could achieve their aim of 
destroying the existing order". The ECC was presented as a purely negative influence, part of "the anti-apartheid, anti-
this-and-that crowd all over again". The certainty projected by the Citizen editor's thundered "Of course", at the 
beginning of five successive paragraphs to emphasise his "total onslaught" arguments against the ECC further 
contrasted with the equivocation of the liberal position that conscription was a "sensitive" issue and a "complicated 
dilemma".440 
Nevertheless, by 1984 liberal whites were being forced, particularly by the youth, to acknowledge that conscription 
generated political and moral unease, to the extent that the liberal camp endorsed the ECC's right to oppose 
conscription. As conscription became an acceptable topic of public debate this also facilitated a new articulation, 
particularly in the letters pages of the liberal press, of white discontent at the burden of conscription and concern about 
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the internal use of the SADF.441 A tacit acknowledgement of the divisive potential of conscription could be seen in 
the attempts of the pro-government press to downplay the ECC's impact. This sector of the media estimated launch 
attendance figures much lower than the liberal press, for example, while emphasising the negative, as in the Citizen's 
report of violence at the Cape Town declaration meeting, which was not mentioned in the liberal press. The NSF 
further emphasised its role as spokesperson for youth in a Cape Herald interview.442 
Overall, this initial publicity suggested that the early impact of the ECC was limited to an accommodation of aspects of 
the ECC's call into the existing conscription discourse, rather than the ECC significantly altering this discourse. 
Continuing white security fears meant there was little sympathy for the ECC's radical analysis that the apartheid state 
was being perpetuated by force through the SADF, and that South Africa was essentially in a state of civil war. 
Moreover, despite sympathy for the ECC's moral arguments, its programme tended to be written off as "impractical", 
as the liberal press, despite opposing the deployment of troops in the townships, continued to endorse the SADF as a 
necessary part of the reform process.443 Yet if the ECC had won only limited support for its platform by the end of 
1984, it had nevertheless achieved recognition as a valid commentator on conscription issues. For example, the Cape 
Times headlined an article "PFP hits at use of troops", but two-thirds of the article was dedicated to an ECC press 
conference called to protest the decision to use the SADF in black townships. 
In the first half of 1985 articles about conscription continued to be in general terms rather than advancing the ECC's 
concerns. While the ECC was increasingly accepted as a recognisable part of the opposition - for example, quoted 
along with representatives of white political parties, the UDF, AZA.PO and the SACC, after the June 1985 SADF attack 
on Gabarone - its profile was largely dependent on being seen to be in tune with liberal concerns like individual 
conscience, freedom of speech, detention without trial and spiralling defence costs. The Argus, for example, 
condemned the banning of a proposed ECC meeting after the March Uitenhage shootings. Similarly, disclosures 
about SADF activities at Cabinda in Angola, despite a supposed accord between the two countries, created space for 
the ECC. However, patrons like Sir Richard Luyt or Andre Brink still received far more space to talk about conscription 
issues than the ECC.444 This suggested that liberal whites generally continued to accept the PFP's analysis of the 
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SAOF as a necessary shield for reform, and consequently to press for the creation of a professional army, rather 
than the ending of conscription.445 
Reporting on the ECC per se remained largely sporadic and localised. Articles about the security police raid on the 
ECC national conference in Natal, for example, were mostly limited to the Natal papers, and the opening of ECC Port 
Elizabeth and Pietermaritzburg branches received mostly regional attention too, suggesting that the ECC was not yet 
recognised as a nationally significant organisation. Rather, articles headlined "Anti-call up man addresses students" 
and "Student: SA in state of civil war in townships" reinforced the ECC's image of a student-based oppositional group, 
leading to hostility towards the ECC as a "radical" or "impractical" organisation. A Cape Times editorial, for example, 
denounced the 1985 extension of camps for a number of reasons, including the fact that this would "lend impetus to 
the anti-conscription campaign", while a report on ECC school pamphleteering in the Natal Mercury suggested that the 
campaign had been rejected by "a trail of angry parents, headmasters and school children", who had been 
approached largely by "students". While the ECC successfully negotiated a positive article a few days later, this was 
no guarantee that the previous readers would be either reached or convinced. A similar problem arose with reports of 
a Johannesburg vandalism campaign using ECC slogans. 446 
The June 1985 Johannesburg debate between the ECC and PFP leader Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert further 
demonstrated the limited credibility of the ECC at this point. The liberal press gave Slabbert the floor, reporting his 
round condemnation of the ECC as "dangerously romantic, extraordinarily naive and counter-productive". Only the 
Daily Dispatch gave space to David Webster's rebuttal although still headlining Slabbert, while at the other end of the 
liberal spectrum a Natal Mercury editorial angrily concluded that Slabbert was being "dangerously and extraordinarily 
charitable" towards the ECC. In the pro-government press, reports of the debate were used primarily as a means of 
taking issue with the PFP over its professional army proposals. Beeld, for instance, reported the debate as a speech, 
effectively blocking the ECC's point of view completely.447 
The nature and extent of newspaper articles thus suggested limited white support for the ECC by mid 1985. 
Conscription, however, still featured regularty in the media because of the growing white problems and grievances 
surrounding the issue. Even the pro-government Burger ran a story about a camp dodger whose failure to report was 
based on business reasons. Humanitarian and theological concerns about the Board for Religious Objection also 
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encouraged stories about the cases reviewed and the plight of non-religious objectors.448 Moreover, while General 
Malan used the press to attempt to smear the ECC by frequently asserting that it was part of a ANC-CP-UDF 
campaign to make South Africa ungovernable, the internal deployment of troops played an important role in moving 
the liberal press from merely accepting the legitimacy of conscription objection in terms of its broader commitment to 
freedom of speech, towards a new challenge to the state's security discourse. 
Sections of the liberal press began to suggest that conscripts had the right to make a personal moral choice about 
their national service, particularfy where this involved going into the townships. The Natal-based Sunday Tribune, for 
example, ran its ECC-Slabbert debate coverage with a picture of an unidentified black man, captioned "SADF is 
synonymous with tear gas, rubber bullets and aggression", and reported that township residents did not welcome the 
SADF as a peacekeeper as the state liked to suggest. The Cape Times also published a long letter which reopened 
the civil war debate, and claimed that service in the SADF was "moral suicide" primarily because of the internal 
deployment of the SADF. A Daily News editorial noted that the "issues are no longer clear-cut" and "conscripts have 
misgivings about what they are upholding" as the struggle seemed to arise "from the internal political system rather 
than a malignant totalitarian power". A Natal Witness editorial argued that the PFP was "evading the issue", by 
focusing on the creation of a professional army, as an army needed conviction rather than a mercenary spirit.449 
In this climate of increased liberal unease the ECC held its June/July peace festival. The international interest and 
state repression which surrounded this event helped not only to draw attention to the ECC, but also to give a new 
credibility to its campaign. The state's refusal of a visa to Cardinal Paolo Ams embarrassed the liberal establishment, 
encouraging reports in which the voices of the SACC, SACBC, UDF and the ECC predominated, claiming that Ams 
had refused to accede to the gag demands of the South African government that he be silent on moral issues. This 
was in stark contrast to the pro-government press in which the voice of government spokesmen predominated, 
claiming Arns' visa had been withdrawn because there were hidden motives behind his visit, reinforcing "total 
onslaught" paranoia. The Vaderland made a visual connection between subversion and the ECC, with a photograph of 
a welcoming committee of black students in black power t-shirts against an ECC banner. The accompanying article 
presented the students as a "rent-a-rabble" who had no idea who Arns was, and suggested that the ECC had 
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prevented the students being interviewed further, again reinforcing the idea that the ECG had little real support and 
had something to hide.450 
Initial liberal "freedom of speech" interest in the festival was further piqued by the calibre of international speakers, and 
the support of local affiliates, such as the SACBC, which, a week before the festival, made a highly publicised joint call 
with the ECG to end conscription. For the first time the ECG was achieving a positive public image through its own 
efforts. In the liberal press, including a front-page comment in the Star and numerous photographs in the Weekly Mail, 
the festival was reported as a successful and professionally run event, which increased the profile of the ECG, and, in 
turn, encouraged a more positive public association between the ECG and the existing conscription discourse.451 
After the festival, the ECC's newfound credibility was demonstrated by reports on the role of conscription in white 
emigration and the ECC's publicising SADF non-reporting statistics. SADF sources reported that 7 589 conscripts had 
failed to report for national service in January 1985, a five-fold increase on the previous year. Although the SADF 
immediately refuted its own figures, claiming that exempted students had mistakenly been included, the increased 
profile of the ECG can be seen in the continuing resurfacing of this story throughout the year. The financial newspaper 
Business Day, for example, reported the Ams visa issue in the government's voice, but by September ran a story 
using the original non-reporting figures despite the fact that the state had already strongly refuted these. 452 The press 
also began to quote ECG members who used terms like "civil war", although still making it very clear that they were 
reporting an opinion.453 When Alan Dodson was court-martialled in August for refusing to go into the townships, the 
Star report carried an ECG comment on the case, and both the Cape limes and the Star quoted the ECC's evidence 
before the Geldenhuys Committee. This counter-voice was important as in 1986 the committee declared the existing 
system "satisfactory", and the state refused to discuss the findings further, in an attempt to suppress the opposition 
expressed to the committee.454 Another indicator of a broadening of white interest in conscription issues was the 
movement of ECC stories beyond the political pages of the press. Argus columnist, Gory Bowes-Taylor, for example, 
interviewed Laurie Nathan and articulated her pain as the parent of a conscript, as well as that expressed by her 
readers over their sons' call-up.455 
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Nevertheless, press reports suggested that white sympathy for conscription objection still stalled when it came 
action. Where ECC objection moved beyond the liberal comfort zone, Slabbert's accusation that the ECC was largely 
unrealistic and na"ive was reiterated in the press. When the PFP Youth got too close to the ideological position of the 
ECC, its arguments were dismissed as "emotional" .456 In particular, the assertion that South Africa was in a state of 
civil war led to attacks on the ECC in the liberal press. Columnist Ken Owen, for example, argued that the ECC was 
polarising whites and attempting to "deny Mr Botha the instruments for the suppression of revolution". A Star editorial 
lumped together the UDF, ANC, PAC, and ECC as organisations which concealed their "real" agendas behind anti-
apartheid rhetoric. The Caoe Times demonstrated the extent to which whites were shielded from South African 
realities by contending that "If civil war does come nobody will be in any doubt." Thus when the Deputy Minister of 
Defence Adriaan Vlok alleged that the ANC was using the ECC to achieve its "evil goals", this was not only widely 
reported, but even enjoyed some liberal support, as indicated by the editorials which greeted attempts by the ECC to 
go beyond a moral challenge. 457 
If there was still only limited white support for the ECC, the organisation's increasing media profile after June 1985 
nevertheless posed a sufficient threat that a media counter-campaign began (see Chart Two). Immediately before the 
peace festival the Sundav Times revealed "secret ANC material" suggesting the ANC claimed to have infiltrated the 
ECC. Since the state had considerable powers to control what the media said about the ANC, its approval of these 
extensive "revelations" indicated this suited its purposes. The next day the Transvaler carried a similar story, 
headlined "So veg die UDF teen diensplig en SA", while the Citizen emphasised the connection between SADF 
regional actions to quell "violence" and the continued possibility of reform. In reporting on the July chaplaincy debate 
in the Anglican synod, the Citizen also went further than most of the liberal press in expressing concern at the divisive 
impact of conscription debate and suggested the synod had been "hijacked" by the left, under the influence of the 
ECC.458 
However, neither the state's attempts to undermine the ECC by smears nor the English press' continued loyalty to the 
PFP could disguise the continuing deployment of troops in the townships, or adequately address the white unease this 
generated. By targeting this issue the ECC's September 1985 "Troops Out" campaign encouraged the liberal 
community to acknowledge the dichotomy between its ideals and South African realities. 
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Once again when ECC members were detained just before the fast, the human rights angle stimulated liberal 
interest in conscription opposition. Even the Natal Mercury. the liberal paper most critical of the ECC, noted sternly 
that while it was "possible to silence some voices, ... it is not possible to ban continued discussion of a question that 
directly or indirectly touches practically every white home in the land", while a strongly ECC voice predominated in a 
Cape Times article on the detentions.459 By contrast, the Burger ran a story on white school pupils planning to boycott 
in sympathy with blacks, and claimed the ECC was involved in this, conveying the impression that the ECC was 
actively encouraging unrest and thus tacitly justifying the state's actions against the organisation.460 
The combination of repression against the ECC and an accessible campaign led to a peak in media attention in late 
September and early October 1985, as the ECC achieved its most widespread coverage to date. The human interest 
of the fast led to almost daily updates, particularly in the Cape Town press, where Ivan Toms was already a known 
quantity. Further evidence of growing white interest in conscription issues was the flood of letters to the press around 
this time, both endorsing and opposing conscription.461 An unusually high number of photographs not only drew 
attention to ECC articles, but also encouraged recognition of those taking part in the fast and gave visual 
corroboration to the figures of those attending the rallies. Photographs placed the ECC within a visual context as 
tasters were pictured with a rabbi, Archbishop Tutu, concerned mothers and thronged by multiracial crowds of 
supporters.462 Recognition of the value of visual cues was demonstrated by the pro-government Citizen, which ran a 
large photograph of a pensive Archbishop Tutu, captioned "Silent Tutu avoids press at start of 24 hr fast" together with 
an article which emphasised his unwillingness to be interviewed, implying that he was uncomfortable about 
associating with the ECC.463 
Once again editorials were a useful indicator of the range of interest and the level of white support for the ECC's 
position. Liberal editorials at the time of the fast tended to be highly critical of the state, demanding faster reform and 
greater recognition for objectors. The Argus, for example, praised Toms for his "courageous and genuine expression 
of protest" at a time when "peaceful protest is stifled by official bans and restrictions" ,464 while the Cape Times argued 
that the 4 000 people at the Cape Town city hall meeting were not a gathering of radicals and revolutionaries but a 
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meeting of South Africans of "all races, colours and creeds" concerned about the future.465 The Cape Times also 
began to make a direct link between the SADF and apartheid. While not yet agreeing that there was a civil war, the 
newspaper was considering the possibility, calling on the state to listen to "the growing number of South Africans who· 
say they do not want civil war". In the eastern Cape where conflict was most violent, the Evenina Post noted that in the 
townships the SADF was "increasingly identified as an instrument of government oppression".466 On the other hand, 
the Star argued that since South Africa was not at war the state must recognise and make provision for those with 
moral or political objections to serving in the townships or in "foreign territories like Namibia and Angola".467 
The press coverage of the fast thus offered a number of indicators that conscription was increasingly impinging on the 
white community, stimulating a range of potentially divisive responses. Not only was the geographic range of coverage 
the widest yet, and the daily intensity the highest (see Chart Two), but also the range of articles within publications 
addressing the fast meant that a wide variety of readers were being exposed to conscription debate. Besides religious 
and political commentary, and human interest and human rights stories, a tongue-in-cheek look at fasting as a way to 
beat inflation by Cape Times columnist John Scott indicated that conscription had moved from the rarefied realm of 
politics into the normal discourse of liberal whites, encouraging them to articulate the personal fears and frustrations of 
national service, which the NP had tried to disallow through its rhetoric of patriotic duty. 468 
While the liberal press was still far from endorsing the call to end conscription, the state's renewed attempts to 
undermine the ECC suggested it found the ECC's media headway threatening. Earlier, the Minister of Defence had 
warned a zealous NP politician not to raise conscription issues in his local press as this might give indirect momentum 
to the ECC.469 By the time of the fast, however, senior NP leaders attacked the ECC publicly, and their prominence 
guaranteed them media space across the political spectrum. Shortly before the fast, General Malan launched a 
stinging attack on the ECC and defended the use of troops in the townships, while Chief Director of Operations, Major-
General J.P. van Loggerenberg claimed in an address to a passing-out parade that the only aim of the ECC was to 
break morale in the SADF in order to leave South Africa defenceless.470 Soon after the fast the Afrikaans Sunday 
paper Rapport carried a double-page spread with banner headlines "ECC se politiek skyn rooi deur" and "Aanslag op 
wit seuns",471 accusing the ECC of "subtle" propaganda. This allowed the journalist to make accusations with little 
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evidence, and, claiming that the authorities were powerless against the ECC because it was not a banned 
organisation, encouraged readers to push for the state to act against the ECC. 
However, in the liberal press, and increasingly in the business press too, draft resistance continued to make 
headlines. The "brain drain" became a recognised phenomenon, while articles like "Award for brave objector?" in the 
Daily Dispatch, the story of a drowning rescue by a CO, directly contradicted the state's avowals that objectors were 
cowards. 472 By 1986 a steady stream of stories about the ECC continued the trend of liberal support for aspects of the 
ECC's work which highlighted or complemented its own concerns, signalling the growing power of conscription issues 
to exacerbate political differences among whites. In January 1986, for example, security force intervention at Clifton 
Beach to prevent the ECC building a sandcastle in the shape of the SADF logo was widely reported and ridiculed in 
the English press. Reports now also tended to emphasise the legality of the ECC's protest. suggesting that by 1986 
the ECC had significanUy increased not only its mainstream liberal recognition, but also its legitimacy within that 
group.473 
Other indications of this trend included greater reporting of ECC's protest at the January 1986 conscript intake than a 
year previously. Several ECC letters on the issue were printed, and both the Evenjng Post and Cape Times used 
language which supported the ECC's position and emphasised that the movement had considerable support, 
respectively reporting that "thousands of reluctant conscripts" were beginning their national service, and that the ECC 
advice bureau had been "flooded with calls" in the pre-intake weeks, while also reminding readers of the support for 
the ECC indicated by the October 1985 Cape Town rally.474 Reporting on the ECC's anti-cadet campaign also clearly 
carried the ECC message that the cadet system was not compulsory. 475 When General Malan accused the ECC of 
not working in the interests of the country, the Cape Times carried an article which was essentially an ECC rebuttal. 
The Cape Times further allowed the ECC considerable letter space to carry on a running debate with Willem 
Steenkamp.476 In addition, the liberal press began to give the ECC a platform to challenge the state. When the SADF 
refused to release its 1986 reporting figures, the ECC's condemnation of this was published, as was criticism of the 
state's refusal to publish the findings of the Geldenhuys Committee. The ECC's position that there should be an 
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extension of CO beyond religious objection and non-punitive alternatives to service in government organisations 
was also reiterated.477 
Reports about the ECC in this period accorded the movement a new respect. Articles in the liberal press emphasised 
the ECC's growth, its international influence, and its potential expansion into Afrikaans areas like Stellenbosch 
University.478 This carried over into the more conservative financial press. A Business Day report on the March ECC 
submission to the UN noted that it included a dossier of affidavits by township residents and COs, suggesting both 
that the ECC was taken seriously overseas and that it represented more than just a student constituency.479 The 
continued endorsement of high-profile supporters helped consolidate the ECC's position further. Newly elected 
Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, was quoted as speaking warmly of the "wonderful momentum of the 
ECC"480 and claiming that men like CO Philip Wilkinson represented "the hope for this country".481 The opening 
speeches of respected academic Colin Bundy, and PFP politician Alex Borraine also helped draw press attention to 
the April Cape Town ECC photographic exhibition and film festival.482 
The net result of both its own efforts and the continued support of high level patrons ensured that when the ECC 
began its April 1986 "Working for a Just Peace" campaign, it was building on a solid media presence. Like "Troops 
Out", this campaign attracted liberal interest because it resonated with existing concerns. Although there was not the 
same "soap opera" feel to the campaign which the daily tracking of Toms' fast had produced, the social upliftment 
angle of the campaign generated photographs too. In addition to a positive press profile, the ECC was now headlined 
in its own right; a further indication that the organisation was established as an accredited part of the anti-apartheid 
movement, and that its actions were perceived as both interesting and relevant within the liberal community.483 
Moreover, although campaigning again created a spike of press attention, the ECC achieved a more consistent press 
profile throughout 1986, as opposed to 1985, where campaigns had been the primary means of attracting attention 
(see Chart Three). 
Nevertheless, the ECC was disappointed with the media generated by the campaign because it felt the essential ECC 
message had been obscured by the liberal upliftment angle, which did not advance the ECC's radical understanding 
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of the connection between poverty and apartheid, or the SADF and apartheid.484 Only the most left wing Weekly 
Mail contextualised the campaign as an interim measure in a civil war context.485 The rest of the liberal press was still 
wary of the "civil war" concept, remaining committed to the PFP's call for the conversion of the SADF into a volunteer 
force before making any changes to the system of conscription. The ECC's call for alternatives to purely military 
national service, however, was clearly reported in several newspapers, suggesting that there was considerable 
support for the ECC's interim demands, and a growing acceptance that there were numerous conscripts who were, 
justifiably, deeply conflicted by military service in the current political climate in South Africa.486 
In the pro-government press the ECC still made little headway, suggesting that the readership of this sector remained 
highly committed to a "total onslaught" interpretation of the conflict. While the Citizen emphasised SADF socio-
economic upliftment projects as a counter to "Working for a Just Peace",487 for the most part ECC activities were 
ignored. In January 1986, for example, Rapport was forced to retract its October 1985 smear of the ECC, and to allow 
the ECC space to state its case, but the rest of the pro-government press did not follow suit, although several English 
newspapers took note of the retraction.488 Similarly, when the ECC won a media council ruling against the Aida 
Parker Newsletter in November 1986 this was reported in the English press, but largely ignored in the pro-government 
and right wing press, which continued to name the Aida Parker Newsletter as a credible source, such as an indignant 
Patriot article which warned of ECC activity on Afrikaans campuses. 489 
Nevertheless, conscription was becoming contentious in Afrikaans communities too. The Pretoria News, for example, 
headlined "War on campus", claiming that conscription issues were having an impact on the Afrikaans Universiteit van 
Pretoria campus, despite continuing majority support for national service there.490 In an attempt to counter the 
negative impact of the growing costs of conscription among whites, the pro-government press imputed sinister 
motives to the ECC rather than reporting on its activities. The Burger, for instance, reported "ECC se geld kom van 
buiteland",491 which suggested both an underhand foreign connection in the "total onslaught" context, and implied 
there was insufficient local support to sustain the organisation. Similarly, while the Cape Times reported the ECC's 
ejection from the Stellenbosch campus from a freedom of speech angle, three articles in the Burger suggested the 
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banning was widely supported in the interests of order and stability,492 and questioned the motivation and 
supporters of the ECC, using material from the Aida Parker Newsletter. The right-wing Afrikaner went further, claiming 
that an intensive campaign was underway by left-wing radicals, and noting that a founding member of the 
Stellenbosch branch, in open defiance of the government, had met with the ANC in Harare in December 1985.493 The 
Citizen used criticism of the ECC by a coloured Labour Party MP to emphasise the ECC's limited support base. 494 
The pro-government press not only projected the ECC as an opponent of the state, but also as a destroyer of the 
status quo, and a "spoiler" with no positive programme.495 While the liberal Star focused on ECC speaker Gavin Evans 
in its report of riot police entering the University of the Witwatersrand campus, after a "minor incident" with the NSF 
affiliate the Student Moderate Alliance during an ECC rally, the Citizen headlined "Violence on Wits campus", and 
reported an attempt to bum the South African flag and calls for students to be necklaced, creating an impression of 
irrational, violent, unpatriotic opposition associated with ECC activities. Similarly, when CO Philip Wilkinson was 
forcibly arrested at the start of a Johannesburg ECC rally in April 1986, the liberal press expressed outrage. The Cape 
limes asked "What kind of society treats ordinary citizens as criminals for refusing to take up arms and kill people?" 
while the Weekly Mail trumpeted, "For those of us who call ourselves white democrats, the time for theorising is over. 
We have to act." By contrast, Wilkinson's arrest was reported by Beeld as a "capture", with the implication of 
wrongdoing and evasion on his part.496 
By mid 1986, both the growing acceptance of the ECC in the liberal media and the hostility of the pro-government 
press indicated that whites were increasingly aware of the impact of conscription. The ECC was becoming more 
successful at stimulating debate, and consequently division, around the moral dilemmas inherent in conscription, as 
well as attracting attention to the personal costs of conscription. In part, the 12 June state of emergency was an 
attempt to curb the growing media interest in the anti-conscription message. 
Emergency regulations greatly increased the costs of reporting on the ECC, defining as "subversive" any statement 
which contained "anything calculated to discredit or undermine the system of compulsory military service". The 
regulations also created a climate of fear and uncertainty in which the press was not even sure if the ECC still existed 
as a legal entity.497 The Cape Times noted with disgust that the opposition press "has been forced to censor itself to 
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the point where the only meaningful reporting can take place in the editorial columns - comment and analysis are 
still relatively free. A few brave publications like the Weekly Mail, City Press and New Nation have tried to push the 
laws to the limit and have suffered the consequences in detentions, harassment, seizure and threats of closure".498 By 
December 1986 the press was no longer permitted even indirect signals - such as the use of blank spaces, daily 
reckonings of the length of the emergency and listings of detentions - to alert whites to the discrepancy between 
reality and what the press was allowed to print. 499 
However, Chart Three shows that despite the dip in the frequency of articles on conscription in July 1986, there was a 
recovery in the latter part of the year, while the Sunday and financial press exhibited more interest in the ECC after the 
declaration of the state of emergency than before. This ongoing press presence, despite the increased costs to the 
newspapers concerned, suggested that by mid 1986 conscription was firmly entrenched as an issue of concern to 
whites, and the ECC was accepted as a legitimate mouthpiece for objection to conscription. The pro-government 
press' continued attempts to undermine the impact of the ECC on their readership, even after the increased 
repression was in place, further indicated that even in constituencies sympathetic towards "total onslaught" thinking, 
there was concern about the political potential of the costs of conscription. 
Moreover, the state of emergency, while attempting to contract the legal space for public debate on conscription, also 
created news stories. Harassment of the ECC reignited the human rights concerns of the liberal press. The petrol 
bombing of the home of Johannesburg ECC member Anne McKay drew media attention,500 while the state's 
ineffectual attempts to deport Port Elizabeth ECC member Dominique Souchon prompted ongoing press interest as 
the case increasingly resembled a situation comedy with his passport expiring and his supposed "home country" 
Mauritius refusing to accept him.501 As the longer term effects of detentions began to be felt, so the liberal press also 
used harassment of the ECC, articles about detainee depression or testing of the emergency regulations, as a means 
of drawing attention to, and protesting, the ongoing state of emergency.502 In some cases this was implied, such as a 
Business Day photograph showing ECC women in a seated protest outside Wits Command, while armed police 
loomed over them. Other articles were overt. The Evening Post, for example, slated the state for holding Souchon 
without charge or explanation for five months. 503 The release of Michael Evans after six weeks of detention was 
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sympathetically noted in the Cape Times, along with a photograph showing his dog's delight at his return. Evans 
was quoted as saying that "Detention is one of the things one accepts as a liability in commitment to peace and 
change in this country",504 while the Star applauded "Brave Clare" (Verbeek, Johannesburg chair) for standing up for 
her convictions.505 
Although the ECC was very weak in the months immediately following the declaration of the state of emergency, its 
continued press presence was in part due to its previous success in integrating conscription into public discourse. 
Despite the state's attempts to criminalise opposition, in the liberal press both the tone and language continued to 
create a positive picture of the ECC as articles emphasised the ECC's legality and reminded readers of its successful 
past campaigns. Moreover, the liberal press increasingly claimed that conscription issues would not go away if the 
ECC was silenced, and reminded readers that although it was illegal to oppose conscription, it was still legal to 
demand the right to do so. Local affiliates and patrons, as well as the ECC's international supporters, continued to 
draw public attention to conscription issues. The ongoing debate in "Letters to the editor" pages further demonstrated 
that the interest the ECC had managed to generate around conscription had sufficient momentum not to be crushed 
by the state of emergency. Rather, the state's continued deployment of the SADF in the townships and reports of the 
rulings of the Board for Religious Objection, particularly the successful supreme court challenge to its theist principles 
by Buddhist, Dave Hartman, continued to focus attention on the costs of conscription.506 
Without campaigns, however, it was difficult for the ECC to move beyond existing levels of support in the press. 
Campaigns had given the ECC an opportunity to involve whites in positive activism, but after the declaration of the 
state of emergency the liberal press reflected a mood of helplessness. A Natal Mercury editorial argued there was no 
real alternative to "lumping" the current system, while the Business Day suggested that while "Military conscription 
raises for many young South Africans a moral dilemma of excruciating complexity", the only choices were between 
"order and chaos, courts and people's courts•. 507 
Campaigns were also an opportunity to try to assert the ECC's position, in order to shift liberal perspectives rather 
than ECC actions being interpreted within the confines of liberal thinking. The "Working for a Just Peace" campaign, 
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for example, had won a new acceptance of the need for alternatives to purely military service. The September 1986 
"Yellow Ribbon" campaign, however, demonstrated the difficulties of working under the new conditions. The campaign 
was primarily reported as a protest against repression, indicating both the capacity of the state to limit the conscription 
discourse, and the confusion in liberal white ranks about how to proceed. Nevertheless, a spate of letters followed the 
campaign; a clear indication that conscription was still a significant issue in white society, and one which could not be 
repressed away. 508 Like the January sandcastle incident, the "Yellow Ribbon" campaign encouraged the liberal press 
to question why the state over-reacted to the ECC, and articles mocked the heavy security force presence to prevent 
the innocuous tying of ribbons. 
As the ECC began to campaign again, so the pro-government press ran counter-interpretations of its work. Beeld, for 
example, noted that the yellow ribbon campaign had been illegal, without the rider added by the liberal press, that the 
ECC had not sought municipal permission in order to prevent harassment. The Citizen reported that a crowd had 
applauded the October arrest of ECC women protesting outside Witwatersrand Command and suggested that while 
the ECC had claimed that prominent female black leaders like Winnie Mandela, Albertina Sisulu, and Leah Tutu would 
be there, they had failed to appear. The article thus implied that the ECC had delusions about being relevant to the 
opposition movement, and offered evidence of support for state actions against it.509 
If the ECC had made little progress in the pro-government press by late 1986, its arguments were increasingly being 
integrated into liberal complaints, demonstrating that conscription was an issue of sufficient significance that the liberal 
press was prepared to face the risks of reporting about it. Criticising the imposition of restriction orders on the state's 
opponents, for example, the Caoe Times declared "There can be no peace under apartheid" echoing the just peace 
themes of the ECC.510 Reports of actions such as of the Cape Town "Dad's army" protest demonstrated the growing 
range of opposition,511 while the Weekly Mail photograph of UCT students eating a cake in the shape of the SADF 
logo, described as ·a way around the ban on building castles" reminded readers of previous ECC campaigns. 512 The 
fact that Business Day was one of the newspapers reporting on the arrest of ECC women outside Witwatersrand 
Command suggested that conscription was increasingly impinging on the business community too. 513 
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Throughout 1987 a number of factors encouraged ongoing media interest in conscription. ECC projects which 
resonated with existing religious and liberal concerns, like the December 1986 "No War Toys for Christmas" campaign 
continued to attract media attention.514 The "War Is No Solution Let's Choose a Just Peace" campaign drew attention 
to the ECC's call through upliftment opportunities and creative actions which publicised the ECC's claim that 
alternatives to national service could be positive, and that the demand for such alternatives was reasonable, as well 
as encouraging photographic opportunities, which helped articles about the ECC to stand out.515 
Ongoing repression of the ECC also continued to direct white attention to shrinking white freedoms, and to focus 
criticism of the state. The Caoe Times editor, for example, commenting on the banning of the December 1986 Cape 
arts festival, noted that "South Africa cannot be bludgeoned back into a condition of stability and prosperity", and 
called for negotiation "before the social and economic fabric of the country is destroyed". 516 Instead of the ECC being 
called "unrealistic", an Argus editorial now argued that the ECC espoused a cause "of grave concern to many" and 
admonished "the authorities· to "confront issues realistically".517 The press also noted the failure of state interventions 
to limit the ECC. In August 1987 the Saturday Star commented that the investigation of anti-apartheid bodies under 
the Fund Raising Act seemed "to have fallen flat so far",518 while the opposition press not only recorded ECC outrage 
at allegations made against it on the television current affairs programme "Network", but also allowed the ECC space 
to counter these allegations. 519 
Reporters with links to the ECC like Barbara Orpen, Mike Loewe and Gavin Evans, drew attention to the lack of 
alternatives facing objectors such as Philip Wilkinson during his April 1987 trial, and reminded whites of the continued 
detentions of Janet Cherry and Sue Lund. In the liberal press the ECC voice increasingly predominated in reports of 
repression. A Cape Times report on the December 1987 detention of Paula Hathorn, for example, gave Cape Town 
ECC chair Crispian Olver the floor to challenge the state to bring charges against her openly, and to "publicly address 
the issues around conscription in a constructive manner".520 Even the Citizen allowed the ECC to comment that the 
seizure of its campus comic indicated the "pettiness of a government unwilling to tolerate dissenting voices".521 In this 
way the ECC was still able to stimulate press debate on the decreasing benefits of "reformed" apartheid, as well as to 
encourage whites to take stock of the costs of continued conscription. 
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The liberal press had moved beyond its 1986 position of accepting the validity of the ECC's interim demands and 
by 1987 was reflecting a new scepticism towards "total onslaught" justifications of conscription. While the state 
continued to assert that the ECC was attempting to sway the young and na"ive through its work in the schools, the 
1987 SADF distribution of the Aida Parker News in Eastern Province schools and army bases was criticised in the 
liberal press, with the editor of the Eastern Province Herald dismissing the publication as "the epitome of advocacy 
journalism - the last thing to be foisted on young impressionable minds", and arguing that although most continued to 
"do their duty", it was often with heavy hearts, and conscripts therefore " ... deserve understanding and support. Not 
inane brainwashing".522 Similar1y, when the SADF ran an unprecedented advertising campaign in January 1987, with 
the head of the SADF General Jannie Geldenhuys publicly acknowledging the fears and frustrations of conscripts, and 
emphasising it was not SADF policy to "break troops", the Star noted scathingly "With key opposition organisations 
silenced by emergency press curbs, government propaganda wheels whirled into motion unhindered this week".523 
The article offered a strong counter voice, quoting extensively from an ECC's press release, which reminded readers 
about the deployment of the SADF in the townships, questioned what they were being called on to defend, and asked 
whether or not their actions would "further the cause of peace in our country".524 
It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest a smooth linear progression towards an ever-increasing acceptance of the 
ECC's cause in the liberal press. Chart Four shows that the amorphous "War Is Not Compulsory, Let's Choose a Just 
Peace" campaign struggled to make headway against news of the general election in May 1987. Moreover, the NP's 
focus on security issues in its election campaign, and particularly its attempt to undermine the PFP by associating it 
with the ECC, demonstrated clearly that white security fears remained a potent force in white politics.525 The pro-
government press was quick to accuse the PFP of being "soft" on security, demonstrating again why conscription was 
too costly an issue for parliamentary politics.526 Nevertheless, while PFP defence spokesman Brian Goodall reiterated 
a "total onslaught" line that "one should not be na"ive about the nature of the communist threat to overthrow the 
country violently and impose a totalitarian state", he also stated that the SADF "should be above controversy and be 
accepted by all South Africans as an impartial guardian of stability and order",527 a comment which expressed 
considerably less confidence in the neutrality of the SADF than the 1984 PFP discussions around conscription. 
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Moreover, the ECC was no longer relegated to the sidelines by the press when the PFP debated conscription. An 
ECC counter voice was heard throughout the elections, even though the PFP was under siege over security issues. 528 
While the state celebrated the 751h anniversary of the SADF with great pomp and ceremony, the Johannesburg ECC 
delivered a cake in the shape of the ECC logo, covered in grave markers, to Witwatersrand Command and called on 
the SADF to give servicemen a present by extending the boundaries of opposition to conscription. This provided a 
wonderful photographic opportunity for the Weekly Mail.529 Further evidence of liberal disillusionment with the 
impartiality of the SADF and a greater acceptance of the ECC's claim that the SADF directly upheld the apartheid 
state can be seen in the Cape Times coverage of the SADF's anniversary, which included the ECC comment that 
there was little for the SADF to celebrate, as the armed forces were responsible for "maintaining the abhorrent system 
of apartheid". 
This growing criticism of the SADF in the liberal press still stood in stark relief to the pro-government press. The 
Citizen ran an editorial saluting the SADF as the source of South Africa's regional power, and reiterated that it was the 
"shield behind which the government is introducing reform". The editorial further attempted to bolster the SADF's 
image by the incredible claim that the SADF had helped "pacify the townships without becoming directly involved in 
putting down unrest", and claimed that if SWAPO, backed by the Angolan and Cuban forces, were to take over South 
West Africa, then South Africa itself would be the next target.530 This kind of unsubstantiated threat-based rhetoric, 
typified by the NP election slogan "no surrender", demonstrated continuing resistance to the anti-conscription 
message in the wider white community. However, the attempt to white-wash the actions of the SADF in the townships 
suggested that where the ECC was having an impact in this pro-government constituency was its continuous 
reminders of the internal deployment of the SADF, and its questioning of the ethics of that deployment. 
The May 1987 trial of Philip Wilkinson drew further media attention to evidence about SADF atrocities in the townships 
and the negative impact of the SADF outside South Africa.531 Unlike the bald assertions of the Citizen that the SADF 
was keeping hostile regional enemies at bay. the trial allegations led to stocktaking in the liberal press, such as the 
analysis in the Cape Times by UCT Professor of Sociology Mike Savage. He addressed a range of issues, from the 
brutalisation of national service and its potential impact on civilian society, to a reminder of the ECC's "Working for a 
Just Peace" campaign as an example of "creative, constructive and realistic alternative service". He suggested that as 
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many as 10 000 conscripts were living abroad, and warned readers about the Nuremberg principles which 
recognised individual responsibility for one's actions, even when under orders. Perhaps the punch line, however, was 
his assertion that "the right to contribute positively to the development of our society should not be limited to COs, but 
should be a basic human right".532 This not only challenged the state's monopoly on the concept of patriotic duty, but 
also suggested that military service was actively contributing to the country's problems. 
Ivan Toms' refusal to serve a camp, together with his subsequent arrest and trial, further kept the issue of conscription 
in the press from July 1987 until his trial the following March.533 The liberal press emphasised that Toms had already 
served and attained the rank of lieutenant, and had tried the non-combatant option, but found it a prevarication. Toms' 
integrity was further underscored by his work in Crossroads, giving substance to his argument that his work among 
the poor was "real national service".534 
The publicity which surrounded Toms' refusal to serve535 also gave the ECC media space to refute Minister of 
Manpower Pietie du Plessis' contention that religious objectors were difficult to place as "many people were not in 
favour of being served by them". The ECC emphasised that religious objectors were not refusing to serve their country 
but were refusing to be "part of an army that in effect defends apartheid".536 When Deputy Minister of Defence 
Wynand Breytenbach labelled the 23 who publicly refused to serve in August 1987 "cowards", the Cape Times 
allowed the ECC space to make a rebuttal that "Those South Africans who choose to work for peace find it impossible 
to serve in the defence of apartheid", 537 and even Willem Steenkamp objected to the label, saying that "no matter how 
short-sighted or misguided" these men seemed, the cowards and the selfish went on the "chicken-run", emigrating 
rather than confronting the state.538 The Star further turned the tables by allowing the ECC to criticise the state for its 
failure to provide figures of those refusing to serve. Thus as the ECC was increasingly accepted as making a valid 
case, so new media opportunities allowed the organisation to reiterate previous arguments. The refusal of the 23 gave 
the ECC the chance to remind readers of the state's reluctance to disclose non-reporting figures, while articles in the 
week following the January 1987 SADF advertisement touched on the withdrawal of Souchon's deportation order, the 
failure to charge the nine Cape Town ECC members detained in December 1986, and emphasised that the ECC was 
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a "moderate and responsible opponent of the government", that ECC members in detention had been charged with 
no crime, and that the ECC was only campaigning for a change in the law. 539 
A further indication of the ECC's success in impressing the costs of conscription on whites was that articles on 
conscription began to appear independently of the ECC. While it is significant that Business Day, among others, 
should include comment from the ECC in its report on the Defence Budget vote, 540 it is also noteworthy that, as the 
negative impact of conscription became increasingly self-evident, 1987 saw a rise in articles about the "brain drain" 
and the costs of the conflict which did not necessarily originate with, or mention, the ECC. Even the Citizen, for 
example, headlined "Brain drain costs SA 40 citizens a day", and later ran a letter complaining about the treatment of 
veterans. This indicated that while the ECC represented an extreme of opposition, even among those who had done 
their national service there was a sense of making a sacrifice without recognition or reward. The negative impact of 
conscription on society was also explored in artides linking servicemen with crimes, and reports on the high SADF 
suicide rate. While the liberal press gave the ECC space to comment on this issue, even the Citizen and Beeld gave 
the statistics, suggesting that although the pro-government press was attempting to downplay the problems 
associated with conscription by giving them limited recognition, this could not camouflage the costs to white society. 
Similarly, while the liberal press ran predictably raucous cartoons around the exemption from national service of ballet 
dancers and jockeys, Willem Steenkamp, who had never questioned the need for the SADF, nor seriously challenged 
its deployment, responded to the exemptions with the comment that "National servicemen are not simply labour units 
and their parents are not simply child factories", suggesting a new recognition of the human costs involved in 
conscription. The casualties in Angola towards the end of 1987 exacerbated this climate of greater white uncertainty 
about the role of the SADF. 
Again, as the ECC was more successful in focusing white attention on conscription and developing support for its 
interim demands, this provoked a counter campaign to undermine its work and image. The Citizen, for example, 
attempted to detract from Toms' refusal to serve by suggesting that he was talking about it but not following through 
with action.541 Steenkamp, too, attacked the ECC for hijacking "caring people to pursue its own political aims".542 While 
the Afrikaner was the most rabid, calling the ECC a deadly psychological weapon against white South Africa,543 the 
supposed link between the ANC and the ECC continued to be emphasised by the pro-government press, as the state 
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justified its repression of the ECC in terms of "total onslaught". President P.W.Botha alleged that the ANC's plans 
for 1987 involved the PFP youth and the ECC in broad democratic front, while Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok 
told students, "Weaken our defence force and you dream your dreams in vain."544 Nevertheless, by the end of 1987, 
although Rapoort still asserted, "ECC is SA se probleem" it also carried a story about national servicemen torturing a 
cat, indicating a new recognition that national service did not always bring out the best in conscripts.545 
In the liberal press, the release of casualty figures after the SADF reluctantly admitted its troops were operational in 
Angola led to heightened criticism of the state, and more sympathy for the ECC. The ECC's call that troops be 
withdrawn from Angola was printed widely, and the Cape Times ended its report of the death of 12 soldiers in Angola 
with the ECC comment that the "deaths of these young conscripts is the price paid for the military aggression of the 
Nationalist govemment".546 After the Veterans for Victory smear leaflet "ECC: wolf in sheep's clothing" was inserted in 
the Grahamstown Grocott's Mail, the Eastern Province Herald published a rebuttal by academic Andre Brink and the 
comment of Grahamstown ECC chair Andrew Roos that "Even good Nationalists are beginning to ask why their 
children must be killed on foreign soil in adventures which can do absolutely nothing about safeguarding our 
county. "547 Support for the ECC's interim demands began to emerge on a number of fronts. The ECC wrote to 
Business Day, for example, to express a sense of deja won its editorial calling for "troops out".548 
A largely unfocused but increasingly debilitating white angst was clearly demonstrated in articles such as the one by 
journalist James Ambrose Brown in the Weekend Argus. Brown quoted from a letter he received from a man who had 
been in Angola in the 1970s and had seen a comrade wounded to the point of losing his humanity. He hastened to 
add that the ex-soldier did not support or condemn any controversy about conscription, and did not argue that war was 
bad or unnecessary, but that attempts to glorify war were vile. 549 While the article bent over backwards not to be seen 
to support the ECC, it encouraged a move away from the state's "heroic duty" conception of conscription and, if 
nothing else, expressed some of the pain surrounding the ongoing conflict. The exploration by the press of the "brain 
drain", the impact of the war on the economy, and, towards the end of 1987, the growing casualty list in Angola, 
further suggested that a reasonable proportion of the liberal readership were increasingly uneasy about conscription. 
544 Weekend Argus 4October1986, Natal Mercury 9September1986, Citizen 4October1986, Cape Times 13December1986. 
545 Rapport 13 December 1987. 
546 Sundav Star 11 October 1987, Star 10 October, 18 November 1987, Araus 13 October 1987, Business Day 6 October 1987, Cape Times 14 
October, 4 November 1987. 
547 Eastern Provjnce Herald 19 November 1987. 
548 Business Day 31 December 1987. 
549 Weekend Argus 21 November 1987. 
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While it may not seem indicative of a major impact on the part of the ECC to suggest that by late 1987 it had 
achieved a growing acceptance of the need for alternatives to conscription in the liberal press, this was indeed 
significant because it undercut the state's attempt to link the security of the whole white community to ongoing 
compliance with its conscription demands. By keeping the moral dilemma of conscription in the public eye the ECC 
further encouraged the liberal press to use ECC issues to assert the link between apartheid and the SADF, while 
redefining patriotism. Moreover, this reservoir of white frustration fuelled the "Alternative National Service" campaign 
of 1988.550 
In 1988 the "CasHe Three" story furthered this climate of growing white disillusionment. The pro-government press at 
first attempted to use the story to smear the ECC, with Beeld, for example, claiming to know "on good authority" that 
one of the servicemen accused of spying had previously requested exemption from military service and was possibly 
a member of the ECC. This indicated that the pro-government press still did not accept even the legal exemption 
process through the Board for Religious Objection, as Beeld implied that the request for exemption was part of a 
progression from pacifism to spying, with its associations of treason.551 As the story unfolded, however, the state's 
demands for secrecy were received unsympathetically in the liberal press, and for the first time the PFP aligned itself 
with the ECC to investigate the state's implication in the smears. 552 This tendency to side with the ECC against its 
detractors continued in the liberal press' rejection of the March 1988 Veteran's for Victory publication Rape of Peace. 
The Sunday Times, for example, called the Veterans for Victory a "shadowy group", unknown to veterans' service 
organisations like the MOTHS or the South African Legion, and allowed the ECC space to dismiss the booklet as an 
"emotive tract" and to explain how it wanted to change the law to allow conscripts the freedom to "decide how they 
should serve their country".553 
Unsurprisingly, the Citizen quoted approvingly from the booklet and suggested that the 1985 ECC peace festival 
developed out of the ANC's consultative conference where the ANC had expressed itself as being in favour of whites 
joining its military wing.554 Once again, the intention was to undermine the credibility of the ECC and to suggest that its 
peace actions concealed a more sinister purpose. 
550 filfil 2 January, 6 January, 7 January, 13 January, 22 January, 28 January, 16 February, 18 February, 19 February, 23 February 1987, Caoe 
Times 28 January, 20 February, 26 February 1987, Argus 18 February 1987, Beeld 19 February 1987, Citizen 27 January, 19 February 1987, 
Business Day 10 September, 13 November 1987. 
551 Beeld 21 December 1987. Similarly, fu!.rafil ran a story on independent candidate Wynand Malan, which focused on his contention that the ECC 
were "nie so sleg", presumably to damn him in the eyes of potential voters. Burger 29 October 1987. 
552 filfil 14 January, 20 February 1988, Weekly Mail 5 February, 19 February 1988, Cape Times 8 February 1988. 
553 Sunday Times 13 March 1988, Argus 19 March 1988 
554 Citizen 11 March 1988. 
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In the liberal press, however, other voices were supporting the ECC's claims against the SADF. By February 1988 
the Star reported at length on academic Peter Vale's claims that the state had used the media, particularly television, 
to keep South Africans believing in the existence of a Soviet-led "total onslaughr, so that the ECC was the only 
"competing message vis-a-vis whites".555 Headlined "Military in charge, claims professor", the tone of the article 
suggested a new wariness of both the military's influence in government, and the accuracy of its threat perception. 
This trend continued as the Cape Times published a long letter from theologians Douglas Bax, John de Gruchy and 
J.Thompson which asked, "Is the SADF beyond morality?"556 An Argus editorial admonished, "No matter how 
unpopular the ECC's cause may be among a large sector of the population, the fact is that it is a lawful organisation. 
The mere suggestion that a large and powerful arm of the state is spending time and money on undermining a legal 
organisation within the society it is paid to protect is a serious one. "557 
A concomitant aspect of this growing disillusionment with the SADF and increased acceptance of its connection with 
upholding NP policies was a new openness in the opposition press to non-military solutions. The Sunday Tribune ran 
an article about the "fallacy of WHAM" {winning hearts and minds) strategy, and argued that the only reasonable 
alternative was political discussion.558 From the proportion of state revenue spent on defence to those questioning the 
morality of the conflict, the voices calling for alternatives became louder, with the Sunday Star, for example, 
suggesting at the end of an article on an inquest into security force brutality in the townships, "There comes a time 
when the cure for what officialdom calls terrorism and subversion is worse than the disease. "559 
Nevertheless, white fears and concern over the future still created wariness about ending conscription. An article in 
Business Day, for instance, was sharply critical of the ECC and "all others who imagine that the solution to South 
Africa's problem is to destroy the civil administration".560 The moderate demands of the ECC's 1988 "Alternative 
Service" campaign, however, drew sympathetic media attention, particularly as the costs of conscription within the 
white community were increasingly obvious. The trials of Ivan Toms and David Bruce drew attention to the stark 
choices facing conscripts.561 The SADF suicide rate remained in the news, while the Sunday Tribune linked a range of 
social ills, from suicide and vehicle accidents to rape, heart disease, divorce, and drug abuse, to "war psychosis". The 
Citizen emphasised that it was his objection to the demands of military service on his sons which had led prominent 
PFP member Peter Nixon to decide to emigrate. A letter in the Natal Witness similarly explained that Dean of the 
555 Star 12 February 1988. 
556 Cape Times 23 February 1988. 
557 Argus 19 February 1988. 
558 Sunday Tribune 24 January 1988. 
559 Weekly Mail 11 March 1988, Sundav Tribune 6 March 1988, Sunday Star 13 March 1988. 
560 Business Day 24 February 1988. 
561 Argus 8 February 1988, Pretoria News 8 February 1988, Star 20 February 1988. 
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Faculty of Law at the University of Natal Professor Laurence Boulle had decided to emigrate because the "socio-
political state of country leaves little prospect for the future of my children, particularly with increasing militarisation 
taking place".562 
Older issues also continued to be linked to the new campaign. The Weekly Mail, for example, reminded readers of the 
state's continuing refusal to release non-reporting figures, headlining the article "Magnus says little but his silence 
speaks volumes", and criticised the state for using billions of rand of taxpayers money, while throwing a "cloak of 
secrecy" over activities which might be "politically embarrassing". 563 The ongoing banning of the ECC on Stellenbosch 
campus also continued to raise issues of freedom of speech in both the English and Afrikaans press. 564 
By the time the ECC met with the SADF in June 1988 a range of newspapers were expressing encouragement for the 
idea of alternatives to the current system of military conscription. 565 By July indicators of decreasing support for 
conscription included an article in the Weekend Argus which suggested South Africa's aerial strength was seriously 
compromised, in contrast to the Citizen which the same day carried an article complacently reporting "SA military 
power on parade".566 The Star quoted Slabbert's views that the government was lying to the public about Angola, and 
soon afterwards the Sunday Star, while reporting that white South Africans still had "every confidence" in the SADF, 
also headlined "War-weary whites support a settlement". 567 After the Bruce trial the Sunday Star canvassed student 
opinion. While white RAU students still claimed it was a privilege to serve in the SADF, they agreed that the six-year 
sentence was too harsh. University of the Witwatersrand student attitudes varied from acquiescence, doing two years 
to stay out of jail, to definite plans to emigrate.568 By the end of July the Sunday Tribune reported the call-up was a 
major factor cited by new doctors deciding to emigrate, and a week later the Sunday Star graphically demonstrated 
the skills gap left by emigration in its touched-up graduating class photograph, with the proportion planning to emigrate 
blacked out.569 
By mid-1988 conscription was drawing continuous press attention from both the English and Afrikaans press (see 
Chart Five). Reports about David Bruce's sentencing at the end of July were followed by the 3 August stand of the 
143. While the Volksblad dismissed Bruce's case as emotional and claimed that his duty, like everyone else's, was to 
562 Sunday Star 13 March 1988, Citizen 19 February 1988, Sunday Tribune 24 January 1988, Natal Witness 4 February 1988. 
563 Weekly Mail 4 March 1988, Cape Times 2 March 1988. 
564 Buraer7 March 1988, Pretoria News 31 March 1988. 
565 Business Day 20 June 1988, Weekly Mail 24 June, 30 June 1988, Star 1 July, 4 July 1988. 
566 Weekend Argus 2 July 1988, Citizen 2 July 1988. 
567 film 13 July 1988, Sunday Star 24 July 1988. 
568 Sunday Star 24 July 1988. 
569 Sunday Tribune 31 July 1988, Sunday Star 7 August 1988. 
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carry out his God-given task to protect his fatherland, Rapport ran an article acknowledging that soldiers 
experienced emotional and psychological difficulties related to their national service. 570 While much of the pro-
government coverage of the 143 was predictably hostile, Beeld did include an article commenting that 600 SADF 
soldiers had died since 1975. The article still toed the patriotic line, claiming that many more enemy soldiers had died, 
and calling on whites to do their duty so that the conflict would be over and national service could be reduced.571 
However, this counting of the cost was a shift from earlier bellicose attitudes that the SADF could defend South Africa 
indefinitely, again suggesting creeping war weariness even in the sector most supportive of the SADF. 
In the liberal press the Bruce trial led to criticism of the state for failing to provide acceptable alternatives. The Pretoria 
News. Daily News and Argus, for example, agreed with General Malan that citizens could not arbitrarily decide which 
laws to obey, but added that if he offered alternatives he would find it easier to win compliance. Moreover, the Pretoria 
News told Malan he was wasting his time attacking the ECC since the debate on conscription had spread "way 
beyond the ECC to the churches and political parties" so that despite the emergency regulations to contain criticism of 
the system of compulsory military service, conscription remained a "contentious issue which impacts the lives of many 
thousands of young South Africans". Similarly, the Cape Times editor chided Malan for over-reacting in his diatribe 
against the ECC, which he had described as "the vanguard of those forces that are intent on wrecking the present 
dispensation and its renewal". The editor claimed that rather than being a threat to the state, the ECC was a "worthy 
and useful organisation operating above board in perfectly legal fashion" to press for alternatives to purely military 
service. The editor of the Star went further, linking the call for alternatives directly to the state's deployment of the 
SADF either to "preserve a sullen peace in the townships or defending ill-defined principles in an undeclared war far 
beyond the country's borders".572 This criticism of the NP's deployment of the SADF continued in the Sunday Times, 
which argued that conscripts particularly opposed township deployment, while the Sunday Star was more explicit, 
claiming that a growing number of conscripts "abhor the fact that the SADF is being used increasingly in the civilian 
arena to prop up apartheid".573 The Weekly Mail of 5 August ran a front page cartoon contrasting a military juggernaut 
bearing Malan's face and sprouting his accusations against the ECC, with the small, defenceless figure of a lone ECC 
member. This power inversion was given added impact by a 1915 quotation from General Barry Hertzog, opposing the 
conscription of South African soldiers to fight in Namibia in 1915, which had been used as a defence of his refusal to 
serve by Andre Zaaiman, one of the 143. Hertzog had accused the government of taking away the liberties of the 
570 Volksblad 28 July 1988, RrumQIT 10 July 1988. 
571 Beeld 4 August 1988. 
572 Argus 5 August 1988, Caoe Times 5 August 1988, Daily News 5 August 1988, Star 5 August 1988. 
573 Star 3 August 1988, 4 August 1988, Volksblad 3 August, 4 August 1988, Business Day 4 August 1988, Pretoria News 4 August 1988, Eastern 
Province Herald 4 August 1988, Caoe Times 4 August 1988, Natal Witness 4 August 1988, Daily News 4 August 1988, Vaderland 4 August, 5 
August 1988, Daily Disoatch 4 August 1988, Grocott's Mail 5 August 1988, Weekly Mail 5 August 1988, Argus 5 August 1988, Sunday Times 7 
August 1988, Sunday Star 7 August 1988. 
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people, induding freedom of the press and freedom of speech, and warned the Minister of Defence that he "would 
do well to listen to the voice of the people". This juxtapositioning of the Afrikaner voice calling for freedom from 
government tyranny with the graphic depiction of the opposition impact of the ECC and a detailed article on the 143 
led to the banning of this issue. 
Nevertheless, conscription continued to feature heavily in the press, including reports that a move to commit the PFP 
to supporting both objectors and campaigns aimed at ending conscription had been narrowly defeated three days after 
the stand of the 143.574 The Sunday Tribune chose to focus on the defection of Afrikaner Andre Zaaiman.575 In the 
eastern Cape the press reported· that a right-wing businessman refused to serve a camp. 576 With both the tone and 
content of the press making the divisive impact of conscription increasingly apparent, the state soon had little option 
but to ban the ECC outright. 
Reporting of the ban was widespread and indicated the continued potential of conscription to polarise white opinion. 
Media opponents of the ECC reported the official press release faithfully. Both the Burger and the Volksblad ran 
stories of student support for the ban, with comment from Jeugkrag chair Marthinus van Schalkwyk to the effect that 
ECC members clearly placed themselves within the ANC-UDF alliance. The leader of the Populere Studente Alliansie 
at Stellenbosch argued in favour of free speech, but agreed the ECC's "smear campaign" against the SADF could not 
be allowed to continue.577 When coloured parliamentary leader Allan Hendrikse criticised the ban, the pro-government 
press reported in detail Malan's attack on him as being "emotional", "reckless" and "irresponsible", and "playing into 
the hands of terrorists". These responses indicated that the pro-government press remained committed to a "total 
onslaught" interpretation of the conflict which refuted opposition where this appeared to undermine white security.578 
In the opposition press criticism of the ban was widespread, indicating how successfully the ECC had been integrated 
into existing liberal concerns about contracting white freedoms. While the Weekly Mail scathingly noted that the 
Minister could not even ban the organisation efficiently, calling it the End Conscription Committee in the first official 
banning order, other newspapers which had not always been supportive of the ECC's objectives no longer uncritically 
accepted the state's "total onslaught" rationale.579 The Cape Times used the government's own admission that "many" 
574 Cape Times 6 August 1988. 
575 Sundav Tribune 7 August 1988. 
576 Eastern Province Herald 15 August 1988. 
577 Burger 23 August 1988, Volksblad 23 August 1988. 
578 ~ 23 August 1988. 
579 Star 23 August, 26 August 1988, Weekly Mail 26 August 1988, Sunday Times 21 August 1988, Araus 22 August 1988, Cape Times 23 August 
1988, Daily News 23 August 1988, Eastern Province Herald 23 August 1988, Natal Mercury 23 August 1988, Pretoria News 23 August 1988. 
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had been influenced to refuse to remind readers of evidence of growing resistance, such as the stand of the 143.580 
The opposition press also emphasised the costs of conscription. Not only the sympathetic Weekly Mail but also the 
Business Day printed a long letter from Johannesburg chair Chris de Villiers headlined "Conscription issue won't go 
away", highlighting both the state's intransigence and high-handedness, and the fact that mainstream political parties 
had begun to take up conscription issues. 581 
Analysis of white responses to conscription between 1983 and 1988 as indicated by the commercial press thus 
demonstrates a number of significant indicators of changing white public opinion towards conscription. Throughout this 
chapter the term "liberal press" has been used to cover a range of opposition opinion, from the very supportive Weekly 
Mail and Cape Times, to the more conservative Pretoria News, and the frequently hostile Natal Mercury. Overall, 
however, the tone and content of conscription reporting in this sector of the press between 1984 and 1988 shows a 
movement, albeit uneven, from an acceptance of the ECC as a peripheral opposition movement whose right to 
campaign was in question, to a legitimate organisation addressing an issue of great concern to whites, whose 
repression reflected the loss of white freedoms under apartheid. While the ECC was frequently dissatisfied with the 
press because it did not engage with the more radical elements of its call, as the ECC's interim demands were 
increasingly accepted as valid and reasonable this encouraged whites to articulate their frustration around 
conscription, to question the morality of SADF deployments and to seek alternatives. Moreover, the ECC did not have 
to win white support to have an opposition impact. While the ECC continued to be staunchly opposed by the pro-
government and right wing press, its continued public presence encouraged the right wing press to use the ECC's 
existence to criticise the state for losing control; compounding the liberal press' questioning of the internal deployment 
of the SADF, and its criticism that repression of the ECC was unwarranted. As conscription issues increasingly 
polarised the white left and right, the NP's control of the middle ground became more tenuous as it could demonstrate 
neither convincing reform, nor significant socio-economic or political stability or progress. 
58
° Cape Times 23 August 1988. 
581 Business Day 5 September 1988. 
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Although the Financial Mail was not a newspaper in the sense of the other publications discussed, before the advent 
of Business Day it was one of the few indicators of business opinion. 
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Chart Two: Frequency of conscription articles in the white press 1985 
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Chart Four: Frequency of conscription articles in the white press 1987 
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Chapter Eight 
Being heard II: Changing white 
attitudes to conscription as reflected 
by white popular magazines. 
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Like the press, popular magazines are an unselfconscious record of the norms and attitudes of the period, while 
their commercial orientation makes them a valuable reflection of their readership's opinions.582 Between 1983 and 
1988 the press represented the more analytical facet of white public discourse, while magazines addressed issues like 
escapism and self-improvement, and, significantly, barely featured conscription per se. Instead, the ongoing debate in 
the letters pages of Fair Lady about whether magazines were supposed to be offering a respite from reality or 
educating their readership suggested that difficult issues were not welcomed by a considerable segment of magazine 
readership. Despite the lack of overt conscription coverage, analysis of the content and tone of a number of 
magazines of this period will suggest some of the expectations which helped to shape the predominantly middle-class 
white society the ECC was trying to reach, as well as indicate the growing stresses within that society. 
In the 1980s academics pointed to a developing "culture of militarism" among whites, evidenced by advertising, 
recreational pursuits which emphasised combat, and the development of a mindset geared for conflict rather than 
negotiation. Certainly this seems to have been a goal of the official discourse, opposed by the ECC through its 
alternative peace culture. However, the magazines of the period indicated that whites also had a strong desire to deny 
the conflict and ignore its realities as far as possible.583 This was exacerbated by the state of emergency which limited 
public discussion and denied whites access to information about township life as well as downplaying the groundswell 
of popular support for the ANC. The ECC was an important counter to this fac;ade of normality, confronting whites with 
the continued presence of troops in the townships, articulating white discontent, and exposing evidence of a society at 
war with itself. 
While more "intellectual" magazines, like Leadership or Die Suid-Afrikaan, offered studied analyses by academics or 
high-powered figures in politics or business, six mainstream popular magazines will be considered here, as a means 
of exploring the impact of conscription on ordinary whites. Scope was the only non-specialist magazine for men in this 
period. Fair Lady aimed at a mainly female English readership between about 18 and 50 years old, while 
Cosmooolitan appealed to the "yuppie" English female market, relatively wealthy, more educated, and more liberated 
in their views. Sarie and Rooi Roos were aimed at the Afrikaans female market, carrying mainly the traditional fare of 
582 Women's magazines, in particular, ran frequent surveys to make sure they remained in tune with their readership. The significant dip in 
readership which accompanied the resignation of Fair Lady editor Dene Smuts over the refusal of publisher Nasionale Pers to run a story on 
independent candidate Dennis Worrall in 1987 indicated that where publications offended their readership they could expect a decline in circulation. 
See footnote 584. 
583 Price, A documentation of the experiences of military conscripts in the South African Defence Force. pp.201, 192, 383, 388-389. In her interviews 
with conscripts Price noted that conscripts experienced a •general lack of interest• among the public. A conscript told her • ... the people at home 
didn't really know what was going on in the army, and that was a most frustrating thing. They were living their normal lives and didn't know what the 
army was all about, what so many young men were going through, what was happening to the sensitive people". Another said that he "had a year of 
experience which nobody wanted to talk about. Whenever I tried to interject with my experience people didn't want to know, and even if they did 
want to know, they couldn't understand". Conscripts felt their experiences in the SADE were so divorced from the priorities of civilian life they felt 
"lost and disorientated" when they were discharged. 
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women's magazines, cooking, crafts, relationship advice, fashion and self-improvement articles, although Sarie 
was slightly more upmarket. De Kat only operated from July 1985, and was a "yuppie" Afrikaans publication for the 
cultural and economic elite, male and female, with a cover price three times that of the other two Afrikaans 
publications. 584 
Since conscription particularly affected men, the definition of a masculine target audience by the only men's magazine 
in this period is revealing. Scope chiefly sold vicarious thrills, from provocatively posed women to high-speed vehicles; 
from weapons and extreme sports to serialised adventure novels. In addition to this escapist content, Scope's tone 
was sensationalist, presenting a world of clear-cut heroes and villains. The definition of successful masculinity it 
peddled was defined exclusively in terms of heterosexuality and male dominance, through control and power, whether 
through fast cars or dangerous weapons, with physical courage glorified, in both sport and national service.585 
Formulaic, with about as much introspection as a rowdy bar, Scope is therefore a prime example of a source of 
information about changing male attitudes. Scope ran many well-illustrated articles which glorified weaponry, such as 
"Man's heart is in his weapons",586 and equated weapons with manhood, in articles like that extolling "the virile beauty 
of a hand-cut blade",587 while war games were advertised as entertainment.588 Several "glamour" shoots, also featured 
James Bond co-stars, and scantily clad women posed with weapons, or even draped with a machine-gun magazine, 
as a "necklace".589 Scope used women as "rewards· for serving soldiers, through its pen-pal service, complimentary 
copies of Scope for men on the border and the dedication of one of its topless spreads to the "troepies". 590 
Throughout the period from 1983 to 1988 much of the tone and content of Scope reinforced total onslaught discourse, 
with Russia frequently depicted as being behind a policy of deception designed to win over the unwitting people of 
South Africa.591 The destructive intent of South Africa's enemies was an ongoing theme. Articles, often with graphic 
584 Orculation figures according to !':A Barometer vol.2, no.7, 22 Aoril 1988, o.101. Fair Ladv 18 March 1987. 
Ju/v-December 1986 January-June 1987 July-December 1987 
CosmoooJitan 115 414 118 296 123 459 
Fair L<>rlv 180 843 168 786 179 133 
Scope - 98 295 109744 
YourFamilv 
- 255 831 -
HyJs~noot - 507 484 -
The last two magazmes, although having the largest circulation, are not relevant to this study as they were largely skills-, rather than mformat1on-
oriented. Unfortunately ~ Rooi Roos and ~were not included in this circulation count. 
585 ~ promoted events like the Denim-man action hero competition, ~ 17 June 1983. 
586 J.Cock and L.Nathan (eds), Society at war (New York, St Martin's Press, 1989) pp.10-12. Cock, "A high price for freedom", vol.53, April/May 
1988 pp.19-23. ~ 20 April 20 1984. 
587 ~ 22 July 1983. 
588 ~July 8 1983, 11 May 1984, 29 August 1986. 
589 ~ 12October1984, 8 Marcil 1985. 
590 ~ 14 January 1983, 20 May 1983. Price, A documentation of the experiences of military conscripts in the South African Defence Force, 
r,.71. 
91 ~7September1984, 16November1984, 17May1985, 10 January 1986, 17January 1986, 18 July 1986. 
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footage, showed African countries and those under communist rule or attack, as places of civilian suffering where 
the rule of law was disregarded. 592 Similarly, an article on the training of women fighters in Libya claiming that "little 
girls are turned into cold-eyed killers", was typical of the portrayal of South Africa's enemies as the "unthinking 
products of ongoing propaganda".593 
Articles also contrasted the threat to South Africa with the SADF's offensive capacity, touting the power of the SADF 
military machine through glossy photo-stories, 594 as well as covering weapons development in countries South Africa 
regarded as friendly.595 Coverage of the ANC remained hostile throughout, particularly as the guerrilla campaign 
gained momentum. Artides like "The ANC terror plan to destroy South Africa", and "Comrade Joe Slovo: the man who 
hates South Africa", portrayed the liberation struggle as essentially destructive,596 while UNITA was extolled as a band 
of heroic freedom fighters wanting only to "be master of [their] own piece of Africa".597 By contrast, an August 1988 
article suggested the Cubans would be in Angola for a long time as war was Cuba's most profitable export, reducing 
the enemy to the level of mercenaries.598 Individual SADF unit leaders and special units were interviewed as heroes, 
further underscoring the contention that South African soldiers and their allies defended civilised principles, while the 
motivation of enemy soldiers was questionable.599 
Scope was thus very much in tune with the state's discourse of external threat, with the ANC as a destructive enemy, 
and the SADF as whites' protection against chaos. Increasingly, however, the realities of ongoing conflict, economic 
decline and continuous conscription demands began to intrude even into Scope's escapist world. As early as 1984, 
South Africa's reliance on American film models exposed it to the crises of returning Vietnam soldiers, struggling to 
readjust. Reviews of a series of war films from "Apocalypse now" to "Platoon" and "Purple Hearts" began to consider 
concerns about the effects of war.600 Secondly, disquiet over the growing dislocation within South Africa kept intruding. 
After 1983 the creeping malaise of HIV/AIDS tempered gung-ho articles on sex, while a declining economy meant 
articles about expensive cars were increasingly just window-shopping, and by 1986 a report exposed desperate white 
poverty.601 In 1985 the article "Family killings: a South African 'epidemic'· reported that some 200 people had died in 
two years and quoted a psychologist who linked these to deepening recession and political instability which "threatens 
592 These included an article headed "The 12 most sinister men in Mozambique· which turned out to be about the Mozambique cabinet. Scooe 25 
Februrary 1983, 25 March 1983, 8 April 1983, 2 June 1983, 17 June 1983, 19 August 1983, 6 April 1984, 7 September 1984, 16 November 1984, 
18January1985, 25January1985, 4October1985, 24 January 1986, 28 March 1986, 13June1986, 21November1986, 12 August 1988. 
593 Scooe 17 June 1983. 
594 ~ 20 January 1984, 19October1984, 13 May 1983, 19 July 1985. 
595 ~ 28January1983, 11November1983, 11October1985, 19June1987, 10 January 1986. 
596 ~ 10 January 1986, 18 February 1983. 
597 ~ 15June1984, 29 June 1984, 29November1985. 
598 ~ 12 August 1988. 
599 ~ 16 December 1983, 25 January 1985, 18 March 1983. 19 October 1984, 19July1985, 17 January 1986, 7 March 1986, 18 July 1986. 
600 ~ 10 February 1984. 
601 ~ 26 September 1986. 
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to spill over into civil war".602 By 1987 the link between the conflict and social dislocation was made much more 
explicit as Scope quoted Lloyd Vogelman of the Applied Psychology Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand as 
saying "the troubled political situation in the country will lead to more family murders as people feel insecure, unstable 
and unable to impose a sense of order in their lives".603 
Thirdly, while the ANC's widening of its guerrilla campaign led to articles like "How to survive a terrorist attack",604 in 
which the tone was highly critical of the "heinous crimes" committed against civilians in the "name of freedomn605 with 
no contextualisation of the conflict, the issue of troop deployment in the townships was treated differently. The editor 
assured readers that ~ was not turning into a political magazine, but he stated that the unrest in South African 
townships was "an issue of such massive social concern that it reaches far beyond the arena of politics" so that it 
would be "gross negligence" to ignore the violence in the townships.606 When letters criticised Scope for running the 
story on the grounds that "we see enough violence daily on TV and in the press", the editor replied that unlike other 
countries where politics were abstract ideologies, in South Africa politics "affect each and every one of us every 
day".001 
Thus although ~ continued to glamorise war in general, and to extol the SADF and accept its role as "defensive", 
by late 1986 it was also beginning to document a mood of resistance and unease. In an article on white emigration 
Scope stated that the "white community must be made to understand that they will face growing pressures if they 
concede less than what democratic equity requires".608 A July 1988 article noted that national servicemen disappeared 
with "frightening regularity•, especially when going home on pass, evidence of a growing opposition to the demands of 
conscription.609 In a 1987 interview liberal icon Alan Paton claimed to detect a "tremendous mood of despondency 
among the young". 610 
Scope reflected the mindset only of a section of white South African males. Nevertheless, it is a useful indicator of 
white attitudes because its emphases were so similar to those of the SADF in glorifying war, uncritically accepting the 
premises of "total onslaughf, and associating successful masculinity with combat experience. By 1988 the growing 
mood of uncertainty, despite the magazine's core goal of escapism, suggested a considerable shift in attitude from the 
602 ~ 22November1985. 
603 ~ 4 December 1987. 
604 Scooe 4October1985. 
605 ~ 25 January 1986. 
606 ~ 25 October 1985, 20 September 1985. 
607 ~ 25October1985. 
608 ~ 7 November 1986, 19 June 1987. 
609 ~ 14 July 1988. 
610 ~7November1986, 13 March 1987. 
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uncritical acceptance of the long-term efficacy of "total onslaught" solutions in 1983. In a 1985 review of the book 
Like the wind: the story of the South African army. the reviewer claimed that reassurances about the capability of the 
SADF by Chief of the Defence Force General Jannie Geldenhuys were "long overdue in the current climate of 
uncertainty",611 suggesting a growing white need for reassurance, as opposed to the previous gung-ho mood. By 1988 
the tone had become more fatalistic. Articles like "The AWB prepare for Armageddon",612 and "Shades of survival: 
what if the crunch came in SA?.s13 suggested Scope had not changed its definition of the enemy, but there was no 
longer the assurance that military solutions would inevitably save the day. 
Equally significant was the fact that an examination of issues from 1983 to 1988 does not support the "culture of 
militarism· hypothesis. Rather, as a proportion of the output of a weekly magazine, war topics occupied a very limited 
space. Very few advertisements targeted conscripts directly, and only one fashion spread, in 1983, featured khaki.614 
What prompted more in-depth investigation and criticism was evidence of social dislocation and economic decline. 
While the magazine never even acknowledged the ECC existed, let alone endorsed its position, the tone of Scope 
thus suggested that the ECC's call for "Troops Out of the Townships" and campaigns which targeted the costs of 
conscription exacerbated existing points of disquiet in white society. 
By contrast, Fair Lady was aimed at a generally liberal, middle-class female readership and under editors Jane 
Raphaely (-1983) and Dene Smuts (1984-1987) the content and tone of articles reflected a belief that women had the 
right and the duty to be exposed to injustice in South African society, and that political issues (in the sense of where 
power was located and how it was shared in society) affected daily life.615 From 1983 successful black women were 
interviewed, making the predominantly white readership aware of a more educated and empowered sector of the 
black community, beyond their normal domestic worker contacts. From 1983 Fair Lady published a who's who of 
South African women, including not only the more conventional business and academic achievers, but also a number 
of peace activists.616 Fair Lady further explored issues of urban unrest, squatter camps and detentions,617 but primarily 
espoused ameliorative efforts, with concern to foster better interracial relationships, rather than offering a critique of 
611 ~ 5 July 1985. 
612 ~ 6 May 1988. 
613 ~ 18 November 1988, 1July1988. 
614 ~ 9 December 1983. 
615 Fair Lady 23 February 1983, Raphaely noted that female insistence on the right to cover political issues on women's pages in newspapers and in 
women's magazines was highly contentious, but noted the growing power exercised by women in the United States and encouraged South African 
women to ·realise their potential power". Fair Lady 26 June 1985. As the conflict built, Smuts defended the publication of interviews with blacks like 
Winnie Mandela on the basis that "We cannot hope to understand our fellow South Africans or to reach political accord with them if we do not know 
what is going on in their communities and minds.• 
616 Fair Lady 4 May 1983. 
617 Fair Lady 27November1985, 14 May 1986, 22 January 1986. 
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the underlying conflict beyond a liberal opposition to the racial inequalities perpetrated by the apartheid regime.618 
When Cape Town ECG member Helen Zille was interviewed in 1984 there was no mention of her connection to the 
ECG, let alone an explanation of what the ECG stood for.619 Similarly, an interview with singer Jennifer Fergusson, a 
contributor to the ECG record "Forces Favourites", noted her comments that a SABC television interviewer had been 
afraid he would lose his programme if she "talked about the pain in the country", but the article did not investigate what 
she meant by this or comment on the accuracy of her views.620 
Moreover, while Smuts once introduced the idea of the structural violence of apartheid in discussing township 
violence,621 on the readers' pages a debate continued between 1983 and 1988 between those who wanted escapist 
entertainment from a magazine, and those who welcomed the political content, or felt that it was valid in a South 
African context.622 An initial reading of the magazine could leave one doubting that there was a war. Apart from one 
example in 1983, advertising did not target conscription. Editors Smuts and Raphaely claimed not to have taken any 
conscious decision on this, nor to have been pressured by their publishers to promote the "war effort", although Smuts 
noted she had faced "constant pressure from management" about social awareness articles.623 There was one article 
on tuck boxes for "troepies", no fashion spreads with a militaristic flair, and only one agony column describing the 
difficulties of having a loved one "on the border".624 Like~. however, this desire for escapism was continually 
brought up short by the increasingly intrusive realities of conscription, economic decline and societal conflict. 
Fair Lady was a particularly significant indicator of the stresses on the liberal group the ECG was most directly 
targeting. In January 1983 Raphaely wrote "If we judge the importance of the issues raised in Fair Lady by the volume 
of mail they attract then the most burning issue of our times for the women of South Africa is the question of military 
duty in South West Africa . ..s25 Writing about the cease-fire with Angola in 1984, Smuts wrote that she felt "terrific 
resentment when an army wife but gaily forg[o]t the army between camps" .626 This encapsulated the conscription 
dilemma for whites. However concerned white women might have been about their men serving in the SADF there 
were no easy alternatives, and for many the only way to cope was escapism. Thus when an article by a conscript 
618 Fair Lady 1 April 1987. 
619 Fair Lady 16 May 1984. 
62
° Fair Lady 14 April 1988 
621 Fair Lady 10 July 1985. 
622 Fair Lady, see for example the period 26June1985-4September1985. 
623 Letter from Jane Raphaely to Merran Phillips 14 September 1998. Letter from Dene Smuts to Merran Phillips 30 October 1998. 
624 Fair Lady 24 August 1983, 27 July 1983, 14November1984. 
625 Fair Lady 12 January 1983. 
626 Fair Lady 4 April 1984. 
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described his feelings of being dislocated from his society through his experiences in the SADF, this generated no 
response on the letters' page.627 There was nothing helpful to say. 628 
Emigration, too, drew numerous letters and articles. As early as 1985 the editor called on readers to be sensitive to 
grandparents bereft through emigration in the holiday period.629 Some readers made an explicit connection between 
the decision to emigrate and conscription, particularly after the internal deployment of the SADF.630 Letters touching 
on various aspects of emigration continued until Smuts' resignation, after which the entire magazine took on a more 
frivolous aspect.631 However, even those who welcomed Fair Lady becoming "delightfully carefree.sa2 could not avoid 
the intrusion of conscription. 
As conscript deaths mounted in late 1987 and 1988, eventually the dam burst. In a long, emotionally charged article, 
two Afrikaans mothers described their pain and confusion on losing their sons. The boys' photographs were 
superimposed on a map of southern Africa, with South Africa's borders outlined in red to demonstrate clearly how far 
from the South African border the boys had been when they were killed. With the unselfconscious self-interest of grief, 
one of the mothers told the reporter "Isn't it terrible that it should be~ son?" and she added, "You can never bring 
your child back. You are the one that suffers." She did not question the need for conscription but she was very bitter 
that her son had not been guarding the "border", but had been killed in a foreign country, and she told the reporter that 
many of those calling her in sympathy felt the same way. 633 Due to the emergency regulations, the journalist was 
careful to end the article with the disclaimer that she had been reporting on the anguish of two mothers, not about the 
rights and wrongs of war. Nevertheless she opened a floodgate of emotion. A girl whose boyfriend had been killed 
sent in a poem, a mother complained that she was doomed to "worry non-stop for two years", another wrote in 
expressing her relief that her sons were still small.634 This suggested that the ECC's articulation of the personal costs 
of conscription was a highly fruitful avenue of opposition within this target group, and reinforces the contention that 
conscription eventually hamstrung the apartheid state because it feared that the cost of conscript deaths would lead to 
significant white resistance and criticism. 
627 Fair Lady 23 March 1983, 15 June 1983. 
628 Durban ECC activist Ann Colvin wrote of her frustration at corning back from overseas and finding the supposed "liberals" of Natal demonstrating 
a "supine acceptance" of apartheid. Again this was evidence that in the face of the costs of opposition it was easier to look for distractions. Interview 
with Durban ECC member Ann Colvin (1998). 
629 Fair Ladv 27November1985. 
630 Fair Ladv 30 October 1985. 
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' Fair Lady 22 July 1987, until the end of the period under discussion the strain this put on journalists can be seen in articles as desperate as a 
discussion of Margaret Thatcher's wardrobe, and endless covers of Princess Diana and Princess Caroline, as the magazine gave in to the escapist 
faction. Fair Lady 25 November 1987, ongoing calls for a return to the previous mix were ignored. An angry reader noted Fair Lady now had little 
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Like Fair Lady, Cosmopolitan ran articles on prominent black women. An article on women who died for peace, for 
example, did not only look at whites like Molly Blackbum, but also black women such as murdered activist Victoria 
Mxenge.635 Cosmopolitan also overtly saluted those white women confronting the apartheid state. A 1986 article 
featured Dr Wendy Orr who blew the whistle on human rights abuses perpetrated against detainees,636 and in 1987 
national secretary of the ECC Adele Kirsten was included in an article "Lionhearts", which also featured Helen Joseph, 
a stalwart of the liberation struggle. The quest for publicity was initiated by the ECC. In 1986 Paula Hathorn wrote to 
both Raphaely and Smuts suggesting an article on conscription. While Smuts demurred out of concern about the 
emergency regulations, Cosmooolitan took up the challenge, but while the ECC wanted space to make a political 
case, Cosmopolitan needed a story with human interest, leading to a lengthy process of compromise. The resulting 
article presented Kirsten as an admirable person, who was prepared to stand up for her principles and take the 
consequences, which included being in hiding, constantly looking over her shoulder and living alone.637 However, the 
focus of the magazine was on advising women on relationship issues, and showcasing high-profile, high-paying jobs, 
and a consumer lifestyle. This suggested that while the average reader may have been interested in Kirsten's story 
and even have had sympathy for her work, Cosmopolitan's target audience was unlikely to be attracted to political 
activism if the costs were so high.638 
However, Kirsten also expressed the view that women were drawn to oppose conscription because of its effect on 
their lives, and the lives of those they loved. The impact of conscription at the personal level emerged again in the 
March 1988 article ·conscription makes war on love". The journalist bemoaned the fact that her fiance had left the 
country rather than do military service in the townships. The article included input from a Johannesburg marriage 
counsellor who claimed that alcoholism, psychological disturbances and interfamilial violence could frequently be 
linked to "army experiences that have pushed conscripts beyond their level of endurance", and described interviews 
with women whose marriages had suffered as a result of their partners' military service, as well as mothers fearing for 
their sons. Steven Louw's testimony at Phillip Wilkinson's trial was repeated to suggest that men were seeing terrible 
things in the townships, the effects of which was bound to carry over into their civilian lives. Another psychologist was 
quoted as saying that township duty "often proves to be the breaking point for many conscripts". The article concluded 
that "we can't afford to lose any more of our men, whether through fighting or flight". This time the magazine faced 
pressure from the security branch, and General Malan threatened to ban any further stories about conscription in 
635 Cosmopolitan April 1987. 
636 Cosmopolitan January/February 1986. 
637 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.2.9, letter from Paula Hathorn to Jane Raphaely 13November1986 and Dene Smuts 21 November 1986. 
638 Cosmopolitan November 1987. 
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women's magazines.639 Despite this intimidation a June 1988 article on those remaining in the face of the "brain 
drain" continued to investigate conscription concerns, suggesting the extent to which conscription was affecting white 
society, and consequently was of continuing interest to whites who needed to articulate their frustration and pain.640 
These articles offered significant clues as to why an affluent, urban readership would be sympathetic to the ECC's call 
for alternatives to military service. The intensity of the tone, and the way the concerns of whites, rather than political 
polemic, were linked to conscription suggested that this readership was perhaps most susceptible to the argument 
that the costs of conscription outweighed the remaining benefits. 
By contrast, Afrikaans magazines like Rooi Roos and Sarie remained within the ruling white consensus that 
conscription was a necessary duty and a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood. In 1991 sociologist Jacklyn 
Cock argued that "popular magazines often include articles on the importance of supporting soldiers, for example 
through sending food parcels".641 However, not even Rooi Roos or Sarie offered much proof of this, suggesting once 
again that South African whites had a strong desire to escape from the difficulties of their society where possible. 
Nevertheless, conscription remained an inescapable fact of white life. Where Rooi Roos and Sarie did address 
conscription, the need for military service was an unquestioned given and articles focused on coping with the status 
quo rather than exploring alternatives. Even these magazines, however, bore unwitting testimony to the growing costs 
of conscription for whites. While a 1983 Rooi Roos article about women in the navy glamorised the incorporation of 
women into the security forces,642 the majority of articles about conscription offered glimpses of the disruption of 
conscription, even as conscription was being presented as a necessary and proud duty. At intake times articles like 
"My seun gaan weermag toe" and "Wanneer hy grens toe gaan",643 and at the end of service periods advice to 
mothers, wives and girlfriends on handling this transition, suggested that these were periods of real crisis for families, 
perhaps even more so because the expression of personal fears and loss were unacceptable.644 
Rooi Roos, for example, took a highly patriotic tone, suggesting that no one watching those doing their part to ensure 
the "toekoms en voortbestaan van Suid-Afrika" could be anything but proud, and contrasting the confidence of the 
young soldiers with the uncertain, frightened schoolboys they had been before their basic training. While articles 
639 Star 7 May 1988. Cosmopolitan March 1988. Letter from Jane Raphaely to Merran PhiUips 14September1998. 
64
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presented the difficulties of re-adjusting to civilian life merely as a temporary transitional phase, there was an 
acknowledgement that changes would not only be physical but also mental, and the suggestion that the uncertainty of 
border war created its own kind of tension. However, relationship difficulties were written off as being due to the 
immaturity of these relationships in the first place, although the impact on marriages was accorded a little more 
sympathy. Such articles did acknowledge the concerns of parents that their sons were doing too much or too little in 
the army, as well as the complaint that two years of initial training was a waste of time and an imposition on the 
personal and professional lives of conscripts. However, the SADF had ample space to refute these complaints, to 
reassure mothers their sons would be well-fed, and to assure conscripts they need not be bored and that students 
would be accommodated in their chosen field as far as possible.645 Rooi Roos articles in 1984 thus hinted at problems 
like post-traumatic stress syndrome, but the overall message was of rallying whites to accept conscription as a difficult 
but necessary transition which ultimately benefited white society. The possibility of objection was not even considered, 
and the tone suggested that anyone who was not coping was not trying hard enough. 
From 1985 Rooi Roos articles on domestic violence and family killings, as well as articles about survivors of bomb and 
landmine attacks, suggested a growing dislocation in white society, where, despite the sacrifices of conscription, 
violence and uncertainty were becoming more prevalent.646 By 1987 another Rooi Roos conscription article suggested 
some significant deviations from the ear1ier patriotic duty model.647 While this was still the ideal being upheld, with the 
positives of teamwork, co-operation and discipline being claimed to outweigh the hardships, the article acknowledged 
that servicemen succumbed to drug and alcohol abuse, and that relationship difficulties occurred. Although the focus 
was on how the army had trained personnel to help in these areas, this was nevertheless a tacit recognition that not 
all servicemen were coping with their military training or with their return to civilian life. The article still did not even 
acknowledge legal avenues of objection like the Board for Religious Objection, or allow that there might be moral 
ambiguities surrounding the internal deployment of the SADF. Nevertheless it did suggest that even in a sector of 
white society strongly committed to the military, conscription was causing stress. 
Like Rooi Roos, Sarie did not ever question the need for conscription. However, like the other magazines discussed, 
the content and tone of articles between 1983 and 1988 suggested areas of stress in white society. As early as 1983 
645 Rooi Roos 26December1984, 13June1984. 
646 Rooi Roos 7 August 1985, 28 May 1986, 6 August 1986, 16 April 1986. 
647 Rooi Roos 4 February 1987. 
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an article touted depression as "die siekte van ons tye", and other ills like alcoholism and anorexia nervosa, as well 
as the rising rates of divorce and teen suicide, were topics of concem.648 
In 1983 the positive image of the military was evident in a Sarie fashion shoot featuring khaki, and a wedding issue in 
which the bride's white was offset by the generic uniform-style dress of the groom. A competition featured cake baking 
on a SADF theme.649 Support for the "total onslaught" line was also evident in an article about urban terror, which 
emphasised that SWAPO and the ANC were financed by the Soviet Union.650 This tone continued into 1984. An article 
on Prince Charles investigated his many uniforms, fusing the idea of political leadership with that of military 
command.651 The association of successful masculinity with physical courage and stamina was also underscored by 
interviews and fashion shoots featuring actors like Tom Selleck and Mel Gibson, heroes of action films and television 
programmes, and this stereotype was further reinforced by an article which invited readers to rate their partners on a 
"macho" quiz. 
From 1984, however, there was also evidence that while the male model of physical courage epitomised in patriotic 
national service remained the official role model, at a micro level it was under strain. A Sarie agony column discussed 
coping with separation while one's husband was on the border.652 The broader socio-economic decline was also clear 
in articles about how to cope if one's husband lost his job. 653 
It is clear from the limited number of such articles that the primary emphasis of Sarie remained on escapism, but once 
again the intrusion of conscription on white life proved inescapable. At call-up time, a couple of articles investigated 
the practical and emotional demands on conscripts. Like the Rooi Roos articles, the conscripts interviewed stressed 
they were maturing through the experience and that although it was tough, in hindsight their national service had 
taught them valuable lessons. Even by 1986 an article suggested that one of the biggest problems facing conscripts 
would be their longing for home cooking and having to come to terms with the loss of personal freedoms. There was 
no suggestion that conscripts might be experiencing uncertainty about the nature of the struggle or township 
deployment.654 Rather, readers were reminded of the close links between national service and patriotism, the 
preservation of cultural heritage and religious freedom. While the article did acknowledge that some "so-called" 
pacifists refused to do military service, their motivation was subtly called into question and they were clearly set 
648 Sarie 19 January 1983, 16 February 1983, 2 March 1983, 30 March 1983, 13 April 1983, 28September1983. 
649 Sarie 19 January 1983, 13 April 1983, 4September1983. 
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outside the group norms of Sarie readership. Similarly, while the article conceded that war per se was undesirable, 
it was justified the current conflict because people had a right to protect "their own", emphasising that the SADF's role 
was "defensive". Despite this determinedly "total onslaught" tone, however, the article unwittingly exposed evidence of 
opposition to national service. The article relied on Defence Force input, and from this source came a warning against 
theft due to a sense of entitlement or as revenge against superior officers, and advice about problems in readjusting to 
civilian life, as well as the difficulties of maintaining relationships over time and distance. 
The 1987 ~article "Grensdiens: pa jou seun het jou nodig" continued the theme that with religious belief and 
familial support the SADF would make young adults out of boys. This implied that dysfunction was located within the 
home situation rather than army experiences. Again, however, there were subtle indicators of the stresses imposed by 
conscription. Parents were warned that conscripts sometimes acted in ways they never would otherwise because they 
had compartmentalised their army experience. Relationship difficulties were glossed over as mere teenage romances 
which would have ended anyway, although the article did acknowledge that it was not always easy to maintain the 
balance between the disciplined world of the soldier and a man's "personal needs".655 The "total onslaught" line was 
strongly emphasised at the end of the article where SWAPO prisoners of war were interviewed, and, predictably, 
SWAPO was presented in a very negative light and the SADF was seen as a window of opportunity for the prisoners, 
some of whom indicated they would like to sign up. 
Both Rooi Roos and Sarie demonstrated the difficulties faced by the ECC in penetrating Afrikaans culture with an anti-
conscription message. However, there was also evidence of dissatisfaction with conscription manifested through 
impotent anger expressed in theft, and emotional distress expressed in relationship dysfunction and substance abuse. 
De Kat was much more open to discussing controversial topics. Black leaders including Desmond Tutu, Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi and Jakes Gerwel were interviewed.656 De Kat also acknowledged an alternative culture, investigating 
alternative music and labels, like Shifty Records which pressed the ECC record "Forces Favourites", although this was 
not mentioned in the article. Nevertheless, De Kat did emphasise that through music people were exploring and 
commenting on the political situation in South Africa. In a later article singer Jennifer Fergusson was permitted to 
discuss her involvement with the ECC project, although from the angle of a general abhorrence of war, and the article 
suggested that even on the left, the ECC was controversial.657 A 1985 article further explored the role of culture, from 
655 Sarie 16 December 1987. 
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films to literature, in articulating the violence of society, and particularly how the traditional heroic view of soldiers 
was frequently inverted by authors who had seen active service.658 
De Kat was not afraid to examine protest, or to suggest that the institutions governing South Africa set and controlled 
the norms and values of white society, rather than accepting these as ahistorical absolutes as Sarie and Rooi Roos 
did.659 While an artide on protest stressed the negative consequences of civil disobedience and suggested it was 
more appealing for the young, these kind of topics indicated a considerably more analytical readership, and one which 
was beginning to consider alternatives, albeit tentatively. 
If some artides demonstrated a concern to question and explore alternatives to the status quo, De Kat nevertheless 
continued to present South Africa's enemies as brutal, suggesting that the Cubans were forcibly conscripting young 
Angolans, and presenting General Jannie Geldenhuys as a credible and charismatic authority figure. The 
decontextualisation of the South African conflict continued in an artide about the television series about soldiers 
"Ouens soos ons", and the emphasis on the red BMW and new "star" status of Ronel Henning who presented the daily 
"emergency bulletin" on television, with no analysis of the implications of her role.660 
Like the other magazines, De Kat suggested societal crisis in articles on investments and the uncertain gold price, as 
well as the growing emigration rate, family murders, and a climate of fear, but reflected disquiet and confusion rather 
than a dear prescription for change.661 In November 1986 journalist Harald Pakendorf, for example, called for a new 
vision of leadership from the NP, which he criticised as being stuck between fighting off the challenge from the right 
and emphasising its continued protection of Afrikaner interests. Similarly, the Professor of Legal Philosophy at the 
University of Pretoria called for dialogue, suggesting there were areas of the Freedom Charter which would strike a 
chord with all parties. Artides on the new moderator of the NGK Professor Johan Heyns and independent 
parliamentary candidate Wynand Malan also emphasised the need for a new direction.662 While De Kat did not 
support the ECC it is dear that within the ranks of wealthier urban Afrikaners concerns about the status quo might 
have made them more open to the call for alternatives to military conscription. 
656 ~ June 1986, 30 July 1985. 
657 De Kat December/January 1986, July 1985, December/January 1986. 
656 De Kat November 1985. 
659 De Kat February 1986. 
660 ~July1986, September 1986. 
661 De Kat May 1986, August 1986, October 1986, February 1987, May 1987, December/January 1988. 
662 De Kat November 1986, December/January 1987, April 1987. 
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The readership of the magazines surveyed represented a small proportion of the white population. As footnote 584 
shows, the readership of the most popular weekly magazine Huisgenoot was 507 484, while those discussed here 
were only half of that. However, while the ECC officially saw its constituency as all those affected by conscription, 
effectively its target audience was an educated, middle-class, urban elite, many of whom would have read these 
magazines. The changes in tone and content discussed are therefore indicative of changes in attitude within this 
narrower target audience. 
Despite the lack of attention to the ECC in these magazines, analysis of their tone and content offers a number of 
indicators as to why conscription opposition offered a challenge to the apartheid state. Firstly, even politically 
conservative magazines like Scope, Rooi Roos and Sarie reflected the growing insecurity within white society. As the 
benefits of apartheid became less apparent for whites, so the inherent burden of conscription became more noticable 
in reports of emigration, conscript suicide, evidence of theft from the SADF, substance abuse, domestic violence and 
relationship breakdown. Secondly, while the state's security discourse advocated conscription as a heroic duty and a 
rite of passage, the anger and anguish expressed by an Afrikaans mother in Fair Lady in 1988 indicated that 
disallowing opposition to conscription was less successful as the costs of conscription mounted. Thirdly, the topics 
covered in the magazines suggested that even if there was no outright support for conscription objection, other 
aspects of the conflict like the impact on family life, individual ambition and decreasing socio-economic cohesion were 
making whites reconsider the cost:benefit ratio of "reformed" apartheid. Lastly, by 1988 in more liberal magazines like 
Cosmooolitan and Fair Lady an explicit connection was made between white frustration and conscription to the extent 
that the Minister of Defence felt compelled to intervene. The tone and content of the white magazines considered in 
this chapter therefore corroborate the contention that conscription was a significant opposition issue because it 
imposed a cost on whites for the continued benefits of white political rule. As the costs increased while socio-
economic indicators declined, so dissatisfaction around conscription put pressure on the apartheid state and 
undermined its attempts to reinforce white political cohesion through its security discourse. 
Chapter Nine 
A unique voice: The role of graphics 
in the conscription debate. 
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While much of the discussion of the ECC's role thus far has been in terms of its language-based opposition, 
throughout the opposition movement, as formal opposition was increasingly curtailed, so flags, banners, songs, 
poetry, art and theatre took on a growing significance as symbols to rally support, and as a means of articulating 
anger, pain and political ideas.663 The ECC, too, had a highly symbiotic relationship with the arts. Art exhibitions, 
music concerts and drama provided unique opportunities to attract audiences less interested in political argument, and 
gave an emotional edge to the ECC's work. This chapter will concentrate on the graphic work of both the ECC and its 
opponents to examine how this type of opposition contributed to the extra-parliamentary conscription debate between 
1983-1988. 
The graphic medium is significant for a number of reasons. Elsabe Pepler has suggested that after the 1976 advent of 
television in South Africa, visual images increasingly became a communication channel for abstract political ideas, as 
people became more reliant on, and adept at understanding, visual signals.664 Moreover, research has shown that 
exposure to posters may have a long-term influence on making people aware of issues.665 The use oft-shirts, bumper 
stickers and posters also allowed the ECC to reach a more diverse audience, and to intrude into the consciousness of 
those not innately sympathetic to the anti-conscription message. 666 
Symbols are a crucial aspect of ideology, which, as previous chapters have noted, played a significant role in 
perpetuating the apartheid system. Ideology works to ascribe meaning to particular symbols, which then act as a 
"capsule form" of the message. However, their persuasive capacity depends "on the degree to which ideas, images 
and symbols are internalised and reproduced as part of the individual's own way of thinking and experience".667 The 
ECC's graphic opposition was thus particularly significant since it used graphic traditions and symbols accessible to 
whites, while conveying a message in direct opposition to that of the state.668 
Visual images challenged existing symbols of power and security, for example, showing cracks in the five-pointed 
Cape Town castle logo of the SADF. ECC graphics also contrasted images of war and repression with symbols of 
663 s. Johnson, (ed.), South Africa: no turning back (London, Macmillan, 1988) p.175. 
664 E.M.Pepler, Alternatiewe media in Suid-Afrika met veiwvsina na plakkate (Johannesburg, RAU, 1988) p.87. 
665 llllit.. p.92. 
666 Fair Lady 13 May 1987, artist Sue Williamson suggested that the state was not threatened by opposition art in galleries because it appealed only 
to a liberal elite, whereas street level art on t-shirts, posters, and postcards was much more prominent and accessible. 
667 D.Posel, "The language of domination, 1978-1983" in S.Marks & S.Trapido, The politics of race. class and nationalism in twentieth century South 
Africa (New York, Longman. 1987) p.438. Pepler, Altematiewe media in Suid-Afrika met verwysinq na plakkate. p.153. 
-On black protest posters, for example, the black fist salute was a readily understood and empowering symbol as well as a rallying call, but was 
perceived as threatening by whites. Historical Papers, SACC collection, A2623, box 34.12, letter from ECC rally co-ordinator Marlene Powell to 
Beyers Naude 25 April 1986. M.Graaf, Hawks and Doves: the pro- and anti- conscription press in South Africa (Durban, University of Natal, 1988) 
p.38. 
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peace, encouraging the viewer to question the status quo. A barbed wire cage imprisoning the dove of peace, for 
instance, raised questions about the peacekeeping role of the SADF, and the repression of the state of emergency. 
The ECC also used Christmas cards, Valentine's Day cards and yellow ribbons, to superimpose opposition meanings 
over traditional ones.669 
Through the colours, symbols and facial expressions used in the graphics, the ECC was also able to convey a more 
emotional message than its largely intellectual verbal and written work.670 However, the intention remained the same: 
to encourage whites to re-evaluate the cost:benefit ratio of apartheid, using conscription issues as the focus. The 
concentration of resources allocated to this area of its work indicated that the ECC regarded it as very important. The 
significance of graphic opposition was further underscored by the emergence of a counter campaign, largely funded 
by the state.671 
Initially the ECC's graphic campaign reflected a lack of experience which limited its impact. The 1984 declaration 
poster (Figure 1), for example, contained the entire declaration, filling the whole poster and leading to small writing 
only legible from up close. 672 The overall impact was cluttered and the lack of clarity or focal point made it difficult for a 
passing viewer to absorb. Later posters had much greater impact through the use of fewer, more intense colours, 
limited detail, and a short punchy slogan to complement a simpler, more focused, and thus more easily absorbed, 
graphic message. 
Because graphic material was expensive and time-consuming to create and distribute,673 it tended to correspond with 
the campaigns already discussed chronologically. However, in addition to the particular messages of campaigns, four 
concepts formed a continuous part of the ECC's opposition. The first challenged the SADF's conception of the 
soldier/conscript, the second opposed the NP's "total onslaught" conceptualisation of the nature of the conflict, the 
third undermined existing beliefs about the nature and possibility of peace, and the last offered alternatives both to 
conscription and to the conflict. This chapter will examine how the ECC's graphic work contributed to the introduction 
and consolidation of these concepts in white consciousness. 
669 Alistair Teeling-Smith's personal papers, ECC Christmas card. 
670 Pepler, Altematiewe media in Suid-Afrjka met verwysing na olakkate pp.84-85. 
671 The ECC devoted a considerable part of its budget to media, and continued to put up posters despite fines from local municipalities. Vandalism 
and the removal of ECC posters in the Western Cape was traced back to the state in the course of the 1988 interdict hearing. Historical Papers AG 
1977, folder A10.5.2.2, notice from Cape Town municipality to the ECC 27 January 1987. 
672 Images of defiance (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1991) p.130. 
673 Ibid., p.3, it is difficult to date and place an the ECC visual material. The spread of material between branches suggested that visual images were 
recycled and used in more than one region. Posters had a long protest tradition in South Africa, being common on campuses from the 1960s, and 
used by trades union from the 1970s. By the 1980s the opposition potential of posters was further enhanced by the Cape Arts Project and the 
Screen Training Project in Johannesburg, which gave the ECC access to unprecedented training and resources, in an era before ready and 
affordable access to the marvels of computer graphics. 
180 
The state's visual depiction of the soldier was designed to foster acceptance of conscription by idealising the 
soldier's role and romanticising war.674 Price suggested that in western mythology the soldier's ability to "consolidate 
and reaffirm the existing social order" by subduing the enemies of that order has led to a process which not only 
justifies militarisation, but also exalts the soldier as hero, and even saviour. The apartheid state emphasised this 
aspect, justifying force by claiming that it was serving ideals like "freedom" and "justice".675 The security discourse 
downplayed the specific historical context of the conflict, rather defining it as a dash of absolutes, good and evil. This 
encouraged a pre-social, biologically determinist interpretation of masculinity, which was only fully realised through 
military service. The language and ideology of SADF training underscored this by associating masculinity with power, 
and defining femininity and homosexuality in terms of powerlessness.676 In SADF pamphlets, publications and 
sympathetic advertising, idealised images of men, lean, tanned, and muscled, were meshed with the power and 
dominance of military force. The hardships of basic training were presented as a rite of transition from boyhood to 
manhood, with the frequently used slogan "Let the army make a man of you". National service was presented as the 
means to build character attributes like bravery and endurance associated with traditional concepts of masculinity.677 
Similarly, the SADF's encounters with the ANC were graphically "mythologised" in popular magazines like Scope 
which emphasised the excitement of conflict in terms of successfully completed missions against a faceless "enemy", 
with images of the SADF associated with copious weaponry, and the "enemy" often as nameless, tattered corpses, 
powerless and overcome.678 On the film circuit, brooding, muscled actor Arnold Vosloo took acceptance of the soldier 
image further into popular culture through the "Boetie" films, while the censor's board ensured there were few critical 
dramatic counter voices, with the exception of the theatre, which had a more limited and elite audience.679 
Much of the opposition writing of the 1980s sought to expose this "culture of militarism" and its role in overriding 
differences among whites to promote a common definition of white security based on military power. Yet analysts 
John Sharp and Emile Boonzaier argued that while culture creates the boundaries of "class, ethnicity, race, [and] 
gender", culture is not static.680 The official culture of militarism thus faced a growing dissonance within the white 
community, as the prospect of serving and the realities of national service led to disillusionment, confusion, fear, anger 
and hopeless frustration among many young whites. 
674 Price, A documentation ofthe experiences of militarv conscripts in the South African Defence Force. p.2. 
675 Nurnberger, Tooke, and Domeris, Conflict and the guest for justice, pp.156-158. 
676 Price, A documentation of the experiences of mffitarv conscripts in the South African Defence Force. pp.52, 135, 147, 187, 192. H.Brod (ed), The 
gi,akina cl masculinities (Massachusetts, AUen & Unwin, 1987) p.95. Cock, Colonels and cadres, p.94. 
Cock, Colonels and cadres, pp.31, 58-59, 74. 
678 ~ passim. ~ passim. Cock, Colonels and cac!res, p. 73. 
679 Sunday Times Maaazine 16 June 1985, p.38, the "Boetie" films were described as ·a phenomenal success in South African box office terms·. 
680 J.Sharp, & E.Boonzaier, South African keywords: the uses and abuses of oolitical concepts (Cape Town, David Philip, 1988) p.22. 
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By naming and illustrating these realities, the ECC set up an oppositional projection of the conscript, which 
challenged the state's glorification of the soldier. Using symbols of entrapment and confusion, the ECC invited white 
conscripts to acknowledge and access their conflicted emotions regarding conscription. The 1984 Cape Town 
declaration launch pamphlet,681 for example, showed a soldier bent double under the weight of a bullet, emphasising 
the burden of military service on conscripts (Figure 2). A frequently used image showed a black-and-white photograph 
of a soldier crouched in a foetal position inside the SADF castle logo, his arms wrapped defensively around himself, 
while a spider web of white lines was superimposed to suggest his sense of despair at being trapped in the 
conscription system (Figure 3).682 The slogan "Conscripts with no right to choose" underlined the image of being 
voiceless, as another graphic showed a soldier's mouth sewn shut with barbed wire (Figure 4).683 
Significantly, this aspect of the ECC's opposition was outlawed by state of emergency legislation, and the ECC was 
reduced to bumper sticker slogans, like "voters have a choice, conscripts don't" around the May 1987 election. By 
1988, however, the "Alternative National Service" campaign gave the ECC space to visualize the conscript again. The 
growing public concern around CO trials and Angolan deaths led to a sepia-tinted photograph of a soldier, with his 
head cradled in his hands, and the caption, "Botha, ek's gatvol". The colour heightened the sense of depression, the 
brick background encouraged a sense of being hemmed in, while the colloquial slogan emphasised that conscripts' 
disillusionment and despair extended beyond the English-speaking community.684 
These graphics were intended for general consumption, and, interestingly, often featured photographs, perhaps to 
give a greater authenticity to the visual message. In the student press, the greater existing sympathy for the ECC 
position, together with the speed and cost effectiveness of cartoons, encouraged a more informal graphic style to 
highlight the dilemmas of conscription. Youth audiences were open to more radical graphic messages, which tapped 
into their rejection of adult norms and values. Similarly, African geometric shapes in poster borders were accessible to 
white youth who listened to crossover bands like Jaluka and Mango Groove, whereas white magazines, subject to the 
conservative influence of their broader commercial goals, demonstrated a much slower general acceptance of African, 
as opposed to western, cultural influences.685 
681 Sue Brittion's personal papers, declaration launch pamphlet. 
682 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, ECC peace festival material. 
683 Manuscripts and Archives BC 912, folder A12, ECC News, April 1986. 
684 lmaaes of defiance, p.133. 
685 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder J, ECC stickers, various. Scooe January 2 1987, ~magazine, for example, did an article on how 
Ladysmith Black Mambazo had little relevance outside of a narrow ethnic market, shortly before Paul Simon's "Graceland" album, which featured 
the group, smashed records worldwide. Fair Ladv 13 June 1984, p.138, and passim, Fair Ladv only began to feature South African pop stars in 
1984, and even then many of the pin ups remained overseas artists. 
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A cartoon version of Rodin's well-known "thinker" sculpture, surrounded by question marks while a faceless figure 
tried to thrust a gun on him, was used in the student press as a visual introduction to advertisements for the various 
conscription advice services established in response to the growing dilemma of conscription.686 This graphic is an 
example of how the ECC tapped into the symbolic culture of its constituents. While the graphic was self-evident, the 
fact that a number of white students would have been able to identify it and so know its title would have given added 
impetus to the extrapolation of meaning that the viewer should seriously consider the implications of conscription. 
In other instances cartoons highlighted the negatives associated with a call-up to draw attention to the issue. With the 
slogan "conscription headache", a SADF logo fell on a conscript's head, while another jumped in horror, his hair 
standing on end, at receiving his call-up papers. Cartoons were also an ideal medium to depict the dehumanising 
aspect of military service, and a number showed the transformation from soldier to pig.687 
The ECC's attempts to counter the state's depiction of the soldier also extended to cadets. While Paratus carried 
numerous photographs of cadet competitions and cadets mastering survival skills to emphasise the role of military 
training in the transition to skilled and competent manhood,688 an ECC anti-cadet poster made a strong visual 
argument that militarism involved barely controlled violence, and led to disintegration rather than maturity. In modern 
cartoon style, with direct appeal to the youthful cadet audience, and utilizing the most compelling colours, red and lurid 
yellow, the poster showed a cadet commander with a hand grenade for a head, about to pull the pin. The jagged lines 
of the drawing contributed to a disturbing image of unsuccessfully controlled violence and anger, reinforced by the 
blood on the commander's hand, his manic expression and bared shark-like teeth. The image underscored the slogan 
"Cadets maak malletjies!" in an explosion of a speech balloon (Figure 7).689 
In both its more conservative public and its more radical student-targeted graphics, the ECC clearly opposed the 
state's depiction of conscription as a proud duty and a rite of passage. Instead ECC graphics suggested that military 
service was an imposition and a dilemma. Military symbols were associated with the degradation and disintegration of 
humanity, in direct opposition to the state's association of these symbols with the assumption of manhood and power. 
The fact that material such as the 1985 intake pamphlet, with a booted foot entering a door, under the slogan "Has 
686 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 811.3, ECC News, vol.1, no.1, 1985. 
687 Archives and Manuscripts BC 1102, folder A, "What is the Ecc· pamphlet. At Ease, vol.2, no.1, February 1987. Historical Papers AG 1977, 
folder M1 .1, cover of Forces favourites. See title page for chapter three. 
688 ~ June 1982, October 1983, January 1985, February 1985, July 1986, September 1986, and passim. 
689 Images of defiance, p.132. In one of the ironies of post-apartheid South Africa, in 1999 a postcard form of this image was on sale at the Castle in 
Cape Town where Western Province Command once mounted its anti-ECC smear campaign. 
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the army invaded your life?.s9o was banned outright, suggested that the state clearly recognized the danger of this 
kind of opposition, particularly with its strong student appeal. 
A wider and potentially greater challenge was the ECC's attempt to counter the image of the SADF as an integral part 
of the reform process. This was a critical oppositional point as both the PFP and the state were committed to the view 
that the SADF was a "shield" behind which orderly reform (i.e. reform at a pace and to an extent acceptable to whites) 
could occur. Since the state largely controlled visual imagery of the nature of the conflict, this was a significant, but 
difficult, oppositional endeavour. Deborah Posel's research, for example, suggested that SABC newscasts, which 
were the main visual information about the townships for most white South Africans, decontextualised and 
depoliticised both the conflict and mass action, as "black on black violence", which reinforced white stereotypes about 
blacks, and furthered white acceptance of the need for forceful containment of the violence. 691 
Despite the state's attempts to present the troops as necessary for the maintenance of law and order and the 
protection of the "innocent", the white unease which accompanied the internal deployment of the SADF gave the ECC 
scope to develop a graphic challenge which presented the troops as part of the problem, and were reminders that 
troops continued to be deployed in the townships. The "Troops out of the townships" poster,692 for example, showed 
the distraught face of a middle-aged black woman, her hand upraised as if to ward off a blow. The background was a 
crisscross of lines like a net, symbolising entrapment, or cracked earth symbolising barrenness. In the middle 
distance, between the woman's face and her hand, loomed an armoured personnel carrier symbolising the 
omnipresence, the divisiveness or the intrusion of the troops. The clashing visual impact of red and yellow further 
underscored the impression of conflict and violence. While the poster could be "read" at a number of levels, the 
emotional impact was clear: the woman's distress made an appeal to the viewer's common humanity, regardless of 
political differences. Thus, while the slogan, "No apartheid war", underscored the deeply political nature of the conflict, 
particularly by using red for the word "apartheid", the immediate impact of the poster had a wider appeal, reinforcing 
white liberal and humanitarian unease generated by the use of troops in the townships (Figure 8). 
690 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, "Has the army invaded your life" pamphlet. . 
691 Posel, "The language of domination, 1978-1983" in Marks and Trapido, The politics of race class and nationalism in twentieth centyrv South 
~ pp.419-439. 
Pepler, Alternatiewe media in Suid-Afrika met verwysing na olakkate, p.124. 
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The poster "Where's the border now?.s93 (Figure 9) used a newsprint background to emphasise the current events 
triggering the protest, and a superimposed map of the country with red castle logos to highlight some twelve occupied 
townships. This created a visual association between the SADF presence and blood, violence and danger, visually 
validating the call "SADF get out!" in large print at the bottom. The poster emphasised the reality of the internal 
deployment of the SADF, as opposed to the state's justification of conscription demands on the grounds of the 
external threat of "total onslaught". 
A "troops out" sticker featured an inverted dove, bleeding over a list of the occupied townships (Figure 10). This 
symbolised the inversion of values of "peace" and "conflict", as the state touted the SADF as a "peacekeeper" in the 
townships, yet many township residents perceived it as a means of enforcing the structural violence of the status quo 
and the instigator of further conflict.694 
The importance of the "troops out• message can be seen in the desire to spread the message to a number of 
constituencies. Regional posters, such as "Troops out of Alexandra" and "Troops out of Crossroads", as well as an 
Afrikaans version, "Wat soek jy in die townships troepie?" were designed to bring home the impact of the internal 
SADF deployment as widely as possible.695 The "troops out" call was also expanded to "Troops out of the schools" 
(Figure 11 ). Using eye-catching black and yellow, a poster used a child's drawing of a well-armed soldier carrying a 
child holding a brick to symbolise the circularity of the conflict, and its racial aspect.696 Urging, "Tie a yellow ribbon 
against a civil war", the poster used a graphic reminder of the conflict in the townships and the ongoing SADF 
deployment there to make its point that the conflict was between South Africans, not faceless enemies. Pamphlets 
like "Join the army and see the townships", and "Catch 22 for conscripts, Namibia or the townships", also used images 
of violent domination, like a giant army boot about to come down on the heads of the people below, to suggest that the 
SADF's real purpose was to control and coerce.697 
In contesting the nature of the conflict and the role of the SADF, the ECC went beyond questioning the "protector" 
image of the SADF, and depicted the soldier as a destroyer. The poster, "Namibia, South Africa's Vietnam.s98 (Figure 
12) showed a soldier, tattooed with a skull and crossbones, tearing Namibia apart with his hands. Another showed an 
outline of Namibia in red with blood running down it, and a gun forming the Caprivi Strip, a graphic reminder of the 
693 Ibid., p.120. 
694 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, ECC stickers. 
695 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, ECC Focus, March 1986. lmaaes of defiance, p.135. 
696 lmaaes of defiance. p135. 
697 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B5.4, •Join the army and see the townships· pamphlet. 
698 Im ages of defiance, p.136. 
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SADF occupation of Namibia and the resulting conflict.699 A later poster showed an armed soldier with his face 
masked with a South African flag, like a gangster or a terrorist, while a photographic negative of images of conflict and 
violence scrolled across the bottom of the poster; a graphic assertion that the ECC's message was based in the "real" 
world, rather than being propaganda (Figure 13).700 The mask symbol underscored the state's attempts to counter 
individual conscience with the call of patriotism, while the ECC implied that this both blinded the soldier and made him 
"faceless", undermining his humanity, much like the state's projections of the enemy. 
Particularly in the student press, cartoonised soldiers were used to speak ECC messages, suggesting that the ECC 
and conscripts could have opinions in common and reinforcing the ECC's claim to speak on behalf of the unwilling 
conscript. A soldier posed next to a story about the 23 who refused to serve in 1987, for example, commented in a 
speech bubble, "This makes a lot of sense, you know".701 The ECC developed a war-comic style, similar to existing 
war comics, but carrying a very different message. The cover of one showed a soldier, standing amidst a scene of 
devastation, looking down at someone he had just killed, thinking "He doesn't look like a terrorist",702 challenging the 
state's propaganda of clearly defined "good guys and bad guys" (Figure 14). A similar picture showed a soldier 
standing before a smoking battlefield saying, "They're all dead .. both ... their men and ours and what for?"703 Again this 
attempt to tap into and express feelings of frustration and concern about the rationale and practicalities of the southern 
African conflict was in direct opposition to the unquestioning patriotism demanded by "total onslaught". 
The ECC also used graphics of soldiers to justify their demands. Three white silhouettes of soldiers on a black 
background carried the declaration diagonally across their bodies (Figure 15). This time key phrases like "We call for a 
just peace in our land", "moral right... to exercise freedom of conscience· and "we call for an end to conscription", were 
highlighted in larger type. The slanted writing, interspersed with conflict images, encouraged the viewer to physically 
adopt a new perspective to make sense of the graphic, and by implication, to consider the conflict in terms of 
alternative ideological perspectives. 704 The monochrome colours emphasised the ECC's contention that the internal 
deployment exacerbated racial tension, polarising communities within South Africa. The starkness of the black and 
white image also reinforced the idea of choice between two very different realities, while the larger words directed 
attention to the key points of the ECC's call to end conscription, and the conflict graphics gave these added urgency. 
699 Ibid., p.137. 
700 Sue Brittion's personal papers, Objector, vol.3, no.1, March/April 1985. 
701 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder M1.3, "Hell no, we won't go" campus comic February 1988. 
102 Pepler, Alternatiewe media jn Sujd-Afrika met veiwysina na olakkate p.121. 
703 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, war games comic. 
704 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, ECC Focus, March 1986. 
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The ECC further created an opposition dissonance by combining opposition graphics with the security vocabulary 
of the state. A 1988 poster, for example, implored bring "our boys" back from Angola, using the language of popular 
rhetoric, "our boys on the border", while an accompanying map of southern Africa and an arrow showing the path of 
their return, demonstrated how very far from any logical conception of a "border" Angola was (Figure 16).705 The "Stop 
SADF terror"706 poster in response to the attack on frontline states in 1986 carried the names of the countries attacked 
in the helicopter's rotors, with the slogan "SADF terror" across the poster (Figure 17). The screaming face of the 
victim, in connection with the power of the SADF in the form of the helicopter, made a strong visual justification of this 
accusation. However, "terror" was a word usually used by the apartheid state to describe the actions of its enemies. It 
was therefore a direct challenge to the military policies of the state to apply the word "terror" to actions of the SADF, 
"the shield of the nation·, the "protector of law and order", the "defender of civilisation". 
Thus in opposition to the "total onslaught" line that without the SADF everything worthwhile would be lost, the ECC 
depicted the soldier as an integral part of the process of destruction. The ECC projected the conflict as being 
perpetuated, rather than contained, by the SADF, and claimed that the end result would be devastation. As the ECC's 
version gained currency with white youth the state moved more aggressively to prevent ECC graphics from being 
seen, with student comics being confiscated and legal action being taken against ECC material.707 
However, the ECC did more than contest the state's image of the soldier and the deployment of the SADF. It opposed 
the state's basic justification of the conflict. Here the graphic medium was particularly effective, as language like "civil 
war" was deeply contentious, making the concept difficult to propagate among whites. Graphic symbols were an 
alternative means to convey a deeply subversive message. The ECC used a section of Picasso's Guernica panels in 
a red-and-white poster which asserted ironically, "A civil war is not very relaxing" (Figure 18).708 Once again, this drew 
on accepted traditions of western art, while inviting parallels between Picasso's anguished depiction of the ravages of 
the Spanish civil war and the current South African situation. A simple font, and the use of red, with its associations 
with blood, anger, and violence, made for a powerful impact. 
Similarly, a frequently used cartoon showed white hands gripping prison bars, but the scene inside the "prison" was 
not a cell, but a photograph of conflict within South Africa. 709 This suggested a two-fold message: white South Africans 
705 Alistair Teeling-Smith's personal papers, bring our boys back from Angola graphic. 
106 Pepler, Alternatiewe media in Suid-Afrika met verwysing na plakkate, p.129. 
101 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A22.4, update on repression against ECC 7 August 1986, eight ECC/COSG publications were banned 
between 1985 and 1986 alone. 
708 Pepler, Alternatiewe media in Suid-Afrika met verwysing na plakkate. p.133. 
709 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, The conscript, vol.2, no.1 (undated). 
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were not being protected from outside aggression; rather the conflict resulted from the situation within South Africa. 
The intensity of the hands' grip on the bars, and the visual suggestion that the bars were being broken, encouraged 
viewers to get involved in changing their "prison", with the slogan "End conscription" indicating that this was the way to 
do it. Posters for the 1986 Cape Town film festival showed an army truck running downhill as a bystander screamed in 
horror. The visual message was of imminent collision, that the situation was out of control. The pamphlet detailing the 
screenings showed a gleaming skull wearing 30 glasses, again a visual message that the reality was not what it 
seemed, and that death and destruction, rather than reform and regeneration, were imminent. Once again, the subtext 
was for whites to get involved in change. Just as the viewer could not see the 30 effect without putting on the glasses, 
so whites were being encouraged to move beyond a passive acceptance of "total onslaught" (Figure 19).710 
In addition to graphically undermining the state's justification of the conflict, the ECC encouraged whites to question 
whether the costs of maintaining the status quo were worth it. As the cost of the war increasingly concerned whites, 
the ECC developed the poster "Is war the cost of living?"711 comprising rows of one rand coins stamped with an 
armoured car. The brown-and-white tones of the poster gave it a depressing aspect, while it invited all kinds of 
questions, from the juxtapositioning of the words "war" and "living", to questions about what acceptable costs would 
be, and what kind of life was possible under conditions of continuous conflict. 
Existing images from South African white culture were also pressed into service. As the state of emergency continued, 
a sticker used caricatures of the State President, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Law and Order to 
represent the three monkeys who see, hear and speak no evil (Figure 20), to make the point that South Africa's 
leaders were refusing to confront the realities of the South African conflict, attempting to paper over the cracks with 
emergency regulations.712 Titled "Apartheid emergency", the sticker invited the conclusion that the real emergency 
was the kind of leadership directing the country. Another sticker used the benign image of children's comic book 
character, Casper, to make the point that not all "casspirs" were friendly.713 Others used the conventions of road sign 
graphics to depict a soccer player kicking the SADF logo out of the townships, and the anti-litter logo to call for 
keeping the townships clean by throwing rifles in the rubbish bin, symbolising the ending of the SADF presence in the 
townships. Chevrolet's well-known advertising slogan, which portrayed the brand as an integral part of South African 
white culture, was restated as "Braaivleis, rugby, sunny skies and civil war", calling attention to the extent to which the 
710 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder Q1.58, ECC and filmsoc anti-war film festival graphic. 
711 Pepler, Altematiewe media in Suid-Afrika met verwvSing na plakkate, p.138. 
712 Alistair Teeling-Smith's personal papers, see no evil sticker. 
713 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder M1.7, ECC diary 1988. 
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conflict had become a way of life.714 
Much of this aspect of the ECC's campaign was closed down by the 1986 state of emergency legislation. The 
subsequent "War is No Solution, Let's choose a Just Peace" material demonstrated the new difficulties of opposition 
work. The campaign poster featured a static repeating graphic of casspirs interrupted by the campaign slogan (Figure 
21 ). The largely black-and-white format, and the lack of people, action or interesting focus meant that there was little 
to engage the viewer emotionally. Similarly, the logo of the campaign, while continuing themes of peace through the 
use of a dove and setting the words war and peace at opposing ends of the graphic to suggest the need to choose, 
had so many elements and the images were too loosely defined to have much impact (Figure 22).715 
Nevertheless, if this lack of focus and energy in the 1987 graphics demonstrated the difficulties of redefining 
opposition after the state of emergency, bumper stickers continued to provoke questions through pithy, punning 
slogans, like "The next war will determine not what is right but what is left", or "The problem with this general election 
is that we don't know which general we're electing" (Figure 23) and the confrontational "Will this budget kill your son?" 
(Figure 24).716 The ECG also played on the traditions of free speech implicit in graffiti to reassert both its public 
presence and its right to speak. "The ECG was here" was scrawled the brick background of a sticker, with the "was" 
crossed out and "is" superimposed.717 
The third part of the ECC's graphic challenge was to contest the nature of peace. The strong Christian tradition in the 
white cultural heritage made for an easy association between doves and peace. The ECG used this symbolic 
recognition to contend there could be no peace without justice. Doves appeared wrapped in barbed wire, made out of 
the fingers of bound hands or twisted out of the wire of fences, to emphasise that peace was under siege and those 
seeking peace were under attack. The 1985 peace festival used two doves as a logo, and, perhaps inadvertently, the 
negative space between them suggested a bone, offering a choice between peace and death (Figure 25).718 
Other dove images invited the viewer to participate in a better future. As early as 1985 the ECG noted the need to 
counterbalance the civil war message with the ECC's positive demands, particularly the interim demands for a just 
714 Alistair Teeling-Smith's personal papers, braaivleis sticker. 
715 Manuscripts and Archives BC 912, folder A 11, At Ease, vol.2, no.3, June 1987. 
716 Pepler, Alternatiewe media in Suid-Afrika met verwysing na plakkate. pp.199-200. 
717 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder M1.7, ECC diary 1988. 
718 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, ECC peace festival material, "Fast for a Just Peace" pamphlet. Pepler, Alternatiewe media 
in Suid-Afrika met veiwysino na o!akkate, p. 135. 
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peace and freedom of choice.719 Consequently, the "Fast for a Just Peace" sticker featured a dove with an olive 
branch in its beak, in cool appealing colours of green, blue, and white; a stark contrast to the reds, yellows and black 
of many other ECC graphics. The "Working for a Just Peace• logo showed a gun metamorphosing into spade, and a 
dove bending another gun's stock out of shape, symbolising the ECC's commitment to work for peace through 
alternatives to military service (Figure 26).720 
The last part of the ECC's graphic opposition was the visualisation of alternatives to the "total onslaught" worldview. 
Theologian K.Nurnberger suggested that people within particular systems internalise the patterns of that system and 
thus perceive it as normal, especially "when the system grants them privileges".721 A significant aspect of the ECC's 
work was thus not only to oppose the state's justification of the status quo and to expose the realities of the conflict, 
but also to suggest positive futures and ways whites could contribute to bringing these about. 
A "Working for a Just Peace" poster thus used dynamic verbs: "feed, teach, house, employ,· and hands carrying 
symbols of these upraised to the logo "towards a just peace" with sun-like rays radiating from it (Figure 27).722 Colour 
analysts suggest that blue tones create associations of unity and stability, and the turquoise and white of the poster 
further suggested a calmness which was visually appealing, but also emphasised the contrast with the conflict 
experienced in the country.723 The plant-like reaching hands and the sun suggested the natural cycle of growth and 
fertility, with the implication that a society in conflict with itself was abnormal. While the verbs represented concrete 
demands, they also encouraged the viewers to make themselves the subject of those verbs, and so contribute to this 
more harmonious future. At the same time, the graphic message was in clear opposition to the "total onslaught" focus 
on an external locus of conflict. The focus on a call for social upliftment redirected attention to the injustices of 
apartheid and suggested that overcoming these was the first step to peace. In the same vein, a 1987 ECC peace call-
up showed a gun metamorphosing into a tree, again a visual message that peace needed to be "planted", i.e. required 
a white contribution.724 
At its most basic, the ECC's alternative vision was symbolised by its logo (Figure 28). The broken chain, with the 
snapped links spelling out "ECC", represented the breaking of the oppression of conscription, in contrast to the state's 
719 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder B8.1.2, fast sticker. 
720 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, ECC Focus, March 1986. 
721 K. Nurnberger, Power and beliefs in South Africa (Pretoria, UNI SA, 1988) p.136. 
722 Images of defiance. p.131. 
723 
www.devx.com/projectcool/developer/gzone/color/color_symbolism.html. Pepler, Alternatjewe media jn Suid-Afrika met yerwysing na plakkate, 
r,.153. 
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propagation of conscription as a proud and "manly" duty. 725 The chain also created associations like "chain 
reaction", and "weakest link", images which furthered the idea that the ending of conscription was a valid opposition 
enterprise, which could significantly undermine the apartheid state. 
In contrast to these more generally aimed graphic alternatives, images aimed at students suggested a more defiant 
opposition, in tune with the late adolescents' contempt for parents' values, and confidence in their ability to change the 
world. Posters for music concerts visually symbolised the power of youth to contest the might of the SADF through 
cartoons of people dancing on casspirs (Figure 29), or the notes from a saxophone boldly superimposed over the 
sketchy outline of marching soldiers, suggesting an inversion of the realities of power, like a photographic negative 
(Figure 30).726 These youth-oriented visuals also posed alternative visions of the future. The cover of the "Forces 
Favourites" record, for example, showed a desert-like brown-and-yellow patch with marching soldiers, contrasted with 
a green area where people were enjoying the music, with a cassette player with the logo "Forces Favourites" in 
between, implying a choice between conformity, sterility and possible death, and life, youth and pleasure.727 Another 
common image in youth-oriented material was what a Weekly Mail columnist described as a "kind of forties dude ... 
busy with some serious jiving",728 who represented the good life, and the refusal to conform. In the "Beeindig verpligte 
miliere diens" poster, 729 for example, he was at the end of three rows of static, armed soldiers. They marched, he 
danced; they were in uniform, he had his own individual style; they were contained within the frame of the graphic, his 
arm punched right through it. They conformed to the demands of "patriotism"; he lived for himself and his own 
pleasure (Figure 31). 
This kind of material showed how the ECC introduced anti-conscription themes into the existing youth culture, building 
on the resentment of the intrusion of military service, encouraging resistance and the exploration of alternatives, and 
so denying validity of the "total onslaughr message which claimed that youth must sacrifice to protect the culture 
defined by, and serving the needs of, their elders. 
However, while more radical posters tended to be displayed on university campuses, if the ECC sought a broader 
market, it had to conform to the limitations of the state of emergency, or face the confiscation or banning of material. 
As the ECC sought to extend the appeal of its message through the more conservative demands of the "Know Your 
725 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A1, ECC logo. 
726 Documentation Centre for African Stu<fies, ACC 326, Cover of ECC news, April 1986. Images of defiance, p.303. 
727 !.!2ll1 .• p.165. 
728 Weekly Mail 15 November 1985. 
729 Pepler, Alternatiewe media in Suid-Afrika met veiwysina na plakkate, p.123. 
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Rights" campaign, so its material was toned down. Campaign graphics at first seemed tame, despite being aimed 
primarily at youthful first-time conscripts. While the booklet featured numerous cartoons, similar to those developed in 
the student press over the years, the cover showed a young man complying with his call-up (Figure 32).730 The 
representation of both the conscript and his girlfriend were in modem cartoon style, each conforming to gender 
stereotypes. However, this depiction of conformity was undermined by the curvaceous girlfriend giving the conscript a 
copy of the "Know Your Rights" booklet, implying that this is something which would improve his conscription 
experience. While this may seem a very limited oppositional message, by July 1988 the growing call for alternatives 
was creating so much pressure on the state that the ECC played a significant role just by staying within legal limits 
and continuing to encourage an ever wider exploration of alternatives. The stresses the conscription debate were 
causing within the apartheid state can be gauged by the fact that within a month of the release of the "Know Your 
Rights" material, the ECC had been banned. 
While the outright ban of the organisation was the state's most comprehensive move to contain the ECC, throughout 
its existence the ECC had faced vandalism, confiscation and the periodic banning of graphic material, as well as a 
graphic counter campaign. Although a number of organisations were involved - Veterans for Victory (VFV), the NSF 
and its numerous regional offshoots, Victims against Terrorism (VAT), the Aida Parker Newsletter and Women for 
South Africa - the essential convergence of the smears' motifs can be attributed to the guiding hand of the state, 
which provided both expertise and finance, particularly as the threat of the ECC intensified.731 For example, the 
University of Natal Contemporary Cultural Studies Unit project Hawks and Doves noted that the 1988 VFV Raoe of 
~ booklet was "technically, conceptually and linguistically superior [to previous VFV publications] by several 
quantum leaps", suggesting that VFV now had access to experienced media professionals and financial resources. 732 
The 1988 trial of the "Castle Three" also provided evidence of how Western Province Command had mounted a 
concerted counter campaign against the ECC. 
This increased role of the state signalled its growing lack of manoeuvrability. Both the appeal of the right wing and of 
the ECC lay in their ability to tap into and exacerbate existing white discontent. Just as the right wing reinvigorated 
Afrikaner symbols to give emotional impetus to its opposition to "reformed" apartheid,733 so to the symbols of the 
ECC, from its broken chain logo to its depiction of trapped conscripts, allowed both the voicing and the validation of 
730 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder M.1.5, ·Know your rights" booklet 1988. 
731 TRC, vol.2, pp.525-530. 
132 Graaf, Hawks and Paves, p.55, the similar sized but less glossy ECC publication cost R10 000 for 10 000 copies The SADF had a considerable 
budget for publications, however, spending some R717 844.00 on just 16 of the 83 publications it released in 1987. 
733 P.Frankel, "The right: can culture be translated into power?" S.A. Foundation News, vol.14, no.1, February 1988, p.3. 
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emotions like fear, confusion, anger and frustration, which "total onslaught" ideology sought to repress by projecting 
conscription as a proud patriotic duty, the road to manhood, and the last bulwark of white security. State-sponsored 
smears therefore attempted to undermine the credibility of the ECC and thereby its counter interpretation of South 
African realities and its call to end conscription. Sociologist E.Said refers to the "social authority" of patriotism, in 
fortifying people's sense of group identity as a means of security.734 Attempts to smear the ECC consequently 
emphasised its "otherness", demarcating it as outside of white norms, with the implication that its priorities and agenda 
were in conflict with white interests. 
The graphic symbolism of smears included frequent use of red, with its connotations of danger, blood, and the Soviet 
bloc, while images of guns and vultures carried associations with death and destruction. Like the ECC, the anti-ECC 
groups also used pithy slogans to underline the graphic message. The VFV joked that the ECC had "a terminal 
stomach complaint: lack of guts"; while another group played on the ECC's acronym to suggest an opposing 
message, "Every Coward's Choice".735 
Significantly, many organisations opposed to the ECC used circles in their logos and graphics. VFV used a circle 
enclosing crosshairs aimed at a hammer-and-sickle symbol. Women for South Africa and the NSF enclosed a drawing 
of a soldier in a circle. The NSF had a fighter jet inside a circle. In contrast to the ECC's linear chain logo, with its 
image of breaking the chain of oppression, and movement towards a new and better South Africa, circles symbolised 
completeness, fulfilment and unity, reinforcing the importance of remaining within white consensus, and thus making a 
symbolic connection between continued white security and military power. 736 
Like the ECC's graphic messages, smears can be divided into a number of categories. The first attempted to 
undermine the ECC's credibility by reinforcing the tenets of "total onslaught": that conflict was externally created, and 
that its goal was conquest and the destruction of economic, political and social institutions that whites held dear. By 
reinforcing the state's decontextualised "good guy/bad guy" scenario of "total onslaught", smears thus justified the 
state's conscription demands by mobilising white fears. Whether presenting the ECC as a willing accomplice or a dim-
witted patsy, the graphic message of smears was that the ECC was in league with the country's enemies, and its call 
to end conscription was thus part of the "total onslaughr. 
734 E.Said, "Identity, negation and violence," New Left Review, no.171, 1988, p.59. 
735 Out of step, April 1987. 
736 Historical Papers AG 1977, folders C1-7, smear material of VFV, NSF & Women for South Africa. Graaf, Hawks and Doves, p.52. 
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Communications analysts suggest that propaganda works by creating "hooray" and "boo" concepts, the repetition 
of which leads to a conditioned response to certain words and images. The SABC was a prime source of state visual 
propaganda. News reports depicted the UDF, ANC and SACP in terms of random violence rather than political 
frustration. Political enemies were further dehumanised by largely featuring as statistics, or faceless mobs, while only 
the security forces and white victims were named in newscasts.737 The ANC and SACP were automatic "boo" 
concepts because of their association with the "external threat". By continually associating the UDF with the ANC and 
SACP, together with its role in organising protest marches and funerals, it also became a "boo" word for many whites. 
Smears against the ECC frequently concentrated on building a visual association between the ECC, and the UDF, the 
ANC, and the SACP, to facilitate a similar instinctive negative reaction. 738 
The Port Elizabeth-based NSF affiliate, Positiewe Studente Organisasie (PSO), for example, put out a graphic 
showing a hand of cards, labelled Freedom Charter, ANC, UDF, ECC, while the hand fanning them out wore a 
hammer-and-sickle cufflink. Using the concept that a winning hand in cards relies on the relationship between the 
cards, so the graphic implied a common basis to the organisations named, while the cufflink suggested that all these 
organisations were in fact controlled by the Soviet superpower. In similar vein, the PSO issued "Birds of a feather flock 
together", which showed a row of vultures, identified by the hammer-and-sickle logo and the acronyms ANC, NUSAS, 
and UDF, perched on an ECC chain. This emphasised the symbiotic relationship between these groups, and the fact 
that the ECC was being used by the others (Figure 33).739 
A full-page NSF Sunday Times advertisement implored, "Don't let the ECC gamble with peace",740 and this concept 
was subsequently developed into a red, white and black poster, suggesting the ECC was playing Russian roulette with 
peace (Figure 34). The impact was heightened by the fact that the gun pointed directly at the viewer, demanding a 
response, and creating a visual message that this issue directly affected the viewer. The peace motif on the gun set 
up a visual dissonance, forcing the viewer to choose between the conflicting messages of peace or war, and raising 
questions about the motives of the peace organisations. The ring on the gunman's hand carried a hammer-and-sickle 
symbol, once more inviting the viewer to recognise the controlling influence of the Soviets, while the colours 
encouraged an emotional awareness of danger.741 
737 Graaf, Hawks and Doves, pp.22 & 25. 
738 lbid, p.7. 
739 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder C4, ~. vol.1, no.1. 
m Sunday Times 6October1985. 
741 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder Q2.2, Russian roulette graphic. 
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The use of gambling images in these two graphics further reinforced the message that the ECC's call was risky, 
while official condemnation of gambling at the time intensified the impact of the visual link between the ECC and 
"disreputable" activities. The association of the ECC with irresponsible actions was further developed by the Women 
for South Africa pamphlet "The dangerous game of the ECC".742 
An Aida Park.er Newsletter cartoon of people sewing a peace banner by unravelling the threads of the South African 
flag illustrated the contention that the peace movement was undermining South Africa. A number of the figures were 
depicted as wearing glasses, to entrench visually the message that this group was shortsighted and unable to see the 
long-term dangers of its policies (Figure 35). Other figures looked like children, a graphic suggestion that the group 
was naive or immature. Another cartoon was more aggressive, portraying the ECC as a mad dog destroying the 
SADF logo, while the controlling hand of the smug, smiling master with the hammer-and-sickle on his lapel again 
directed attention to the contention that the ECC was merely following the orders of its "master", the USSR (Figure 
36).743 
The visual message that the ECC was controlled by communist Russia was thus the most frequent theme of smears. 
A leaflet showed the letters "ECC" gradually metamorphosing into a hammer-and-sickle, the graphic message 
reinforced by the slogan "One and the same".744 A cartoon in a VAT newsletter showed an emaciated ECC puppet, 
with dark glasses to symbolise the blindness of the organisation to how it was being manipulated, with the KGB bear 
pulling the strings (Figure 37).745 A VFV leaflet had the hammer-and-sickle striking into South Africa, secured by 
the ECC chain (Figure 38).746 The Aida Park.er Newsletter carried a cartoon of a Soviet filling in the grave of the free 
world, with the slogan "We will bury you so gently you won't even know you're dead" (Figure 39).747 The shovel bore 
the logo "World peace movements" and the use of a peace symbol underlined the idea that peace movements were 
unwitting allies of a devious plot, and that without vigilance and countermeasures Soviet infiltration would undermine 
the values of the west. The association of the ECC with communism also played on whites' fears, that, as the richest 
group in the country, they had most to lose from political and economic changes to the system of government. Smears 
thus continued the "total onslaught" thrust, directing white South Africans to identify with the east/west struggle, rather 
than the specifically South African context of the conflict. 
742 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder C6, 'The dangerous game of the ECC'. 
743 Aida Parker Newsletter. issue 102, March 25 1987, pp.9&13. 
744 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder C, 'One and the same' anonymous pamphlet. 
745 VAT newsletter. vol.1, no.2. 
746 Documentation Centre for African Studies, ACC 326, VFV pamphlet (undated). 
747 Aida Parker Newsletter, issue 102, March 25 1987, p.8. 
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While the Aida Park.er Newsletter and VFV smears were more generally targeted, it is significant that much of the 
smear material was aimed at students. Since this group was more open to alternative messages, the intention seems 
to have been to emphasise the risks of alternatives to "reformed" apartheid. As the graphic war intensified, even the 
Aida Parker Newsletter, which had previously featured pages of written diatribe against the ECC - some 12 pages of 
text in its 8 April 1986 issue - began to feature many more cartoons and graphics to make the articles more 
accessible and appealing.748 
As the conflict within South Africa escalated, the ECC's call for peace seems to have become a particular threat. 
Smear graphics showed the dove of peace carrying a hammer-and-sickle in place of the traditional olive branch, 749 
and flying towards the hammer-and-sickle carrying the slogan "The war called peace· .750 These images reinforced the 
state's contention that any call to limit South Africa's "defensive" capacity was playing into the hands of the enemy, 
and suggested the peace movement was not what it seemed, but was rather part of the "total onslaught". The End the 
End Conscription Campaign explicitly claimed "Stop the call up and peace will fly out of the window". 751 This kind of 
smear was intended to exacerbate white fears about majority rule. While few in the townships would have described 
the ongoing conflict and security force presence as "peace", the smears were aimed at a white constituency whose 
geographic, political and social distance from blacks made them more credulous, particularly when their own interests 
were at stake. 
In addition to repudiating the ECC's depiction of the conflict and its call for a just peace, graphic smears actively 
promoted national service. A NSF graphic showed lines of armed marching soldiers with the logo "We are South 
Africans and are here to stay"752 (Figure 40), making an explicit link between patriotism and military service, and 
implying that those who emigrated or refused to serve were not "real" South Africans. Smears also reinforced support 
for "reformed" apartheid. NSF material claimed to "support freedom and security", with the logo of a soldier encircled 
by the words "I will serve". This typified "reformed" apartheid thinking, that present norms could only be maintained by 
controlled reform, and protected by military power, which in tum relied on everyone doing his "duty". A similar concept 
was the more openly macho VFV slogan "peace through strength".753 An Aida Parker Newsletter graphic contrasted 
the purported ECC image of the SADF as an armed barbarian, with the ANC's image of South Africa without the 
748 The Aida Parker Newsletter. issue 102, March 25 1987, for example, featured an unprecedented number of cartoons. 
749 Ibid., p.1. 
750 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder C4, NSF publication. 
751 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder C2, End the End Conscription material. 
752 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder C4, NSF pamphlet. 
753 Historical Papers AG 1977, folders C4 & 5, NSF and VFV material. 
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SADF, a target painted over South Africa.754 By reinforcing white fears about the ANC's ambitions this kind of 
smear was intended to promote acceptance of the continued need for the SADF, and to suggest that the ECC served 
the ANC's goals by undermining the SADF. Continued acceptance of the status quo was promoted by reinforcing 
fears of the unknown. 
The graphic counter campaign further exacerbated white fears by presenting the "enemy" as demonic, calculating, 
and violent. VAT, for example, created newsletters built on white outrage at bomb blasts and landmine attacks and the 
fears these engendered. Its publications also upheld conscript deaths as the greatest possible honour.755 Western 
Province Command put out a graphic of a bestial figure, with elongated teeth and nails, preparing to hurl a petrol 
bomb, while behind him was a necklace victim (Figure 41). The perpetrator wore the logos of the ANC, UDF and ECC, 
while his hat carried the hammer-and-sickle logo. The slogan of the graphic played on the ECC call for the SADF to 
get out of the townships, but the motivation was inverted by having the violent central figure make the call, with the 
explicit rider "So that we can terrorise the people in peace!" 756 
Smears against the ECC thus exploited the ambiguities of the freedom struggle, particularly the violence which was 
difficult for liberals to understand or accept. VFV, for example, put out a pamphlet to counter Ivan Toms' refusal to 
serve. Headed "We believe Dr Toms is wrong and here's why",757 two contrasting photographs showed a necklace 
victim burning, and a soldier playing soccer with township youth, a clear graphic suggestion of the consequences of 
not having the SADF in the townships and a graphic claim that the SADF was both accepted by the township 
residents and was promoting positive interracial relationships. 
Besides suggesting the ECC stood outside white norms of security, smears also depicted the ECC as being outside of 
gender norms. With national service being held up as the epitome of virile masculinity, General Magnus Malan called 
the ECC "mommy's little boys", implying their opposition reflected a lack of maturity, or a refusal to embrace manhood, 
with all its trials.758 The characterisation of the ECC as cowardly and effeminate was intended to make support for the 
ECC less appealing. This kind of counter campaign seems to have been most directly aimed at youth, where 
adulthood is frequently perceived as the gateway to power and privilege. 
754 Aida Parker Newsletter, issue 102, March 25 1987, pp.2-3. 
755 Victims Against Terrorism,~. August 1988. 
756 ~. 31-5-1987, p.1. 
757 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder CS.2, VFV, "We believe Dr Toms is wrong and here's why". 
758 Cock, Colonels and cadres, p.74. 
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Interviews with soldiers and the ECC's own research showed that even among those who did not explicitly support 
the SADF, the sense of camaraderie, the sophisticated equipment, and the sense of adventure and the achievement 
of overcoming obstacles were often viewed positively by conscripts.759 Smears thus attempted to build an association 
between military service and these factors, while denigrating the ECC as ineffectual bystanders. VFV newsletters 
suggested a mystical warrior cult, claiming "You have never lived until you have almost died".760 A NSF graphic of 
armed soldiers drilling761 reinforced the idea that national service built teamwork, discipline and responsibility. The 
symbols utilised in smears used the phallic associations of weaponry to reinforce the contention that military service 
was a valid and exclusive expression of masculinity, while the ECC was overtly accused of hiding behind "principles", 
while actually not being •man enough" to face the "discipline, physical training and discomfort".762 
Interestingly, though, a number of these graphics of soldiers had a sanitised quality, suggesting that the realities of 
soldiering were not universally appealing, particularly to mothers. Women for South Africa, for example, put out a logo 
in which the soldier resembled a boy scout rather than a soldier763 (Figure 42), while a VFV salute to soldiers showed 
a soldier looking more like something out of an Archie comic than the heroic but more overtly violent images in pro-
war comics like "Grensvegter", whose sentiments accorded with VFV ideals (Figure 43).764 
Smears represented ECC men as cowardly, spotty, weedy, effeminate, failed men or homosexuals, outside the 
"desirable" norm. VFV newsletters suggested that it was difficult to distinguish between the male and female members 
of the ECC,765 implying that men involved in the ECC were asexual or impotent, while also presenting the women as 
undesirably unfeminine. 
Significantly, when Ivan Toms decided to oppose his call-up in 1987 the ensuing smear campaign directly targeted his 
homosexuality. Posters claiming "ECC members are YellOIN", "ECC does it from behind" and "ECC believes in Fairy-
tales" appeared all over Cape Town,766 clearly attempting to reduce support for Toms and the ECC, undermining their 
credibility by presenting them as outside of "acceptable" white norms.767 Similarly, the VFV publication, "Queer birds 
these war resisters", 768 (Figure 44) included an obscured newspaper-style text, in which only a few phrases referring 
759 Price, A documentation of the exoeriences of military conscripts in the South African Defence Force, part II conscript interviews. Cock, Colonels 
~d cadres. p. 76. 
Graaf, Hawks and Doves, p.49. 
761 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder C4, NSF pamphlet "We are South Africans and here to stay". 
762 Graaf, Hawks and Doves, p.52. 
763 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder C6, "The dangerous game of the ECC" pamphlet. 
764 Graaf, Hawks and Doves, p.49. 
765 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder C5.2, VFV pamphlet (undated). 
766 ~1September1988. 
767 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder 88.7, ECC press release 28 April 1987. 
768 Sue Brittion's personal papers, "Queer birds these war resisters· pamphlet. 
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to the growing mobilisation of gays and lesbians could be read in full. A sidebar used the words "schoolchildren" 
and "playground" in describing growing pupil support for the ECC, to imply the ECC was an organisation which would 
only be attractive to the na"ive, immature, or those with a "deviant" agenda. The ostrich feet which accompanied the 
text implied that the ECC had its head in the sand, and that only those determined to ignore the "realities" of the South 
African situation would propose an end to conscription. 
The VFV smear, the "ECC bird or the leftwinger"769 (Figure 45), also showed a disoriented looking bird with labelled 
features: a hammer-and-sickle lodged in the throat from "swallowing ANC and communist junk", a broken beak from 
"pecking at all and any reforms in South Africa", and two left wings, so it could only fly in circles. Moreover, the bird 
looked like some species of poultry, putting it considerably lower in the food chain than the birds and animals of prey 
the SADF used to name its equipment and units, creating associations of power, superiority and nobility. Once again 
the graphic associated the ECC with immaturity, obstructionism and a lack of any positive direction, as well as with 
ineffectuality and powerlessness. 
Thus the graphic work of both the ECC and its detractors continued the conscription debate, contesting the nature of 
South African society and the conflict as well as the role of conscription, through symbols, slogans and emotional 
manipulation. ECC graphics claimed that the status quo was deeply flawed and challenged the viewer to participate in 
the process of change. Smear material called on the viewer to remain passive and to comply with the state's 
demands. By reinforcing white fears about change the state encouraged the protection of the status quo. ECC 
graphics emphasised the individual's frustrations and desires, and encouraged him or her to choose to participate in 
bringing about change. Smears emphasised the needs and security of the group, and the necessity for the individual 
to co-operate with the existing authorities in order to maintain white security. Smears used militaristic images to imply 
that the situation was under control because of the SADF, and to suggest that it would remain so if whites continued to 
comply with the state's conscription demands.770 
The state had enormous power to project a social construction of its opposition which fostered acceptance of "total 
onslaught" and its conscription demands.771 Yet despite its vastly inferior public access and resources, the ECC's 
graphic campaign was an important component in its opposition, allowing for an emotional articulation of the 
frustration of conscripts and the cost of the conflict. While it is impossible to quantify the precise impact of the graphic 
769 Historical Papers AG 1977, C5.2, "ECC bird or the leftwinger" pamphlet. 
770 Graaf, Hawks and ooves: the pro- and anti- conscription press in South Africa, p.12. 
771 Ibid., p.21. 
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campaign on whites, there can be little doubt that it significantly heightened awareness of the ECC among whites in 
general and ECC target groups in particular. The level of resources and concern expressed by the state in trying to 
counter the ECC's message further indicated that the ECC was perceived as posing a significant oppositional threat. 
Chapter Ten 
Conclusion. 
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In an analysis concentrating so specifically on the ECC it is easy to overstate its impact. The ECC was one part of 
a resistance movement which was primarily black, from trade union pressure on business to the township uprisings of 
scholars; from the internal pressure of the UDF to the externally conceived actions of the ANC and PAC. However, 
because the ECC emerged from within the privileged white group, it challenged the power of the state's ideology in a 
unique way. While white security fears limited the PFP's parliamentary opposition, the extra-parliamentary opposition 
of the ECC was not so constrained by the need to hold together a constituency. Rather its oppositional impact lay in 
encouraging whites to re-examine the cost:benefit ratio of the state's continuous conscription demands. 
In 1985 James Phillips, leader of the band the "Cherry-faced Lurchers", commented that South African rock music was 
very significant because "people need to have their troubles and their fears articulated".772 The accuracy of his 
comment was borne out by the 1988 commercial success of the song "Weeping" by the group "Bright Blue", which 
explored the use of the military in the South African conflict.773 It is fitting to conclude this examination of the ECC 
using the insights of this popular song, because culture was a very important means of drawing people to the ECC, 
and in tum, of exposing a variety of people to the ECC's oppositional message, lodging slogans, graphics, drama and 
music, like seeds, in white consciousness. Germination was hastened by factors outside the ECC's control, but as the 
socio-economic climate worsened, and as white families and individuals increasingly felt the negative effects of 
ongoing conflict and conscription demands, so the ECC's call for alternatives to military conscription took root.774 
The song "Weeping" described the conflict in South Africa through the metaphor of a monster who terrified everyone 
by its roaring, and had to be controlled by "a wall of steel and flame/and men with guns to keep it tame". As this study 
has shown, the state relied on white conscription for its physical perpetuation, and on its security discourse to maintain 
white ideological and political cohesion. Through "total onslaught" propaganda the state distracted white attention from 
the essentially political nature of the conflict, and, by portraying its political enemies as monstrous, destructive and 
defiling, legitimised military containment rather than negotiation as the solution. Throughout the ECC's existence white 
security fears remained a potent means of rallying white unity, and were used by the NP regularly at election time to 
ensure whites would return the party to power, as the best guarantor of white security. 
772 Wits Student, vol.37, no.715, May 1985. 
773 Bright Blue, •Weeping• from One world EMI records, 1988. The song reached number one on the Radio 5 charts. See Appendix Two. 
774 A review of the 1985 Cape Town ECC 'Art for Peace• exhibition, for example, was critical of the quality of some of the work but argued that •as 
socio-political comment by concerned artists, it deserves attention", Cape Times 9 October 1985. The ECC's focus on art, drama and music won it 
frequent media attention. "Forces Favourites", for example, was reviewed in the Financial Mail, a publication not particularly sympathetic to the 
ECC, Financial Mail 28 February 1986. 
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However, the state's ongoing conscription demands and its ability only to control the conflict, not to resolve it, 
meant that the issue of conscription had an inherently divisive power as whites continuously had to be convinced that 
the disruption of their personal and professional lives was necessary and worth the cost. The first part of the ECC's 
opposition challenge was thus to demonstrate to whites that the cost of conscription outweighed the benefits. By 
focusing both public and private white discontent on the conscription system the ECC widened the scope of objection 
beyond its own radical demand for the ending of conscription to a more moderate, and hence more widely acceptable, 
call for alternatives to purely military conscription. 
While the ECC experienced periods of growth around campaigns, suggesting it was winning support for its position, 
the rising emigration rate also indicated that by highlighting conscripts' stark choices the ECC had an indirect impact 
on white society, as a number of whites chose to leave rather than confront either township duty or jail. The ECC's 
oppositional impact was about more than manpower, however. The state's security discourse had become one of the 
few avenues for reinforcing cohesion among whites by directing their attention to a common self-interest. The state's 
ideological construction of the conflict was intended to encourage whites to perceive themselves as a group, united in 
its goals, facing a common enemy, sharing a common value system, and then to see the NP as the means of realising 
the ambitions and ensuring the security of this white "group". 775 An important part of the ECC's opposition was thus its 
call for alternatives to military conscription, and its focusing of white attention on divisive aspects of conscription, 
particularly the internal deployment of the SADF, which exacerbated white political divisions. This left the NP in a 
shrinking and increasingly directionless middle ground, unable to overcome either its reliance on conscription, or to 
offer whites sufficient incentives to stem the growing tide of criticism, from both the white left and right, of the state's 
handling of conscription and its containment of the conflict. 
While the ECC did gain a following between 1983 and 1988, the second significant point about the impact of its 
opposition is that it was not dependent on winning widespread white support. Many whites were insulated by apartheid 
so that they had little empathy with blacks, and often lacked understanding or knowledge of the effects of apartheid on 
black communities. The apartheid state controlled broadcasting, school education, publications, and through security 
legislation could muffle, if not entirely quash, protest. Extra parliamentary opposition thus remained largely a fringe 
activity for whites and the government presented its proponents as deviant in one way or another. Whites were also 
made uncomfortable by extra-parliamentary opposition because its demands were radical in the sense that they 
challenged the entire structure of the apartheid system rather than particular symptoms, questioned the moral heart of 
775 Sharp & Boonzaier, South African keywords : the uses and abuses of oolitical conceots, p.6. 
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apartheid rather than particular policies, and advocated cures which were enormously frightening for whites who 
had been raised for generations with a "them and us" mentality, which tended to conceive of change primarily in terms 
of the loss of white power and privilege. 
On one level it thus seems incredible that the ECC should have been a threat to the apartheid state at all. A tiny 
organisation, comprising at its peak no more than between 15 and 80 active members in each of nine urban 
regions, 776 the ECC never had an organisational reach beyond the major cities. It did not penetrate far into the 
Afrikaans community, and even in the English community its support base was primarily drawn from the middle-class 
academic, liberal and church groupings which had called it into being in the first place. Throughout its existence 
military analysts insisted the apartheid state was still militarily powerful, while conscript reporting figures remained 
relatively constant. Yet the state regarded the ECC as a sufficient threat to target it specifically in the 1986 emergency 
regulations, to mount a disinformation campaign directly aimed at the organisation, and finally to ban it in August 
1988. 
The oppositional force of the ECC did not lie in its ability to mobilise large sections of the white community to oppose 
conscription, but in its publicising the essentially divisive issue of conscription. This created a challenge which the 
state could neither wholly contain by repression, nor wholly disarm by acceding to its demands, so that neither the 
white left nor the right were satisfied. While the state tried to control the ECC's opposition through repression, this 
stimulated liberal criticism. Yet as long as the ECC could be heard, the right wing criticised the state for having lost 
control. The situation was thus much like the one described in "Weeping". While the protagonist insisted the threat 
was under "firm contror, the onlooker noted that "the fear and the fire and the guns remain". As long as conscription 
remained, the ECC had a platform, both to remind whites that control came at a cost, and to question the morality of 
that control, while its public presence exacerbated existing political tensions among whites. 
In "Weeping", as the onlooker approached the monster he realised it was not roaring, but weeping. In the same way, 
the third reason why the ECC played a significant opposition role is that it offered whites an alternative version of 
reality, one which inverted the heroes and villains, and questioned the morality of accepted norms.777 People drawn to 
the ECC were predominantly those already committed to the idea that the black majority was weeping in pain. 
776 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder A2.1, national committee regional reports 3 May 1987. 
777 This was particularly difficult in a society bombarded on all sides by "total onslaught" propaganda. On a radio talk show in 1999, a caller relived 
his incredulity at being a conscript undergoing a briefing session on how the ANC embodied evil, when the briefing was disbanded due to the 
announcement that the ANC had just been unbanned. He recalled his struggle to come to terms with the sense of being a pawn, deceived by the 
very authorities which were asking him to risk his fife in battle. The majority of whites were not confronted with the extent of the state's manipulation 
of the security discourse until well after the ECC had been banned. Even after the disclosures of the TRC, it seems that a number of whites will 
never fully beHeve that "their" government could be so expedient. Radio 702 The David O'Sullivan Show, 2 February 1999. 
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However the impact of the ECC came not from attempting to oppose the state's portrayal of the liberation 
movement as a roaring monster which must be kept at bay by military force powered by white conscripts. Rather, it 
articulated the increasing fears and frustrations of whites, which the state was trying to repress behind its discourse of 
patriotic duty. The ECC focused not on the monster's weeping, but on the weeping of those manning the barricades, 
encouraging whites to recognise that they, too, were in pain as conscription tore families apart, and caused individuals 
to suffer mentally, physically and economically. 
In their comprehensive study of CO wor1dwide, Moskos and Chambers suggested that the emergence of the modern 
western concept of the individual has played a significant role in shifting the emphasis from duty to the group to the 
rights of the individual.778 Tom Waspe of JODAC argued that the significance of white extra-parliamentary opposition 
was to organise the ruling dass against its own interests, but the particular contribution of the ECC was to use white 
self-interest as an opposition tool, suggesting to whites that their interests were not being served by the current 
system. Similarly, Beyers Naude argued that it was not possible to make inroads into white society in sufficient 
numbers for whites to change and make a significant contribution towards reform because they were too tied to the 
status quo by fear and self-interest. The ECC was able to make a difference, however, because it did not encourage 
whites to work for reform out of a change of heart, but used those very motivations of fear and self-interest to make 
whites question the costs of conscription.779 The power of white self-interest had kept the NP in power for a long time, 
but became a weapon against the NP when the ECC used it to encourage whites to demand alternatives to military 
service. 
Fourthly, while only sympathisers would recognise the few bars of opposition national anthem "Nkosi Siekel' iAfrika" 
woven into the refrain in "Weeping", this did not detract from the overall message of the song. In the same way, the 
more radical aspects of the ECC's call were never accepted by many whites, but as the status quo became 
increasingly untenable, the ECC's interim demands were adopted by sectors of white society outside of, and not 
necessarily sympathetic towards, the ECC. In 1986 General Malan told a conscript's wife that, because of the threat 
against South Africa, every able-bodied white man now had a second career in the military.780 By 1991 the SADF 
estimated some 500 conscripts emigrated per year, 781 suggesting that for a number of whites the costs of this "second 
career" were no longer worth the benefits. 
778 Moskos & Chambers, The new conscientious objection: from sacrec! to secular resistance, p.199. 
779 Frederikse, The unbreakable thread' non-racjaHsm jn South Africa, pp.222-223. 
780 DSD Ministry of Defence, group 5, MVN/61/1212, vot.62, box 221, letter from Magnus Malan 28 May 1986. 
781 DSD Reports, K97/1, box 371, provisional report on CO 30July1991, p.2. 
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While extra-parliamentary support for the ECC might be battered and bloodied by the state of emergency, by 1988 
the very moderation of the ECC's demands led to an avalanche of protest against conscription from the PFP, within 
the NGK, in the press and popular magazines, from the churches, universities, business and international supporters 
of the ECC, to the point that the state was forced to ban the ECC. The moderation of the ECC's demands thus 
intensified pressure on the state by widening the number of support bases, so that even opponents of the ECC 
encouraged a widening of the conditions of alternative service, convinced this would significantly undermine the 
ECC's momentum. Although the state's manpower needs were decreasing with the increased likelihood of a cease-
fire in Angola, the state could not afford to make concessions on conscription, since to do so would undermine the 
authority of its security discourse, which remained a critical means of containing white discontent - particular1y given 
the CP's gains in the 1987 general election - as by-elections loomed in October 1988. 
Lastly, the ECC was a significant opposition movement because it gave whites a place to work actively and creatively 
for change. Unlike the repeated refrain of "Weeping•, "It doesn't matter now, it's over anyhow", symptomatic of white 
feelings of impotence, a constant theme in interviews with ECC activists was their feeling of having been part of 
something entirely worthwhile. At the 1985 Cape Town "Troops Out" fast, Molly Blackbum told the audience "We must 
refuse to be pulled into a vortex of cynicism and despair. "782 The ECC gave whites a sense of being able to participate 
in the struggle for democracy at a meaningful level. No longer was it a case of "being the least obstruction".783 Rather, 
Durban ECC member Rob Goldman suggested the ECC gave whites more options than "guilt-ridden inertia" or 
emigration. 784 ECC campaigns offered whites a vision of a better alternative to the embattled present, as well as a way 
to contribute actively to the struggle for a more just, peaceful and equal society. 
In the context of bannings, detentions, violence, torture and executions, it seems incongruous to cast the period 
between 1983 and 1988 as an age of innocence, yet the ECC's very limited opposition goals and its emphasis on 
peace and justice gave the movement a unique sense of unity and a moral vocabulary which fostered an energising 
creativity, and offered a vision of opposition which was not only ethical, but was also fun. As the new South Africa 
manifests so much of the violence and power mongering, together with a continuation of much of the structural 
inequality of the old, it is difficult to recapture that sense of unity of purpose and clarity of goals, so that the ECC 
seems to belong to a different, simpler era.785 Yet the ECC was not na"ive. One of its core strengths was the ability to 
782 Historical Papers AG 1977, folder E1.1.2, Cape Town report on fast meeting. 
783 See footnote 130. 
784 Sunday Tribune 30 October 1988. 
785 Long-term ECC member, Gavin Evans, for example, in his book Dancing shoes is dead, detailed his growing disillusionment, with the realisation 
that the ANC, too, was peopled by mortals with faults and weaknesses, and concern about the endemic violence and crime in the new South Africa. 
G.Evans, Dancing shoes is dead (London, Transworfd Publishers, 2002) passim. 
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unite such a variety of individuals and organisations around the common conviction that apartheid was wrong, that 
the SADF was directly responsible for perpetuating the apartheid system, and therefore to undermine the one was to 
undermine the other. As soon as the possibility of a new political dispensation became a reality, the fragility of these 
alliances was revealed, but between 1983 and 1988 the common goal of ending conscription created a unique focus 
and unity within the democratic movement, and the ECC spearheaded a significant white extra-parliamentary 
challenge to apartheid. 
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Appendix Two: "Weeping" by Bright Blue. 
I knew a man who lived in fear 
it was huge it was angry 
it was drawing near 
Behind his house a secret place 
was the shadow of the demon 
he could never face. 
He built a wall of steel and flame 
and men with guns to keep it tame 
Then standing back he made it plain 
that the nightmare would never ever rise again 
But the fear and the fire and the guns remain. 
It doesn't matter now it's over anyhow 
He tells the world that it's sleeping 
But as the night came round I heard 
it slowly sound 
it wasn't roaring it was weeping 
it wasn't roaring it was weeping. 
SAX SOLO - Basil "Mannenburg" Coetzee 
And then one day the neighbours came 
they were curious to know about the smoke and flame 
They stood around outside the wall 
but of course there was nothing to be heard at all 
"My friends", he said, "we've reached our goal 
the threat is under firm control 
As long as peace and order reign 
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I'll be damned if I can see a reason to explain 
Why the fear and the fire and the guns remain". 
It doesn't matter now it's over anyhow 
He tells the world that it's sleeping 
But as the night came round I heard 
it slowly sound 
it wasn't roaring it was weeping 
it wasn't roaring it was weeping. 
It doesn't matter now it's over anyhow 
He tells the world that it's sleeping 
But as the night came round I heard 
it slowly sound 
it wasn't roaring it was weeping 
it wasn't roaring it was weeping. 
Composed by: Heymann/ Fox/ Cohen/ Cohen, from the album "One world" EMI records 1988. 
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